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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines property generalization among concepts. Its primary objective is 
to investigate the hypothesis that the more central a feature for a concept, the higher its 
generalizability to other concepts that share a similar structure (features and dependencies). 
Its secondary objectives are to examine the relative contributions o f feature centrality and 
feature variability in property induction, whether centrality offers a domain-general or a 
domain-specific constraint, and whether centrality can operate under conditions o f vagueness. 
Experiments 1 and 2 addressed the centrality hypothesis wi th centrality measured, 
whereas Experiments 3 to 14 and 17 with centrality manipulated. Relative feature centrality 
was manipulated as fol lows: f rom a single-dependency chain (Experiments 3 to 7), f rom the 
number o f properties that depended upon a feature (Experiments 8 to 11 and 17), and f rom the 
centrality o f the properties that depended upon the critical features (Experiments 12 to 14). 
The results support the centrality hypothesis. 
Experiments 12 to 16 addressed the relative contributions o f centrality and variability 
in property induction. Experiments 12 to 14 pitted a central and variable property against a 
less central and less variable property in judgments o f frequency and inductive strength. The 
results suggest that property induction depends on centrality rather than frequency 
information, and that centrality can bias the perception of frequency (although the latter 
results were not clear-cut). Experiments 15 and 16 pitted centrality against variability in 
information seeking. The results show that centrality information is sought more often than 
variability information to make an inference, especially amongst dissimilar concepts. 
Experiments 1 to 16 used animal categories. Experiment 17 examined the centrality 
hypothesis wi th artifact categories. The results show centrality effects. Taken together, the 
Experiments suggest that centrality offers a domain-general constraint. Experiments 5, 8 to 
11, and 17 left the properties that depended upon a candidate feature unspecified. A centrality 
effect was still obtained. The results suggest that centrality can operate under conditions o f 
vagueness. The results are discussed in terms o f theories o f conceptual structure and models 
o f category-based inference. A model to capture the present findings is also sketched. 
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One o f our fundamental capacities is using old beliefs to generate new ones. Whenever we do 
so, we have drawn an inference. Much everyday reasoning involves drawing inferences to 
reach conclusions about which we are uncertain. This type o f inference is known as induction 
(for a good introduction on inductive inference see Skyrms, 1975). Induction is an umbrella 
term for "all inferential processes that expand knowledge in the face o f uncertainty" (Holland, 
Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986, p . l ) . The present studies investigate category-based 
induction that involves generalizing properties among categories. We address why some 
properties are more generalizable than others and why the generalizability o f a property (or o f 
a type o f properties) depends on the specific premise and conclusion categories used. We 
propose that property induction is constrained by the immutability o f a feature for a concept, 
that is by the extent to which a feature is mentally transformable while retaining the concept's 
coherence. Under the supposition that concepts consist o f features embedded in networks o f 
asymmetric dependency relations, we assume that immutability can be surrogated by 
centrality in a concept's feature space. That is, we take a feature to be central (immutable) to 
the extent that other (central) features depend on it (cf. Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998). We 
investigate the hypothesis that the more central a feature in a category's representation, the 
higher its projectibility to other concepts that share its structure. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. We unpack the problem o f induction that we 
address, and present the terminology o f category-based inference. Then we highlight some 
robust effects o f category-based induction. A look at some formal models o f category-based 
inference fol lows, where we discuss their assumptions, successes and limitations. This 
discussion lays the background, experimental framework, and motivation for our proposal. 
Subsequently, we present our proposal o f conceptual centrality as an inductive constraint in 
detail - we clarify the representational assumptions and the way centrality is captured f rom 
those assumptions, we derive empirically testable hypotheses, and we motivate our research 
by conceptual and empirical evidence. Finally, we present the break down o f studies into 
experimental chapters, and the hypotheses that each experimental chapter addresses. 
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1.1 THE 'PROBLEM' OF INDUCTION 
The current research is an attempt towards solving the problem o f induction. To be 
clear, our research is not about solving the traditional problem o f induction, i.e. the problem 
o f whether induction can be logically justified (e.g. Hume, 1748/1988; Bonjour, 1992). Our 
starting point is that it is surely rational or reasonable to engage in inductive reasoning 
because otherwise we would not be able to learn from experience or to have expectations 
about the future - all o f our evidence would be about the past (see Harman, 1995). The 
problem o f induction that we address is this: Why are we more wi l l i ng to generalize certain 
(types of ) properties among categories rather than others? Why and how does the 
generalizability o f (types o f ) properties depend on the (kinds of ) categories involved? In the 
words o f M i l l (1843/1974): "Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete 
induction, while in others myriads o f instances, without a single exception known or 
presumed, go such a little way toward establishing a universal proposal?" (p. 314, cited in 
Nisbett, Jepson, Krantz, & Kunda, 1983, p. 342). In Goodman's (1955) terms, why are some 
properties more projectible than others? Why are we more confident, for instance, that a 
newly discovered mammal w i l l have a heart rather than furl Similarly, why are we more 
wi l l i ng to infer that a new refrigerator w i l l freeze food rather than it w i l l be white? 
--BACKGROUND ON CATEGORY-BASED INFERENCE— 
1.2 CATEGORY-BASED ARGUMENTS 
Arguments are statements with a set o f premises fol lowed by a conclusion. 
Categorical arguments are arguments o f the general form Members of category A have 
property X, therefore members of category B have property X^, where property X remains 
constant across the premise and conclusion categories, and A and B are (psychologically) 
simple categories like robin, tomato, and bicycle. For instance, Eagles have an ulnar artery; 
1 Henceforth arguments and predicates are italicized. 
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therefore falcons have an ulnar artery, is a categorical argument. Categorical arguments are 
frequently depicted vertically as in the example below, 
Eagles have an ulnar artery 
Falcons have an ulnar artery 
The statement above the dotted line is the premise o f the argument and is assumed to be true, 
and the statement below the dotted line is the argument's conclusion. 
The predominant measure o f the strength o f a categorical argument is argument 
strength or psychological strength. Argument strength refers to the extent to which belief in 
the premises o f an argument leads to belief in its conclusion. Mere conviction inspired by the 
conclusion o f an argument (independent o f its premise) is not sufficient for psychological 
strength. To make the point clear, consider the fo l lowing argument: 
Doves are white 
Refrigerators are white 
The conclusion o f this argument is credible; most refrigerators are in fact white. However, 
this argument is psychologically weak since the belief in the argument's conclusion was not 
transmitted f rom belief in its premise. (For a detailed discussion o f argument strength see 
Osherson, Smith, & Shafir, 1986). 
Two main aspects can be distinguished in a categorical argument: its premise and 
conclusion categories and the candidate property. In vertical depictions, these parts refer 
respectively to the left- and the right-hand sides o f a categorical argument. The relation 
between an argument's premise and conclusion categories, as wel l as aspects o f the candidate 
property both seem to contribute (though not necessarily independently) to its strength. Below 
we highlight the main findings o f category-based induction in 3 sections reflecting this 
distinction. Our discussion is limited to specific single-premise arguments since these are the 
13 
arguments the present research investigated. (For an up-to-date thorough review on inductive 
inference see Heit, in press). 
1.3 MAIN EFFECTS OF CATEGORY-BASED INFERENCE 
1.3.1 Category effects 
Some researchers studied category effects on induction by using predicates about 
which their participants had few beliefs such as have the neurotransmitter dihedron, secrete 
uric acid crystals, or have a communicable disease (e.g. Osherson, Smith, Wilkie , Lopez, & 
Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 1993). The idea behind the use o f such predicates (named 
blank) is that they allow us to study belief transmission between categories while keeping 
background knowledge effects at a minimum 2 . Under this assumption arguments using blank 
predicates have been depicted in the format "premise category/conclusion category" 
suppressing the blank predicate used. The argument, Falcons have an ulnar artery; therefore 
eagles have an ulnar artery, for example, has been depicted as "Falcons/Eagles". Properties 
and therefore property effects are not considered. Argument strength is captured by the 
conditional probability o f the conclusion given the premise. 
Studies using blank predicates repeatedly reveal that argument strength is an 
increasing function o f three aspects o f the argument's categories: 
1. The similarity between the premise and conclusion category 
2. The typicality o f the premise category 
3. The specificity (homogeneity) o f the conclusion category 
2 Blank predicates have also the advantage of retaining a task's meaningfulness. That is, it is 
meaningful to ask participants for their confidence in projecting blank predicates since there must be a 
correct answer to such queries; e.g. eagles either do or do not have an ulnar artery. Asking participants 
about abstract predicates, such as has substance z, though it would (presumably) prevent participants 
from bringing background knowledge to bear in the task, it would increase the task's vagueness - it is 
unclear whether there is a right answer to such a question. 
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Premise-conclusion similarity. A l l else being equal, the more similar a conclusion 
category to the premise category the stronger the inference. This is known as the premise-
conclusion similarity phenomenon and was first discovered by Rips (1975). Rips asked adult 
participants to imagine that on an island all members o f a particular species o f animals (the 
premise category) had a new type o f contagious disease. Participants were then asked to 
estimate the proportion o f various other species o f animals (the target categories) that also had 
the disease. Rips found that the greater the similarity between the premise and the target 
categories (measured as a distance in a multidimensional scale solution) the stronger the 
inference. For instance, inferences f rom rabbits to dogs were stronger than inferences f rom 
rabbits to bears. The premise-conclusion similarity effect is very robust. It has been 
demonstrated wi th adults (e.g. Osherson et al., 1990; Osherson, Stern, Wilkie , Stob, and 
Smith, 1991; Sloman, 1993), young children (e.g. Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1988), infants (e.g. 
Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 1993; Mandler and McDonough, 1996), and highly diverse 
populations such as North American students and Itzaj Mayans (e.g. Lopez, Atran, Coley, 
Medin, & Smith, 1997). 
Premise typicality. A l l else being equal, the more typical a premise category to its 
superordinate category, the stronger the inference. This is known as the premise-typicality 
phenomenon. Rips (1975), for instance, found that arguments having bluejay (a typical 
American bird) as a premise category were rated as stronger than arguments having goose as 
a premise category. The premise typicality effect is also very robust. (For further studies with 
adults see Osherson et al, 1990; Osherson et al., 1991; for studies with young children see 
Carey, 1985; Lopez, Gelman, Gutheil, and Smith, 1992; for cross-cultural studies see Lopez 
et a l , 1997). 
The effects o f premise typicality are not reducible to the effects o f premise-
conclusion similarity (at least for models that view similarity as a symmetric relation). The 
best evidence for this comes perhaps f rom the premise-conclusion asymmetry phenomenon. 
Inferences f rom typical to atypical categories (e.g. an inference f rom robins to chicken) are 
generally judged stronger than inferences f rom atypical to typical categories (e.g. an inference 
15 
f r o m chickens to robins) even though the premise-conclusion similarity remains fixed (see 
e.g. Carey, 1985; Osherson et al., 1990). 
Conclusion specificity. Finally, all else being equal, the more specific - the lower 
down in the taxonomy - a conclusion category (e.g. Belgian shepherd is a more specific 
category than dog which is more specific than mammal) the stronger the inference. This is 
known as the conclusion specificity phenomenon (Osherson et al., 1990). Osherson et al. 
(1990) found, for instance, that an argument having bird as a conclusion category was rated 
stronger than an argument having animal as a conclusion category. (For related evidence that 
the scope o f a conclusion category constrains induction see McDonald, Samuels, & Rispoli, 
1996). To the extent that more specific categories are more homogeneous, the more general 
conclusion might be that the more homogeneous a conclusion category the stronger an 
inference (see Gelman, 1988; Heit, in press; Nisbett et al, 1983). 
To summarize, categories do matter a lot in category-based inference. Specifically, 
the similarity between the premise and conclusion categories, the typicality o f the premise 
category, and the homogeneity o f the conclusion category all promote strong arguments 
1.3.2 Property effects 
Specifics of the candidate properties also play a critical role on judged argument 
strength. Some properties are more projectible than others (for evidence wi th adults see 
Nisbett et al, 1983; for evidence with children see Gelman, 1988, and Gutheil & Gelman, 
1997; for evidence with infants see Mandler & McDonough, 1998). Nisbett et al. (1983), for 
instance, asked participants to imagine that they were explorers on a remote island where they 
observed a sample o f instances (animals, objects, or people) all o f which had a property. Their 
task was to guess the percentage o f other instances o f the same type having that property. For 
instance, participants were informed that 3 individuals o f a tribe were observed all o f who 
were obese and had brown skin. Based on this fact they were asked to estimate the percentage 
o f the individuals o f the tribe that shared each characteristic. Participants judged that a higher 
percentage o f individuals would have brown skin than they would be obese. Nisbett et al. 
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claimed that this was because the former property was perceived as more homogeneous than 
the latter. Their claim was supported by participants' reports. 
In summary, on the top of categories, candidate properties also matter a great deal. 
But what decides which properties are projectible and which are not? To say that some 
properties are more projectible because they are believed to be more homogeneous is to say 
no more than humans are able to reason statistically - this in fact was the point that Nisbett et 
al. (1983) wanted to make with their study. 
1.3.3 Property by category effects 
Projectibility is not an attribute that features have in vacuum. Rather the effect of a 
property of an argument critically depends on the argument's categories. For instance, color 
may be fairly projectible between different types of polar animals, but not between different 
types of animals. Generally, evidence suggests that the effect of a (kind of) property on 
projectibility depends on the extent to which an argument's categories are similar in terms of 
the relations and attributes that are meaningfully connected to the candidate property. (For 
evidence with adults see Heit & Rubinstein, 1992; Ross & Murphy, 1999; Sloman, 1994, 
1997; Smith, Shafir, & Osherson, 1993; for evidence with children see Gelman & Markman, 
1986; Kalish & Gelman, 1992). 
Heit and Rubinstein (1994), for instance, found that for the anatomical property has a 
liver with two chambers inferences were stronger from hawks to chickens than from tigers to 
chickens, whereas for the behavioral property prefers to feed at night the order of the 
preference was reversed (cited in Heit, 1997). They claimed that there are (at least) two 
distinct types of similarity: anatomical and behavioral. An inference is strong to the extent 
that the type of the candidate property matches the type of similarity between the premise and 
conclusion categories. Notice that to the extent that the properties Heit and Rubinstein 
considered were blank, their results challenge the existence of blank predicates; perhaps all 
predicates enter the reasoning process. 
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But what does it mean to be meaningfully related to a candidate feature? What types 
of relations and properties matter? Lassaline (1996), using both abstract and concrete animal 
categories, showed that a feature is projectible to the extent that it is causally related to a 
property that the target shares. The strength of the argument: 
Animal A has loose tensor tympani and frequent migraines 
Animal B has loose tensor tympani 
Animal B has frequent migraines 
should increase by adding the premise For animal A loose tensor tympani cause frequent 
migraines. (The properties in this example are my own). Notice that without the added 
premise Animal A and Animal B share a property, whereas with the added premise they share 
a causal antecedent. Lassaline's studies provided evidence that argument strength is 
constrained by the principle of systematicity (see Gentner, 1983, 1989). According to this 
principle, a match of a connected system of relations is preferred to a match of an equal 
number of unconnected relations (this point will be elaborated when we wil l present 
structural-mapping models of category-based inference). 
Keil and his colleagues (in preparation, cited in Keil, 1995) have shown an abstract 
type of property by type of category interaction in category-based inference with children, an 
interaction that can not be attributed to (specific) causal knowledge. A group of children were 
presented, for instance, with an ambiguous picture labeled as 'rock' while another group with 
the same picture labeled as 'frog'. Participants were shown two other pictures and had to 
choose the one that belonged to the same category as the target object. The results showed 
that when the property was labeled as 'frog', shape rather than color and surface markings 
were important. When the same entity was labeled as 'rock', color and surface markings 
became more important. Keil (1995) presented studies that showed a similar property by 
category interaction while using pictures vaguely described as either novel animals, or novel 
machines. Once again it seems that the projectibility of a property depends on the respect to 
which the premise and conclusion categories are similar. Critically because the objects that 
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Keil and his colleagues used were by definition novel, the knowledge underlying children's 
judgments should be in the form of abstract pre-theoretical biases rather than of concrete 
causal knowledge. 
To summarize, properties (perhaps even blank properties) enter the reasoning process 
by potentiating some aspects of the premise category. Arguments are strong to the extent that 
the conclusion category shares those aspects. The general case seems therefore to be that the 
effect of properties on projectibility is intertwined with the effect of categories. A critical 
question is what types of properties and relations does a candidate feature potentiate. 
Lassaline (1996) and Wu and Gentner (1998) claim it is those properties that are causally 
related to the candidate feature. Sloman (1994, 1997) and Smith et al. (1993) assume (at least 
for explainable predicates) it is properties that are relevant in explaining the predicate. 
Interestingly, Keil and his colleagues demonstrated that some property effects cannot be 
explained in terms of specific causal knowledge but rather in terms of vague pre-theoretical 
biases. 
1.4 MODELS OF CA TEGORY-BA SED INFERENCE 
Having discussed the three main findings associated with single-premise categorical 
arguments, we turn to various models of category-based inference and briefly discuss the 
extent to which each addresses these basic effects. 
1.4.1 Category-based inference models for blank predicates 
The similarity-coverafie model. Osherson et al. (1990) advanced the similarity-
coverage model (SCM) as an attempt to capture category-based induction with blank 
predicates. The model assumes that categories are represented by exemplars and that they are 
structured in stable hierarchical representations. The model predicts that argument strength 
increases with (i) the degree to which the premise and conclusion categories are similar (the 
similarity component), and (ii) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to the 
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lowest level category that includes both the base and conclusion categories (the coverage 
component). In the special case of single-premise arguments premise coverage reduces to the 
typicality of the premise category to the least inclusive superordinate category. 
The model can capture all three main category effects. The similarity component 
directly captures premise-conclusion similarity effects. The coverage component directly 
accounts for premise typicality effects. The model can also capture some conclusion-
specificity effects to the extent that the more specific a conclusion category the better the 
premise covers it (e.g. robins cover better the category birds than the more inclusive category 
animals). In fact, the model can successfully account for an impressive array of a dozen or so 
phenomena associated with blank biological predicates. 
The feature-coverage model. As an alternative to Osherson et al.'s similarity-
coverage model, Sloman (1993) advanced the feature-coverage model (FCM). The FCM 
diverges from the similarity-coverage model in that it does not assume a hierarchical 
structure, but instead it represents categories at all levels (i.e. basic (e.g. Elephant), 
subordinate (e.g. Indian Elephant), and superordinate (e.g. Mammal)) as vectors of values 
over a set of features. The model consists of a network of n features (input units), which are 
used to represent categories, and a single output unit, which is used to represent the candidate 
property (see Figure 1.1). The model assumes a two-stage process. During the first stage, the 
premise category is encoded as a vector of weights by connecting all the features that 
represent the premise category to the candidate property. In the second stage, the conclusion 
is tested by examining the activation of the candidate property (output unit) upon the 
presentation of the features that represent the conclusion category. Figure 1.1 illustrates the 
process. Roughly, an argument is predicted as strong to the extent that the conclusion 
category shares features with the premise category and has a few distinctive features of its 
own. The feature-coverage model takes advantage of the automatic generalization of 
distributed representations to project a property between categories on the basis that the 
features of the premise categories cover those of the conclusion category. 
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of the feature-coverage model for the argument "Robins 
have an ulnar artery; therefore falcons have an ulnar artery". 
Stage 1. After encoding the premise Stage 2. Testing the conclusion 
"Robins have an ulnar artery" "Falcons have an ulnar artery" 
(output unit) c > (output unit) 
O O O O O O O O 
Feature: 1 ... i ... j ... n Feature: 1 ... i ... j ... n 
Robin: 0 1 1 0 Falcon: 0 0 1 0 
Note. A feature value of 0 means that the category does not have the property, a 
value of 1 means that it does. 
The FCM can also account for the three main category effects. It readily captures 
premise-conclusion similarity effects since the activation of the predicate upon the 
presentation of the conclusion category is proportional to the premise-conclusion feature 
overlap. The model can also account for premise typicality effects to the extent that atypical 
conclusion categories (e.g. ostrich) have more idiosyncratic features than typical conclusion 
categories (e.g. robin). Finally, the FCM could account for conclusion-specificity effects to 
the extent that the more specific a conclusion category the more properties it shares with the 
premise. In fact, the FCM can account for roughly the same array of phenomena associated 
with blank predicates as the SCM. 
Sloman (1998) provided further empirical support for his model by showing that, at 
least under certain circumstances, participants appear to ignore the hierarchical structure of 
categories. For example, many participants did not assign a maximum strength for inferences 
from birds to robins or from birds to ostriches, but rather their estimates were proportional to 
the premise-conclusion similarity. This result directly supports the feature-coverage model 
and challenges the similarity-coverage model's assumption of stable hierarchies. 
Hampton (1982) provides further evidence against the idea of pre-stored hierarchies 
by demonstrating intransitivities. He found, for instance, that people are willing to accept that 
car seats are kinds of chairs and that chairs are kinds of furniture, but denied that car seats 
are kinds of furniture. I f concepts were hierarchically organized in memory, the claim goes, 
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and furniture is a superordinate of chairs which is a superordinate of car seats, then it should 
automatically follow that car seats are kinds of furniture. (For further evidence of 
intransitivity see Kempton, 1978; Randall, 1976). 
Limitations. Although the Osherson et al. (1990) SCM and the Sloman (1993) FCM 
models can capture an impressive array of phenomena, their scope is limited. They cannot 
(nor do they claim to) capture property or property by category effects. To capture property 
by category effects a model should at least allow flexibility in the comparison between the 
premise and conclusion categories. To capture the findings of Lassaline (1996), for example, 
a model should represent somehow causal inter-property relations and offer a mechanism to 
compare such structured representations. However, neither model assumes relational structure 
nor is flexible in comparing representations. 
The need to capture relational structure is pressing because conceptual arguments 
strongly suggest that category representations cannot simply involve a summation of features. 
A summation of features such as barks, has a tail, and has two eyes, for instance, would fail 
to capture dog since these properties in a weird arrangement, say putting the eyes in the tail, 
would not sum up to a dog but perhaps to a Picasso painting (Hahn & Chater, 1997, see also 
Murphy & Medin, 1985). Taking the argument from a different angle, to the extent that 
category-based inference is determined by similarity (like the SCM and the FCM assume) and 
similarity is influenced by inter-property relations, then argument strength should also be 
influenced by such relations. Recent experimental evidence suggests that relations do 
influence similarity judgments (Goldstone, Medin, & Gentner 1991; Goldstone, 1994b). 
Hence, relations should also influence category-based inference. 
The scope of the SCM and FCM models seems even more limited in the face of Heit 
and Rubinstein's (1994) findings of property by category effects for properties that 
(presumably) fall within the models' pre-described domain (i.e., the domain of blank 
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predicates). Heit and Rubinstein's findings are damaging to both models to the extent that the 
properties they considered were blank3. 
To summarize, without doubt the similarity-coverage model and the feature-coverage 
model have increased our understanding of category-based inference. However, the scope of 
these models is limited. It is uncertain how these models can scale up to deal with non-blank 
predicates. 
1.4.2 Category-based inference models for non-blank predicates 
Structural-mapping models. In contrast to models that view concepts as composed of 
exemplars or unstructured lists of attributes, structural-mapping models view category 
representations as composed of features embedded in hierarchical structures of relations (e.g. 
Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Goldstone, 1994a; Goldstone & 
Medin, 1994 a, 1994 b; Markman & Gentner, 1993 a, 1993 b). Object comparison is seen as a 
process of structural alignment between representations; a process that puts the 
representations of the premise (commonly known as the base in this literature4) and 
3 According to Osherson et al. (1990) blank predicates "...involve predicates about which subjects in 
our experiments have few beliefs." (p. 186). According this definition, the blankness of a predicate for 
a given individual depends on whether that individual is familiar with the predicate. Some of the 
predicates that Heit and Rubinstein consider, e.g., prefers to feed at night seem to fall short of the mark. 
Yet it is still unclear how one could independently measure property blankness. One possibility is to 
ask for the unconditional probability of the premise and conclusion statements; e.g., How likely is it 
that eagles have an ulnar artery? Even if such probability estimates are gathered, how is one to interpret 
them? Does no knowledge equate with a probability of 0, .5, or any probability whatsoever? 
Sloman and Wisniewski (1992) provide a different definition of blankness: a predicate is blank as 
long as people cannot explain the relation between predicate and category. Notice that this definition 
diverges from Osherson et al.'s in that it emphasizes the need to consider a property as it relates to 
categories rather than in isolation. In the argument Collies hate salted peanuts, therefore Siamese cats 
hate salted peanuts, for instance, hate salted peanuts is a familiar but unexplainable predicate and 
hence according to their definition blank. Sloman and Wisniewski provided empirical evidence that the 
domain of the feature-coverage model (and presumably the domain of the similarity-coverage model as 
well) can be extended as to include familiar but unexplainable predicates (for inductive inference about 
explainable predicates see Sloman, 1994, 1997). 
In a circular sense, the properties that Heit and Rubinstein studied are not blank according to the 
Sloman and Wisniewski definition since they produced different inductive strength orderings for 
arguments that shared premise and conclusion categories. To avoid such circularity, one needs to 
devise a test for blankness independent of the process studied. It is not clear how such a test can be 
devised. 
4 Structural-mapping models are most associated with literature on analogy. Such models, however, 
readily extend to cases of literal similarity. Literal similarity and analogy are seen as two types 
(continua) of similarity the first one involving lots of relational and attribute matches, while the latter 
lots of relational but few attribute matches (see e.g. Gentner, 1989). 
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conclusion (commonly known as the target in the same literature) categories into a 
correspondence (alignment). Inference is seen as a direct consequence of this structural-
mapping process. 
The structural-alignment process is carried out by the structural-mapping engine 
(SME) which determines the maximally structurally consistent alignment between two 
representations. A structurally-consistent alignment is one that obeys (1) a one-to-one 
mapping (each element of the base maps to at most one element of the target object), and (2) 
parallel connectivity ( i f one element of the base is matched with an element of the target, then 
their arguments must correspond as well). The maximally structurally consistent mapping is 
determined by the principle of systematicity. According to this principle there is a built-in 
bias to show a preference to match common rather than isolated systems of relations 
(Gentner, 1983, 1989). A match of a connected system of relations is preferred to a match of 
an equal number of unconnected relations. 
At the end of the comparison process the system is left with a maximally structurally 
consistent mapping between the representations. Properties that are connected to the resulting 
system of relations that are present in the base but absent in the target constitute potential 
inferences (see Clement & Gentner, 1991; Lassaline, 1996, Wu & Gentner, 1998). Following 
the principle of systematicity, the goodness of a candidate inference increases in proportion to 
the order of the relation that it is embedded in - the higher the order the stronger the inference. 
Structural mapping models can directly account for the results of Lassaline (1996) 
and Wu and Gentner (1998). Moreover such models have been also said to account (Gentner 
& Medina; 1998; Wu & Gentner, 1998) for the various property by category effects such as 
those reported by Heit and Rubinstein (1994). When the candidate property is behavioral (or 
anatomical), the claim goes, participants search for meaningful properties in the base that are 
causally related to this property (presumably behavioral or anatomical). An inference is strong 
to the extent that the target shares these properties with the base. It is less obvious how the 
5 Henceforth, the terms premise and base, as well as the terms conclusion and target will be used 
interchangeably. 
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structural mapping models can account for category effects. Assuming that in the absence of 
causal relations the degree of matching between the premise and conclusion categories would 
be proportional to the extent that their features overlap, the structural mapping models should 
be able to account for premise-conclusion similarity effects and perhaps, because of that, also 
for some premise-typicality and conclusion-specificity effects. Finally, the structural mapping 
models cannot readily capture effects of abstract pre-theoretical biases such as those reported 
by Keil and his colleagues (e.g. Keil, 1995). 
The gap model. The gap model (Smith, Shafir, & Osherson, 1993) was an attempt to 
extend reasoning models to non-blank predicates such as can bite through barbed wire. The 
model assumes that non-blank predicates enter the reasoning process by potentiating the 
dimensions of the premise category that are meaningfully related to the predicate. The 
theorists assumed, for instance, that an argument with the premise Poodles can bite through 
barbed wire would potentiate the dimensions strength and ferocity. Smith et al. also assume 
that predicates are associated with some criterion value on those dimensions. Non-blank 
predicates invite an examination of the plausibility of the premise. I f the values on the 
potentiated dimensions of the premise category are lower than the criterion value for 
satisfying the predicate, the values of the predicate would be lowered; the bigger the gap, the 
bigger the downward adjustment (e.g. the premise Poodles can bite through barbed wire 
would invite more downward adjustment of the predicate values than the premise Dobermans 
can bite through barbed wire). Broadly, the closer the values on the respective dimensions of 
the conclusion category are to satisfy the adjusted criterion values of the predicate, and the 
more similar the premise and conclusion categories are, the stronger the argument. 
The gap model can account for some property by category effects. For instance, it can 
readily account for why participants find the argument Poodles can bite through barbed wire; 
therefore, German shepherds can bite through barbed wire stronger than the argument 
Dobermans can bite through barbed wire; therefore, German shepherds can bite through 
barbed wire (see Smith et al., 1993). Because it incorporates a similarity component, the gap 
model can also account for premise-conclusion similarity effects. Further, because similarity 
25 
is related to typicality - e.g. German shepherd is both more similar and more typical to dog 
than chow-chow is - the gap model with its similarity component can perhaps also capture 
some premise-typicality effects. The main limitation of the gap model is that even though it 
critically depends on a feature potentiation process, it presupposes rather than states how this 
process takes place. 
1.4.3 Summary of category-based inference models 
Both Osherson et al.'s (1990) similarity-coverage model and Sloman's (1993) feature-
coverage model are successful in that with a minimal theoretical edifice they can account for 
a wide array of phenomena associated with blank biological predicates. These models, 
however, cannot account for relational effects because they do not assume relational structure. 
Irrespective of whether unfamiliar properties embedded in causal relations (such as those 
studied by Lassaline, 1996) are blank, it is transparently clear that a complete model of 
property induction, to be viable, must account for such properties' effects. In this respect, 
models viewing inference as resulting from a structural-mapping process have an advantage. 
Such models offer principles of how the goodness of an inference is constrained by a mapping 
process that heavily weights relational matches, thus directly addressing some property by 
category effects. The gap model (Smith et al. 1993) can also capture some effects associated 
with non-blank predicates but most of its explanatory burden rests in the potentiation process, 
a process that the model assumes rather than explains. Finally, both structural mapping 
models and the gap model can, to a certain extent, account for the three main category effects 
because both view argument strength as an increasing function of shared features. 
Is there any underlying commonality to all these models? At a broad level, these 
models rely on similar constructs to explain category-based inference. The Osherson et al. 
(1990) SCM, the Sloman (1993) FCM and the Smith et al. (1993) gap model all put a heavy 
explanatory burden on similarity. The gap and the structural mapping models can be said to 
maximize coherence. A central principle of the structural mapping models is that of 
systematicity. The principle of systematicity can be directly translated as a principle of 
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maximizing coherence. The gap model can also be said to maximize coherence. The notion 
underlying the gap model is that a conclusion category is tested on the closest possible world 
where the premise category satisfies the predicate. To the extent that the closest possible 
world is one that satisfies the premise while retaining the relations between the premise and 
conclusion categories that hold on the actual world, the gap model is maximizing coherence. 
The present account also views category-based inference in terms of coherence maximization 
- albeit a sort of coherence that is not discussed by the reviewed models. 
-BACKGROUND ON CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY-
1.5 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITYAS CENTRALITYIN INTUITIVE THEORIES' 
None of the category-based models reviewed provides constraints on what properties 
get tabulated and ultimately represented. Constraints on what properties get tabulated and 
represented are critical because they point to constraints of inductive inference as well -
aspects of category representations should influence concept use. The aim of the present 
section is not to criticize the models reviewed - none of them purports to completely describe 
category-based inference. Further, the problem of feature selection is very hard (see Chater & 
Oaksford, 1993; Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Rather the discussion aims to motivate our 
hypothesis; i.e., that feature centrality influences property generalization. 
None of the category-based inference models considered addresses what features get 
tabulated and represented in the first place. It is left up to the researchers to feed their models 
with the representations of the premise and conclusion categories. Otherwise stated, the 
models presuppose rather than explain the content of mental representations (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). The researchers are left to rely on some independent measure to capture 
representational content. One such measure, the measure that both Osherson et al. (1991) and 
Sloman (1993) used, is consensual validation (see Rosch and Mervis, 1975). According to 
this, representations are taken to consist of properties that many people list for a particular 
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category. A problem with consensual validation is that it may produce different features 
depending on the level of abstractness of a category. People may list, for example, means of 
transport for vehicle but not for Honda Civic, though they know that this feature applies also 
to the former category. B. Tversky and Hemenway (1986) argued that the features that people 
list critically depend on their assumptions about the relevant contrast set (the set of categories 
that participants implicitly contrast a given category against) and the desired level of 
specificity of the category. Returning to the example, the feature means of transport is 
important for differentiating vehicles from categories such as furniture (given that furniture is 
in the relevant contrast set of vehicle), but not for differentiating Honda Civic from, say, 
Honda Legend. Put in other words, consensual validation downplays people's amount of 
knowledge about categories. 
What factors constrain feature representation? Some of the constraints are provided 
by the perceptual system itself (see Ullman, 1979). To take an extreme example, since we 
cannot perceive quark particles (with the naked eye) there is no way that we can tabulate 
them. More interestingly, property tabulation, and therefore property representation as well, is 
biased by our theories, our intuitions and ideas about how the world works. There is an 
infinite number of co-occurrences that we could potentially tabulate, such as a relation 
between people's toe length and their favorite beverage. Our theories though predispose us to 
expect that no relation is to be found in such cases (see Heit, 1997), thus preventing us from 
tabulating and hence representing such co-occurrences. 
Empirical evidence abounds that suggests lay theories influence how we perceive 
and interpret properties. A striking example is provided by Wisniewski and Medin (1991, 
1994). Participants were given children's drawings to observe and were told that some of the 
drawings were done by city children while others by farm children. The experimenters 
randomly assigned these labels to a set of drawings and in most cases the labels had a great 
effect on how people interpreted a drawing. The clothing of a drawing, for instance, was 
interpreted as farm clothing when the label was "drawings by farm children", but as a city 
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uniform when the label was "drawings by city children." (For closely related findings see 
Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987). 
Hampton (1987) provides another powerful demonstration from the domain of 
conceptual combination. He noted that some novel conceptual combinations give rise to 
emergent properties - properties that are not true of either constituent. For example, when 
asked to describe the novel concept "beach bicycle", participants listed attributes such as has 
wide wheels. Since "beach bicycle" was a novel category, such emergent properties cannot 
have arisen from consideration of category examples. Rather such emergent attributes must 
have resulted from people's relevant background knowledge. People, for instance, may have 
considered that riding on the beach with a normal bike would be problematic since its tires 
would sink in the sand. Naive knowledge of physics dictates that such a problem can be 
remedied with flat tires (for a review on conceptual combination see Hampton, 1997). 
It seems therefore that concepts are intrinsically intertwined with our 'intuitive 
theories', with how we make sense of the world. This view is commonly known as the 
concepts-in-theories view (also known as the theory-based or explanation-based view) and is 
eloquently voiced in Murphy and Medin (1985). 'Intuitive theories' refer to any host of mental 
explanations and may include anything from scientific principles to fallacious beliefs. 
In terms of representational structure, the theory-based view can be safely interpreted 
to support the idea that concepts involve features embedded in networks of knowledge. A 
corollary of the theory-based view is that features, depending on the role they play in how we 
understand a concept, differ in how much coherence they lend to that concept. The more 
central a role a feature plays in our intuitive understanding of a concept, the more 
conceptually central that feature is. For the concept elephant, for example, the feature heart 
promotes more coherence than the feature gray. Thus heart is a more conceptually central 
feature for elephant than the feature gray. 
To sum up, a place to search for determinants of category-based inference is by 
looking at (proposed) factors that constrain representational structure. Both conceptual and 
empirical evidence can be said to corroborate that 'intuitive theories' constrain conceptual 
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structure and use. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 'intuitive theories' to constrain property 
induction also. The present research can be seen as an extension of this corollary of the 
theory-based view, concerning the view that features differ in terms of conceptual centrality. 
In this thesis, the representation and focus of the theory-based view is extended to category-
based inference. I f conceptual centrality is a structural aspect of representations, then it should 
also influence property induction. Specifically, the more central a feature is (or is believed to 
be) to a target concept, the more projectible it should be to that concept. So our broad answer 
to the question "Why are some properties more projectible than others?" is "Because some 
properties (are believed to) promote more coherence to the target concept than others". 
1.6 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY AS MUTABILITY 
The claim that features differ in conceptual centrality depending on how central a role 
they play in how we understand a concept is appealing. At the same time, the notion of an 
'intuitive theory', and thus the notion of a feature's centrality in such a theory, is under-
specified. What is needed therefore is a clear articulation of conceptual centrality, one that 
wi l l allow us to operationalize it and thus make it amenable to empirical testing. Such an 
articulation was offered by Sloman et al. (1998). 
For a given concept, feature centrality can be defined in terms of how mentally 
transformable a feature is while retaining the integrity (coherence) of that concept (Sloman et 
al., 1998). Sloman et al. name this measure of conceptual centrality mutability, a term they 
borrow from Kahneman and Miller (1986). A feature is immutable (conceptually central) to 
the extent that presence of that feature in an object increases people's certainty that the object 
is represented by the concept. 
A way to measure mutability is by asking people how easy they find it to transform a 
concept into one that is in all ways like the original but lacks that feature. This is known as 
the Ease-of-Imagining Task (see e.g. Sloman et al., 1998). For the concept dog, for instance, 
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the feature heart is more immutable (more conceptually central) than the feature fur, in that it 
is harder to imagine a dog without a heart rather than one without fur. 
Our hypothesis is that mutability should constrain projectibility. People should be 
more willing, for instance, to project heart rather than fur to a newly discovered species of 
dog. Before we proceed though, it cries to be shown that mutability is not a superfluous 
concept - it is not reducible to known dimensions of category structure. In the first part of the 
following section, we provide conceptual arguments distinguishing mutability from 
variability, diagnosticity, and salience. In the second part of that section, we provide empirical 
evidence that validates these distinctions. 
1.7 MUTABILITY VERSUS VARIABILITY, DIAGNOSTICITY, AND SALIENCE 
1.7.1 Conceptual arguments 
Mutability is not variability. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1983), we assume 
that there are two distinct perspectives that people may adopt about a concept, an inside and 
an outside view. The inside view looks at the mental representations of categories such as 
features, and elements that bind these features together. The outside view looks at sets of 
actual or remembered instances that comprise a category. Mutability concerns an inside view, 
since it measures the extent to which a feature is mentally transformable while retaining the 
integrity of a concept. In contrast, variability involves an outside view since it measures the 
extent to which a feature is transformable across the remembered instances of a category. 
Most of the times the inside and outside views of concepts are compatible, and hence 
measures of mutability and variability converge. For example, heart is both an immutable and 
a homogeneous property of mammal. In other cases though, mutability and variability 
measures may diverge; e.g., the color of ravens is one of their very homogeneous properties 
but still one of their mutable properties. It seems relatively effortless to imagine a raven that is 
not black. 
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Mutability is not diagnosticity. There are two predominant uses of the term 
diagnosticity, one in terms of informational value and one in terms of inferential potency. In 
terms of informational value, a feature is diagnostic to the extent that it helps differentiate an 
object belonging to one category versus others. Being striped, for instance, is a highly 
diagnostic feature of zebras relative to the set of animals in the sense that a striped animal is 
highly likely to be a zebra. Conceptually, mutability and informational value are easily 
distinguishable. Having a liver, for instance, is an immutable property for zebra though it has 
a very low informational value since many things have livers but are not zebras. 
In the latter sense of the term, diagnosticity is equated to the inferential potency of a 
feature. Inferential potency refers to the extent to which knowing that an object has a feature 
helps predict that the object is also likely to have certain other features as well (e.g., Franks, 
1995). Mutability is conceptually distinct from this second sense of diagnosticity. A feature 
derives inferential potency by virtue of its correlation to other features. In contrast, a feature 
derives its mutability status by virtue of dependencies. For instance, has buttons, is 
statistically correlated with has a zipper, has material, and is colored (Malt & Smith, 1984) 
and thus an inferentially potent feature. That is, knowing that an object has buttons allows one 
with relative confidence to predict that the object is likely to also have a zipper, material, and 
color. At the same time has buttons is a relatively mutable feature; it is easy to imagine, for 
instance, a shirt that does not have buttons. 
Mutability is not salience. Salience measures the extent to which a property pops-out 
from the background - the extent to which it is noticeable in a context-independent sense. A 
loud noise, for instance, is more salient than a barely audible one. Clearly salience is distinct 
from mutability; the florescent jackets of policemen is one of their salient properties albeit a 
mutable one. 
To sum up, mutability can be conceptually distinguished from other dimensions such 
as variability, diagnosticity, and salience. 
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1.7.2 Empirical evidence 
Evidence supporting that mutability is distinct from variability, diagnosticity and 
salience is presented in Sloman et al. (1998). In Study 1, they asked participants to provide 
estimates for various measures. Some of these measures were believed to tap mutability, some 
variability, some diagnosticity, and some salience. Al l the measures of mutability used had in 
common that they asked participants to consider an object lacking a feature but otherwise 
intact. A factor analysis of the results provided evidence that (i) all the measures believed to 
tap mutability indeed gauged the same underlying factor, and (ii) that this factor was distinct 
from the underlying factors of diagnosticity and salience measures. That particular study 
failed to differentiate mutability from variability. Study 5 pitted mutability against variability 
and supported that these two dimensions are empirically distinguishable (for further evidence 
see also Ahn & Sloman, 1997). 
To sum up, both conceptual arguments and empirical evidence support that mutability 
is psychologically real in two senses: (i) in that different measures of mutability gauge on the 
same underlying factor, and (ii) that this factor is distinguishable from the factors of 
variability, diagnosticity, and salience. Having thus established that it is constructive to use 
mutability as an explanatory construct, Sloman et al. (1998) went on to model mutability as 
centrality in a network of pair-wise dependency relations. 
1.8 MUTABILITY AS CENTRALITY IN A NETWORK OF PAIR-WISE 
DEPENDENCY RELA TIONS 
Under the simplifying assumption that representations involve features embedded in 
networks of relations which are generic (their type is irrelevant) and asymmetric (non-
reflexive), Sloman et al. (1998) modeled mutability as centrality in a network of pair-wise 
dependency relations. According to their model, a feature is central, for a particular concept, 
to the extent that other (central) features depend on it. The main idea behind this claim is that 
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changing features upon which lots of other features depend, should destroy the integrity of a 
concept because it would force a cascade of other changes. In contrast, changing features that 
are peripheral in a concept's dependency structure, should leave the structure of a concept 
relatively unaffected. Applying this notion to the example about elephants, given that a person 
believes that lots of features about elephants depend on heart but only few on gray, the 
former feature is more conceptually central than the latter. In most of the present experiments, 
we manipulate the relative centrality of features by manipulating their centrality in a concept's 
dependency space. 
Sloman et al. implemented their centrality hypothesis with the simple, iterative, linear 
equation: 
Q, t+i = E j dy C j t 
where Q t + 1 is the centrality of feature i at time t+1 
dy is the extent to which feature j depends on feature i, 
and C j i t is the centrality of feature j at time t. 
To test their model, they presented participants with features of particular categories 
and, for each category, they asked them to draw links binding these features together (Study 
2). Participants were given the choice of three colors to indicate the strength of a dependency. 
These dependency estimates provided information about the djj terms of the model, which is 
the only information the model needs to predict the relative centrality of properties within a 
category - the model has no free parameters. The results from the model were compared to 
mutability estimates for the same features. The model provided reasonably good fits of the 
mutability data. Correlation measures between the model's predictions and mutability 
estimates were in the predicted direction for all categories. Also, the mean correlation 
between the model's predictions and the mutability data was better than .61 for all categories. 
To summarize, the centrality model provides reasonably good fits to the data given that the 
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model has no free parameters. This supports the notion that conceptual centrality defined as 
centrality in a concept's dependency space is a good surrogate of mutability. 
The Sloman et al. (1998) model can be said to act as a bridge between the appealing 
but not very well articulated concepts-in-theories approach, and the less appealing but better 
articulated feature-based approach. The asymmetric dependency links connecting features in 
the centrality model can be interpreted as stand-ins for intuitive micro-theories. The 
knowledge that wings enable birds to fly, for example, is reductively represented in the model 
as can fly-> having wings, where denotes a generic, asymmetric, dependency link. 
Following this interpretation, the model's conceptual centrality estimate for a given feature 
can be viewed as a global measure of the importance of a feature in a person's 'intuitive 
theory' about a concept. Notice that the Sloman et al. model is not necessarily confined to 
'intuitive theories' - it can represent non-explanatory connections. For instance, with its 
unlabeled asymmetric dependency links it can perhaps also capture pre-theoretical biases such 
as those reported by Keil (1995). 
1.9 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY AND CA TEGORY-BASED INFERENCE 
Although Sloman et al. provide a model that quite successfully captures the relative 
centrality of features within a concept, the present focus is on the role of centrality in the 
projectibility of properties across concepts. This section leads to our proposal of how feature 
centrality influences property induction. 
How does centrality constrain projectibility? As a starter, one might propose that the 
more conceptually central a feature the higher its projectibility. Name this Hypothesis 0. 
Hypothesis 0: all else being equal, the more conceptually central a 
feature, the higher its projectibility across concepts. 
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Hypothesis 0 captures the idea that conceptually central features should be weighted more 
heavily in inference. That is, central features should be more projectible than less-central 
ones, because projecting a central feature should enhance more the coherence of the 
conclusion (or target) category. What Hypothesis 0 fails to capture is that centrality is concept 
relative, i.e. one and the same feature can have different mutability statuses across different 
concepts. For example, roundness is a central feature of basketballs but not of cantaloupes (cf. 
Medin & Shoben, 1988). In sum, Hypothesis 0 seems (at best) to be confined to cases of 
generalizations from instances (e.g., an inference from a sample of bananas to all bananas) but 
it fails to capture category-based inference (e.g., an inference from bananas to boomerangs). 
The observation that centrality is concept relative is readily accounted for by the 
Sloman et al. definition of centrality. Different concepts, such as bananas and boomerangs, 
generally involve different dependency structures and hence the centrality status of a given 
feature across concepts may well be different. For example, lots of things about boomerangs 
depend on the fact that they are curved (e.g., their ability to return when thrown), whereas 
almost nothing about bananas depends on that property. Bananas are something we eat and 
hence being curved is peripheral to their dependency structure. 
The present research focuses on category-based inference, and hence Hypothesis 0 
needs to be revised. Here is the hypothesis we propose: 
The Centralitv Hypothesis: All else being equal, the more central a 
feature for a concept, the higher its projectibility to other concepts to 
the extent that those concepts share its structure. 
Our centrality hypothesis derives from an appeal to conceptual centrality and a belief that 
projecting a property aims to maximize coherence. The more the premise and conclusion 
categories share structure, the more likely it is that a property wil l retain a similar centrality 
status in the target concept. The more central a property is believed to be in the (dependency) 
structure of the target concept, the more coherence its projection would promote. 
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Our appeal to conceptual centrality and our view that projecting a property aims to 
maximize coherence, predicts property by category effects. For instance, even though color is 
a relatively non-projectible attribute, it should lead to strong inferences from solar panels to 
solar calculators. Naive knowledge of physics informs us that lots of the functions of solar 
panels (such as attracting and storing energy) depend on their color being dark. Because solar 
calculators share a similar dependency structure as solar panels with respect to these 
functions, the argument should be judged strong. 
Our line of reasoning is quite similar to Quine's (1961, 1977) argument against the 
existence of analytic truths, statements necessarily true by virtue of the language. A whole 
approach to concepts, commonly known as the classical view, is based on the assumption that 
concepts have defining properties. It holds that some properties, such as we sit on it for the 
concept chair, are defining, and thus statements like "chairs are objects that we sit on" are 
analytic truths. Quine argued that although almost any feature can be removed from a 
category, we are less willing to give up features upon which much of our knowledge depends. 
That is because deletion of such features will propagate lots of other revisions in our 
knowledge base. Quine argued therefore for a continuum, rather than a dichotomy, from 
analytic to synthetic truths. 
In a similar vein, we hold that features can be arranged in a continuum of conceptual 
centrality reflecting how much of the structure of a concept depends on them. Further, we 
hold that central features should be more generalizable than non-central ones across concepts 
that share similar structure, because projecting central features across such concepts should 
promote more coherence in the target concept. 
1.9.1 What we do not claim 
To clarify our hypothesis, we stress what we do not claim. First of all, we make no 
claims about how 'intuitive theories' (or pre-theoretical biases) come about - we take them as 
givens (but see, for example, Atran, 1995, 1998; Carey, 1995; Keil, 1995; Keil, Smith, 
Simons, & Levin, 1998). Further, we do not assume that representations are stable across 
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individuals. Quite the contrary, we believe that representations (and thus feature centrality) 
are conditional on a person's knowledge. People have different theories about how the world 
works, and hence their category representations should involve different dependency 
structures. To illustrate, for most non-biologists like myself, the fact that ravens are black is a 
relatively non-central property - we have no theories connecting raven's color to the rest of 
their properties and functions. Ornithologists, on the other hand, possibly have elaborate 
theories of why ravens are black, theories that relate ravens' blackness to the rest of their 
features. For instance, they may know that their color regulates mating, increases body 
temperature, facilitates enzyme activity and so on (these explanations are made up; their sole 
aim is to clarify the argument). What we believe remains stable across individuals is the way 
conceptual centrality influences inference. In other words, we believe that centrality provides 
a structural constraint on category-based inference. Finally, we have no illusions of trying to 
offer an all-encompassing theory of what constrains categorical inference. We merely suggest 
that the extent to which a feature is believed to lend coherence to a concept should affect its 
projectibility to other similar concepts. 
-OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH--
1.10 OBJECTIVE 1: ASSESSING THE CENTRALITY HYPOTHESIS 
The main objective of the current research is to investigate empirically the hypothesis 
that central features are more projectible than less-central ones across categories that share 
similar structure. There are two parts to this claim: (i) that conceptual centrality influences the 
inductive potential of features, and (ii) that the effect of centrality on projectibility is mediated 
by the extent to which the premise and conclusion concepts share similar dependency 
structure. To empirically assess our hypothesis we manipulate (i) the (relative) conceptual 
centrality of features, and (ii) the similarity between an argument's premise and conclusion 
categories. 
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1.10.1 Manipulations of conceptual centrality 
Our basic experimental paradigm involves informing participants that a premise (or 
base) category has two novel properties, a central and a less-central one. Participants are then 
asked to rate the likelihood that a conclusion (or a target) category has each of these 
properties, or in a few cases to choose which of the two properties the conclusion category 
was more likely to have. The relative centrality of the properties for a given argument was 
either assessed by tasks known to tap mutability (for a detailed exposition of such tasks see 
Sloman et al., 1998), or else it was directly manipulated based on the Sloman et al. rough 
definition of centrality according to which a feature is central to the extent that other (central) 
features depend on it. 
The Ease-of-imasinine task. The ease-of-imagining task measures the mutability of a 
feature by asking people how easily they find it to imagine an object missing that feature 
which is otherwise intact. To assess, for instance, the relative centrality of the features heart 
and gray for the concept elephant, participants are asked to imagine an elephant and then to 
transform this representation into one that lacks the relevant property. The more difficult 
participants find it to complete the transformation, the more conceptually central the feature is 
taken to be. In the example above, participants should find it more difficult to imagine an 
elephant lacking a heart. Mutability estimates are then compared to inductive strength 
estimates about the properties in question to assess whether our centrality hypothesis is 
supported. Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter I I assessed conceptual centrality by the ease-of-
imagining task. 
Centralitv from a dependency chain. Experiments 3 to 7 of Chapter I I I , define the 
relative centrality of two properties by embedding them in a dependency chain: the central 
property being the one upon which the less-central property depends (either directly or via a 
mediating property). This operationalization of centrality is based on the Sloman et al. notion 
that centrality can ultimately be computed from local dependency relations. An example of an 
argument using such a manipulation of centrality is, 
39 
Lions have both the enzyme amylase and the enzyme transacetylase. 
For lions, the enzyme transacetylase is regulated by metabolism. 
For lions, the enzyme amylase regulates metabolism. 
A. Tigers have transacetylase. % 
B. Tigers have amylase. % 
The enzyme amylase is relatively central since metabolism depends on it. The enzyme 
transacetylase is not as central, since it depends on metabolism. 
This operational definition of centrality aimed in part to pit our theory's predictions 
against those of structural-mapping models of inductive inference. This issue wil l be fully 
exposed in Chapter I I I . 
Centrality from the number of the dependent properties. A more natural way to 
operationalize relative feature centrality while staying close to the spirit of the Sloman et al. 
(1998) definition, is by manipulating the number of properties that depend upon a feature. 
This is how we manipulate centrality with the "Lots/Few" definition in Experiments 8 to 11 of 
Chapter IV (animal categories), and Experiment 17 of Chapter VII (artifacts). We stipulate 
that members of a category have two properties: one upon which lots of their functions 
depend, and one upon which only few of their functions depend. Central properties are 
assumed to be the ones upon which lots of the category's functions depend. Below is an 
example of an argument using the "Lots/Few" definition of conceptual centrality, 
Dolphins have the neurotransmitter oxytocin and the neurotransmitter 
calcitocin. 
Lots of a dolphin's functions depend on the neurotransmitter oxytocin. 
Few of a dolphin's functions depend on the neurotransmitter calcitocin. 
A. Seals have calcitocin. % 
B. Seals have oxytocin. % 
In this argument, the central property is the neurotransmitter oxytocin, and the less central 
property the neurotransmitter calcitocin. Because dolphins and seals are very similar, we 
expect participants to give a higher rating for conclusion B. 
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Experiments 15 and 16 in Chapter VI asked what sort of information (centrality or 
else variability) people seek to make a categorical inference. Participants had to guess 
whether a target species had a property, based on the information that some members of 
another species (the base) had that property. To facilitate their decision, they could either seek 
conceptual centrality or else variability information. The conceptual centrality information, as 
in the "Few/Lots" definition, concerned how many of the base category's features and 
functions depended on the critical property. The variability information concerned the 
proportion of the members of the base category that had the critical property. To the extent 
that centrality influences more category-based inference than variability, we expected 
participants to choose centrality information. 
Centralitv from the centrality of the dependent properties. A subtle way to manipulate 
the relative centrality of two features is to keep the number of properties that depend upon 
them constant, and manipulate the centrality status of the properties that depend upon them. 
Recall, that a feature is central to the extent that other central features depend on it. 
Experiments 12 to 14 reported in Chapter V use this definition of centrality. As an example, 
we stipulated that hippos have the hormone aldosterone and the hormone corticosterone. We 
also stipulated that, for hippos, aldosterone regulates the amount of oxygen in the blood, 
controls blood density and blood pressure, whereas corticosterone regulates the amount of 
green in the eye, eye-colour reflectance and uniformity of eye-colour. Because the properties 
that depend upon aldosterone are (intuitively) more central than those depending upon 
corticosterone, we assumed that aldosterone was more central than corticosterone. 
In sum, various measures of conceptual centrality were used to manipulate relative 
feature centrality. There are good reasons supporting the use of many centrality measures. For 
one, it helped us to pit our hypothesis against others that were supported by using comparable 
manipulations. Secondly, as will become evident in the experimental chapters, the results 
obtained by each definition on its own were open to various interpretations. Using a variety of 
centrality measures helped to eliminate competing interpretations across sets of experiments. 
That is, the use of multiple operational definitions strengthens the force of our centrality 
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hypothesis. Finally, a future aim is to model centrality effects on inductive inference. The 
Sloman et al. (1998) notion of conceptual centrality comes with a model that implements it. 
Thus, it provides a good basis for building category-based models to account for centrality 
effects. Using multiple ways of operationalizing centrality from the Sloman et al. definition, 
provides therefore valuable evidence for constructing such models. In the Final Discussion we 
wil l discuss such models. 
1.10.2 Manipulations of shared structure 
The second part of our hypothesis states that the effects of centrality on category-
based inference should depend on the extent to which the premise and conclusion categories 
share structure (features and dependencies). This is based on the assumption that the more 
structure two concepts share, the more likely the candidate property is to share a similar 
centrality status in the target concept. The more central a status a property is believed to have 
in the target, the more coherence projection of the property would promote. Even though we 
expected the effect of centrality to be bounded by the amount of premise-conclusion overlap, 
we had no a priori ideas about the exact amount (or type) of shared structure required. This 
issue was addressed empirically by manipulating the extent to which premise-conclusion 
category pairs were judged similar. Our working assumption was that the more similar a pair 
of categories is judged, the more dependency structure they share. The straightforward 
prediction therefore was that the more similar a pair of categories was judged, the bigger the 
difference between the projectibility of the central versus the less central feature. Sometimes 
we selected category pairs that have been reported in the literature to be associated with high 
or low similarity estimates. In most cases we also independently checked the assignment of 
category pairs to similarity conditions by gathering similarity estimates from a separate group 
of participants. 
Some of our 'natural kind' experiments manipulated shared structure by using high or 
low-similar mammal pairs (e.g. hippos-elephants, mice-elephants). Other experiments 
manipulated shared structure more widely by using similar animal pairs from the same 
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superordinate (e.g. tigers-lions), dissimilar pairs from the same superordinate (e.g. chimps-
lions), and dissimilar pairs from a different superordinate (e.g. falcons-lions). Pairs of the first 
shared structure condition were judged as more similar than pairs of the second condition 
which were judged more similar than pairs of the third condition. We did not include pairs 
from different superordinates but high in similarity simply because it is very hard to find any 
(bats being similar to some bird species, and seals and dolphins being similar to fish are some 
of a very limited set of such examples). As a result, our experiments do not fully address the 
impact of superordinate structure on inductive reasoning (recall that Osherson et al. (1990) 
assume that categories are hierarchically structured and thus reasoning recourses to 
taxonomies, though Sloman (1997) provided evidence against this claim). Our experiments, 
however, do address two more impoverished claims: (1) that sharing a superordinate decides 
the strength of arguments, and (2) that sharing a superordinate mediates the centrality effect 
on property induction. I f claim (1) were true, then we should not observe differences in 
property generalizability among base-target categories from the same superordinate, but we 
should observe differences for categories from a different superordinate. Similarly, i f (2) were 
true, then we should not observe differences in the generalizability of the central and the less 
central properties among same superordinate categories, but we should observe differences 
among different superordinate categories. 
Dependent properties: abstract versus specific. To better understand what type of 
shared structure matters in projecting central versus less central features, some experiments 
left the properties that depended upon the candidate feature abstract (like the experiments 
using the "Few/Lots" definition), while others specified them (like most experiments that 
defined centrality from a dependency chain). Specifically, we investigated the possibility that 
feature projectibility depends on the extent to which the target category shares (or is believed 
to share) the dependent properties specified by the candidate property for the base. Elephants 
and mice, for instance, are fairly dissimilar mammals though they are similar in terms of 
specific properties such as fur, and heart. 
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In addition, the use of abstract dependent properties helped assess whether feature 
centrality operates under vagueness. To the same end, we also used abstract predicates, such 
as has substance Z, and poorly defined categories, such as Mammal 1 and Bird 2. Note that 
for some models of category-based inference to operate, such as structural-mapping models, 
they require a complete specification of the candidate properties as well as the properties that 
depend upon them. Finding that the feature centrality hypothesis operates under conditions of 
vagueness, cannot be accounted for by such models. Further, such a finding would give the 
centrality hypothesis a heuristic status. 
In sum, the overarching objective of our research is to examine empirically the 
hypothesis that central features are more projectible than less-central features across concepts 
that share similar structure. To assess our hypothesis empirically we needed to operationally 
define 'feature centrality' and 'shared structure'. To this end, we stated how centrality and 
shared structure was measured or manipulated. Further, we provided reasons for using the 
various operational definitions of feature centrality and shared structure. 
There are two other related objectives that our research pursues, and are reviewed in 
the following sections. 
1.11 OBJECTIVE 2: MUTABILITY VS. VARIABILITY 
One of our working assumptions is that mutability and variability involve different 
perspectives for looking at categories. We take mutability to be an aspect of mental 
representations in an 'inside view' of categories, whereas variability to be an aspect of 
remembered instances in an 'outside view' of categories. A reason to believe that this 
distinction is grounded comes from the work of Medin and Shoben (1988). They provided 
empirical evidence that properties judged as equally typical for two categories, can 
nonetheless have a different mutability status across these categories. Although, for instance, 
roundness is an equally typical property of the categories wheel and orange (almost all the 
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wheels and oranges one can remember are round), deleting the property round plays more 
havoc in the representation of wheels than that of oranges. Our straightforward prediction was 
that the effect of conceptual centrality and variability on the projectibility of a property should 
be distinct. For example, we expected people to be more confident to endorse the property 
round to an unseen wheel rather than to an unseen orange. That is because projecting the 
property round to an unseen wheel should promote more coherence than projecting this 
property to an unseen orange. 
Most of our experiments controlled for the variability of the central and the less-
central properties; the instances of the base category were assumed to have both properties. 
Moreover, the experiments of Chapters V and VI directly pitted centrality against variability 
to examine the relative effect of each on projectibility. Experiments in Chapter V manipulated 
the frequency of the central and the less-central properties, such as the less-central properties 
were more homogeneous than the central ones. We expected feature centrality to provide a 
stronger constraint on projectibility. The experiments in Chapter V I , pitted mutability against 
variability in terms of the information people seek to make an inference decision. Participants' 
task was to guess whether a target species had a property, based on the information that some 
members of another species (the base) had that property. To facilitate their decision, they 
could either seek conceptual centrality information (information about how many of the base 
category's features and functions depended on the critical property) or else variability 
information (information about the percentage of the members of a category that had the 
critical property). To the extent that centrality influences more category-based inference than 
variability, we expected participants to choose centrality information. 
1.12 OBJECTIVE 3: INFERENTIAL PROCESS: DOMAIN GENERAL OR 
DOMAIN SPECIFIC? 
A final goal of the present research is to show centrality effects on category-based 
inference in different conceptual domains. Previous work on property induction mostly 
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focused on the natural kind domain (though exceptions are provided in Shafir, Smith, & 
Osherson, 1990, and in Sloman, 1993, 1998). At the same time, most models of psychological 
strength (such as the similarity-coverage model and the feature-coverage model) suppose 
domain-general processes. It is transparent that this claim needs to be assessed by using 
arguments beyond the natural kind domain. 
The need to consider arguments from different domains is even more pressing 
because some theorists entertain the possibility that inference procedures depend on domain-
specific theories (like domain-specific causal laws, Carey, 1985). Gelman (1988) claims that 
natural kinds have more inductive potential than artifacts. In a similar vein, Keil (1989) points 
to many differences between the artifact and natural kind categories. His general claim is that 
properties of artifacts are projectible to the extent they are related to their purpose or design. 
Our research assumes that effects of centrality should be domain-general. Artifact 
categories should also have rich dependency structures, and hence centrality should be an 
aspect of artifact representations as well. We know, for instance, that the color of solar panels 
helps them to attract and store solar energy. Both of these functions are crucial in how we 
conceive of solar panels. Hence, the color of solar panels seems also to be one of their relative 
central properties. To be clear, we do not claim that there are no general differences between 
different domains. Nonetheless, we suppose that projectibility should not depend on type of 
category but rather on the relation between predicate and category (Goodman, 1955, 
Markman, 1989, Sloman, 1998). 
The present research addressed the domain-general versus the domain specific issue 
by using categories from both the natural kind and artifact domains. Specifically, the 
experiments reported in Chapters I I to V I involved animal categories, whereas the one 
reported in Chapter V I I involved artifacts. 
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1.13 OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL CHAPTERS 
The experiments are organized into six experimental chapters, roughly reflecting the 
operational definition of conceptual centrality used. In Chapter I I mutability was measured 
from the ease-of-imagining task, in Chapter I I I from a single dependency chain, in Chapters 
IV and VI I by the number of functions that depended upon a property, and in most studies of 
Chapter V by the centrality of the properties that depended upon the candidate property (refer 
to the section 1.10.1 Manipulations of conceptual centralitv). The sets of studies in Chapters 
I I and V aimed to show that conceptual centrality influences projectibility. They also aimed to 
detect a boundary condition for centrality effects by manipulating (at various levels) the 
amount of shared structure between the base and target categories. In other words, these 
experiments addressed our conceptual centrality hypothesis. 
Experiments of Chapter V pitted centrality against variability (the frequency of a 
property across instances of a category) to detect which dimension exerts more influence on 
projectibility. Experiments of Chapter V I took a step back and asked what sorts of 
information (centrality or else variability) people seek to make a categorical inference. 
Finally, the experiment of Chapter VI I aimed to extend the centrality hypothesis to the 
domain of artifacts. 
Below we summarize the broad issues investigated by the present experiments, along 
with the chapter(s) that addressed them: 
1. Role of centrality in projectibility (all chapters) 
2. Role of shared structure on centrality effects (all chapters except Chapter II) 
3. Domain generality of the centrality hypothesis (addressed by relating the results of 
Chapters I I to V I that used animal categories with those of Chapter VI I that used artifact 
categories). 
4. Role of vagueness (mostly Chapters IV, V I , and VII) 
5. Comparative roles of mutability and variability on projectibility (addressed in Chapters V 
and VI) . 
47 
CHAPTER II: 
TWO MEASURES OF CONCEPTUAL 
CENTRALITY: IMMUTABILITY AND 
CENTRALITY IN A DEPENDENCY SPACE 
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The main objective of our project is to examine the hypothesis that the extent to which a 
feature is central for a concept, the extent to which a feature lends coherence to a concept, 
affects its generalizability to other concepts. To do so we need tasks that measure conceptual 
centrality. A subclass of such tasks involves asking participants to perform conceptual 
transformations. Participants are asked, for instance, to mentally transform a concept into one 
that is in all ways like the original one but lacks the critical feature (for a variety of 
conceptual centrality measures see Sloman et al., 1998). The harder people find it to perform 
the mental transformation, the more immutable the feature is assumed to be. For example, has 
wings is more immutable than has a tail for robin, in that people should find it easier to 
imagine a robin without a tail than one without wings. 
Experiment 1 sought empirical evidence for the centrality hypothesis by measuring 
feature centrality from a conceptual transformation task. Participants were presented with 
pairs of category-based arguments. Both arguments in a pair had the same premise and 
conclusion categories but involved different candidate properties. Participants were asked to 
choose the argument they deemed more convincing. Participants were also asked to rate the 
immutability of a property from the ease-of-imagining task. Our straightforward prediction 
was that judgments of immutability should be an increasing function of argument strength 
estimates. 
Showing that immutability influences projectibility provides but a first step in our 
research. Ultimately we aim for a clearer articulation of conceptual centrality, an articulation 
that wi l l allow us to develop precise empirically testable hypotheses (and ultimately a model) 
of how feature centrality affects category-based inference. Such an articulation was provided 
by Sloman et al. (1998). Under the assumption that concepts involve features embedded in 
networks of asymmetric dependency relations, Sloman et al. claimed (and provided empirical 
support for this claim) that immutability can be surrogated by centrality in a concept's 
dependency space. Roughly, the more properties and functions of a concept depend upon a 
candidate feature, the more conceptually central that feature is. Applying this notion to the 
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example about robins, has wings is more conceptually central than has a tail because more 
properties and functions about robins depend on having wings than on having a tail. 
Experiment 2 provided a first step toward applying the Sloman et al. notion of 
centrality to category-based inference. The design was quite similar to that of Experiment 1 
with the change that participants were asked to provide conceptual centrality estimates from 
both the ease-of-imagining task and the dependency task. The dependency task asked 
participants to estimate how much about the structure of a concept depended on the candidate 
property. The higher the estimate, the more conceptually central a property was assumed to 
be. The straightforward prediction was that conceptual centrality measured from the 
dependency task should also be correlated with argument strength. Further, to the extent that 
the dependency task and the ease-of-imagining task hone down to the same factor (i.e. 
conceptual centrality), we expected no response differences based on the task used. 
In sum, the present experiments attempted to show that feature centrality, as either 
immutability or else centrality in a dependency space, constrains property induction. Before 
we proceed with the experiments, we motivate our centrality hypothesis by considering 
evidence from the closely related domain of categorization as well as evidence from the 
domain of category-based inference. We also take a closer look at the design of the 
experiments. 
2.1 MOTIVATION 
In the introductory chapter we motivated our centrality hypothesis by providing 
evidence that lay theories constrain what features get tabulated and represented. We reasoned 
that constraints on conceptual representations should also constrain conceptual use. Below we 
motivate our centrality hypothesis more directly by considering evidence from the domains of 
categorization and category-based inference. 
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2.1.1 Categorization: Differential weighting of deep vs. surface features 
One reason to expect that feature immutability influences projectibility comes from 
studies on categorization. Keil (1989), for instance, found that children prefer to categorize a 
raccoon that was painted black with a white stripe on its back as a raccoon rather than as a 
skunk. Similarly, Rips (1989) found that adults prefer to categorize a bird that was chemically 
contaminated and came to look like an insect but could still mate with birds as a bird rather 
than an insect. These studies show that deep features, such as mates with birds, are weightier 
in category decisions than surface ones. 
For animal categories, deep features can be said to be more conceptually central than 
surface ones by virtue of their dependencies. Surface features depend on deep features while 
deep features do not necessarily depend on surface ones. An animal's phenotype, for instance, 
depends upon an animal's genotype, while an animal's genotype does not depend on the 
animal's phenotype. The color of a raccoon, for instance, depends on its genetic structure, 
while the raccoon's genetic structure does not depend on its color. 
Categorization and inductive inference are intimately related: inductive inference is a 
major function of categorization (e.g. Smith, 1990). Having categorized an entity as a bird, for 
example, helps infer with (relatively) high confidence that it wil l have wings, it wil l lay eggs, 
it wil l be feathered and so on. Moreover, knowing that instances of a category have a 
property, sanctions the inference that members of similar categories wi l l have the property as 
well. Knowing, for example, that robins have the neurotransmitter dihedron makes it likely 
that sparrows (but possibly not spiders) wil l have this neurotransmitter as well. To the degree 
therefore that conceptual centrality influences categorization, we also expect it to influence 
category-based inference. 
2.1.2 Category-based inference: Projectible vs. nonprojectible properties 
Our research is also motivated directly from studies on category-based inference (e.g. 
Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1988). These studies assumed that some properties were more 
generalizable than others, and tested for property effects on category-based inference. We 
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argue that some of these property effects can be explained by appealing to conceptual 
centrality. 
Gelman (1988) presented preschool and elementary school children with various facts 
about a (base) category (e.g. "this rabbit has a spleen inside") and asked them to report 
whether these facts generalized to other (target) categories (e.g. a brown rabbit, a dog, or a 
phone). One of the factors that Gelman manipulated was the type of the candidate property 
(generalizable or else non-generalizable). Generalizable properties involved properties that 
seem stable within an individual (such as has pectin inside), while non-generalizable 
properties ones that seem variable (such as is cold). Gelman found that both preschool and 
elementary school children projected generalizable properties in proportion to the similarity 
between the target and the base categories. For non-generalizable properties children's 
responses were at chance level - they were unaffected by similarity condition. 
Some properties may seem relatively stable because they are conceptually central. 
Other properties may seem relatively unstable because they are not conceptually central. 
More of a rabbit's properties, for instance, depend on properties such as has pectin inside, 
than on properties such as is cold. To the extent therefore that properties that seem intrinsic or 
stable are more conceptually central than properties that seem extrinsic or unstable, Gelman's 
results corroborate our centrality hypothesis. 
2.2 BASIC EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Chapter I I reports two experiments that aim to show that conceptual centrality 
constrains projectibility. Experiment 1 asked participants to choose between pairs of 
categorical arguments that shared premise and conclusion categories but involved different 
properties. Participants were asked to choose the argument that they found more convincing, 
the one whose premise better supported its conclusion. This estimate should tap directly on 
argument (or psychological) strength. Participants were also asked to provide conceptual 
centrality estimates for each property from the ease-of-imagining task. The rationale was that 
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by analyzing conceptual centrality and argument strength estimates we could detect whether 
centrality influences projectibility. Our prediction was that participants would rate as stronger 
the argument whose premise feature they rate as more conceptually central. 
Experiment 2 used the same materials as Experiment 1. Pairs of arguments used in 
Experiment 1 were split apart into two separate arguments. Participants had to provide 
conditional likelihood estimates for each resulting argument. Participants in Experiment 2 
therefore made an independent estimate of the likelihood of each individual argument. 
Experiment 2 aimed to rule out the claim that the results of Experiment 1 are due to a demand 
characteristic stemming from its forced choice design. 
In addition, each participant was asked to provide unconditional likelihood estimates 
for the premise and conclusion statements of each argument. Note that conditional likelihood 
estimates may be contaminated by prior beliefs in an argument's conclusion. By regressing 
conceptual centrality estimates onto conditional likelihood estimates while partialling out the 
effects of prior knowledge we aimed to detect whether mutability influences argument 
strength. 
Experiment 2 used two tasks to measure conceptual centrality: (i) the ease-of-
imagining task, and (ii) what we call the dependency task. The dependency task asked 
participants to assume that a category had the candidate property and to estimate how many 
properties about that category depended upon this property. This task taps directly on the 
Sloman et al. (1998) notion that immutability can be surrogated by centrality in a concept's 
dependency space. The more properties and functions of an animal participants believed 
depended upon the candidate property, the more immutable the property was considered to 
be. To the extent that both tasks measure conceptual centrality, we expected the effect of 
centrality on projectibility to be independent of the task used. 
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2.3 EXPERIMENT 1: IMMUTABILITY 
METHOD 
Participants. Twenty-four first-year psychology undergraduates of the University of Durham 
volunteered to participate. 
Design and Materials. Participants were given two tasks to complete: the Induction task and 
the Centrality Estimation task. 
Induction task. Participants were given 12 items to evaluate, each one consisting of a 
pair of categorical arguments. Both arguments of an item had the same premise and 
conclusion categories, but involved different properties. Participants were asked to circle the 
categorical argument (A. or else B. in the example below) that they deemed more convincing. 
A sample item from the induction task was: 
A. Fact: Giraffes have dense nerve fibres in the mid-brain. 
Conclusion: Zebras have dense nerve fibres in the mid-brain. 
B. Fact: Giraffes have incisor teeth encircled by enamel. 
Conclusion: Zebras have incisor teeth encircled by enamel. 
The ful l set of materials used is presented in Table 2.1 (see overleaf)- Note that the predicates 
used were relatively blank. We avoided using familiar predicates because such predicates 
would presumably contaminate participants' inductive choices. 
Centralitv Estimation task. The conceptual centrality of a property was estimated by 
the ease-of-imagining task. Participants were asked to estimate how easily they could imagine 
an animal missing a property that it normally has. They were given to evaluate 48 items: the 
12 premise and 12 conclusion categories paired with each of the 2 properties. For the 
induction item shown overleaf, for instance, participants had to provide four centrality 
estimates: two for zebras (one about enamel and one about dense nerve fibres) and two for 
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giraffes (one about enamel and one about dense nerve fibres). The first of these four items is 
presented below: 
Imagine a zebra that has all the characteristics and properties of a zebra. Now 
change this image of the zebra so that it is in all ways like a zebra except that it does 
not have dense nerve fibres in the mid-brain that zebras have. Rate the ease of this 
transformation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very easy neutral very difficult 
Table 2.1 The full set of materials of Experiment 1. The left panels of the table 
present the premise-conclusion categories and the right panels the 
properties used. 
Premise-conclusion categories Predicates 
Dogs-Squirrels Use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
Have poor night vision 
Lions-Elephants Have PPT in their blood 
Can sense earthquakes before they occur 
Hippos-Tigers Have synaptic vesicles containing zinc 
Release noxious chemicals when captured 
Weasels-Bears Secrete uric acid crystals 
Have four molar teeth 
Goats-Bulls Have adrenergic receptors 
Have high amounts of melanin in the skin 
Buffaloes-Rhinos Produce THS by their pituitary gland 
Change their teeth twice in their lifetime 
Rabbits-Ferrets Have glycine in their spinal cord 
Have sparse hair in their outer ear 
Deer-Antelopes Have high density brain cells 
Have strong peripheral vision 
Giraffes-Zebras Have dense fibres in the mid-brain 
Have incisor teeth encircled by enamel 
Camels-Wolves Have low blood pH 
Have rolling ankles 
Seals-Flamingoes Have receptors to maintain blood pressure 
Have external ear that lack cartilege 
Rats-Raccoons Have a choroid membrane in the eyes 
Have a new underfur growing in autumn 
For each participant, the centrality estimates were used to divide the members of 
argument pairs into "central" and "less central". The proportion of times the central member 
was chosen in the forced choice induction task was the dependent variable. 
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Task order was counterbalanced across participants. The position of categorical 
arguments in the induction task was also counterbalanced across participants. Thus, 4 lists of 
materials were used. The order of the items in each task was randomized for each participant. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a booklet, containing one of the resulting 4 lists 
of material. There was no time limit but participants were encouraged to work quickly. 
Induction task. Participants were presented with the 12 pair of arguments for 
evaluation. They were informed that they would be presented with a series of items, each one 
consisting of a pair of arguments. Individual arguments involved a fact followed by a 
conclusion. Participants were asked to choose the argument that they found more convincing, 
"...which argument's Fact provides a better support for its Conclusion." They had to work 
through an example of the same format as the test items. Participants were also told not to be 
concerned i f some terms seemed unfamiliar to them. They just had to choose the argument 
that seemed more convincing to the best of their ability. Participants were instructed to ask 
the experimenter in the case of queries. 
Centrality Estimation task. Participants were presented with the 48 ease-of-imagining 
questions for evaluation. They were informed that they would be asked to imagine an animal 
that lacked a property which it normally has. Their task was to estimate how difficult it was to 
complete this transformation on a 9-point scale. A rating of "9" meant that they found 
extremely difficult to imagine the animal lacking the property, whereas a rating of " 1" meant 
that found it very easy to complete the transformation. The higher the rating the more difficult 
it was to imagine the animal missing the property. Participants were given to work through an 
example. They were instructed to ask the experimenter in the case of a query. Participants 
were asked for estimates for both the premise and conclusion categories. 
RESULTS 
Centrality Estimation task. For each participant, the member of each argument pair 
that had the highest centrality score was designated as "central", the other as "less central". 
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Thus, across all participants, the "central" and "less central" items were not the same. Table 
2.2 presents the mean centrality scores for the central and the less central items for each task 
order. Unsurprisingly, the mean centrality scores for central items are higher than the 
corresponding scores for the less central items. The mean scores for the group that received 
the centrality task first are lower than the corresponding scores for the group that received the 
induction task first. 
Table 2. 2 Mean (SE) centrality estimates for the central and less central items in 
each task order for Experiment 1. 
Centrality 
Central Less Central 
Task order 
Centralitv task 4.72 (.69) 2.89 (.50) 
Preceding induction task 
Centralitv task 6.01 (.62) 3.94 (.54) 
Following induction task 
Note. Higher estimates indicate higher centrality. 
Two types of analyses where carried out - one treating participants as a random factor (F|), 
the other items (F 2). Participants analyses allow generalization of the results to the participant, 
while the items analyses allow generalization to the item population (Clark, 1973). In the Fi 
analysis Centrality was treated as a repeated factor, in the F 2 analysis Centrality and Task 
order were treated as repeated measures factors. Centrality had a main effect (F|(l,20) = 
91.17, p<.001; F 2 ( t , l l ) = 557.73, p<.001). The effect of Task order was not significant for 
participants (F,(l,20) = 2.06) but it was for items ( F 2 ( l , l 1) = 197.33, p<.001). The Centrality 
x Task order interaction was not significant for participants (Fi<l) but it was for items 
( F 2 ( l , l l ) = 3.30, p<.05).6 
Induction task. For a particular participant, the member of each argument pair that 
had the highest centrality score was designated as "central", the other as "less central". The 
6 The alpha level is set at .05 unless otherwise stated. ANOVA tables are presented in the Appendix. 
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scores from the forced-choice induction task were organized accordingly in the "central" and 
"less central" groups. Since choice of one member of an argument pair precluded the choice 
of the other, the two choices were not independent. Two types of analyses where carried out -
one treating participants as a random factor the other items. For the participant analysis, the 
dependent variable was the proportion of times the central member was chosen in the forced 
choice induction task (chance = .50). For the item analyses, the dependent variable was the 
proportion of participants that chose the central member in the induction task (chance = .50). 
As expected, arguments involving properties rated as more central were chosen more 
often in the induction task. For participants, the mean (SE) score was .62 (.039). For items, 
the mean (SE) score was .61 (.029). 
Preliminary tests failed to show a main effect of task order (participants: Fi( l ,22)<l; 
items: t ( l l ) = - 1.16; two-tailed paired samples t-test)7. The data were therefore collapsed 
across task order. Properties rated as central were more projectible than properties rated as 
less central (participants: t(23)=3.14, p<.01; items: t(ll)=4.57, p<.01; one-sample t-tests: 
chance = .50). 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1 the relative centrality of pairs of properties was estimated from the ease-of-
imagining task. The harder a participant found it to transform the image of an animal into one 
that lacked a specific property, the more conceptually central that property was deemed to be. 
The results showed that, as predicted, immutable properties are more projectible than mutable 
ones. 
2.4 EXPERIMENT 2: MUTABILITY AND CENTRALITY IN A DEPENDENCY 
SPACE 
One could object that the results of Experiment 1 are an artifact of the forced choice 
design. I f participants made an independent decision about each argument, then possibly they 
7 All t-tests reported in this thesis are two-tailed unless otherwise stated. 
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would be indifferent to projecting the central or the less-central property. Experiment 2 aimed 
to rule out this possibility by using the same materials as Experiment 1 while asking for 
conditional likelihood estimates for each argument in a pair separately. To the extent that 
conceptual centrality influences projectibility, we expected Experiment 2 to replicate the 
results of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 used two tasks to estimate conceptual centrality: (i) the ease-of-
imagining task, and (ii) the dependency structure task. To the extent that both measures gauge 
conceptual centrality we expected participants' responses to be independent of the task used. 
METHOD 
Participants. A new sample of 55 first-year psychology undergraduates from the University 
of Durham or from Northumbria University volunteered to participate. 
Materials and Design 
Induction task. The materials were borrowed from Experiment 1 (see Table 2.1). The 
only change was that in the present experiment participants were asked to provide conditional 
likelihood estimates for each argument in a pair. That is, the two arguments comprising an 
induction item of Experiment 1 were divided into two separate arguments. A sample item of 
the induction task was: 
Assuming that giraffes have dense nerve fibres in the mid-brain, how likely do you 
think it is that zebras have dense nerve fibres in the mid-brain? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very likely unsure very unlikely 
Centrality Estimation task. Two different measures were used to estimate the 
conceptual centrality of a feature, the ease-of-imagining task, and the dependency structure 
task. The materials for the ease-of-imagining task were exactly the same as those of 
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Experiment 1. The dependency structure task asked participants to evaluate how much about 
an animal depend on a given property. A sample item is presented below. 
Assuming that giraffes have dense nerve fibres in the mid-brain, how much about 
giraffes do you think depends on this property? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a great deal almost nothing 
A l l participants were first presented with the centrality estimation task followed by 
the induction task. Twenty-two participants had to estimate the centrality of the properties 
from the ease-of-imagining task (imagining condition), and 23 from the dependency structure 
task (dependency condition). The experiment was, therefore, a two factors repeated measures 
design. The order of the items in each task was separately randomized for each participant. 
Procedure. 
Induction task. A similar procedure was used to that of Experiment 1. Participants 
had to evaluate 24 items. They responded with probability judgments in a 9-point scale, 
representing the conditional likelihood that the conclusion category has the property in 
question given that the premise has. Lower estimates indicated higher judged probabilities. 
The instructions were similar to those of Experiment 1 with minimal changes to compensate 
for the fact that in the present study we asked for conditional likelihood estimates. 
Centrality Estimation task. The imaging group followed the same procedure as the 
corresponding group in Experiment 1, except that the scale was reversed. In Experiment 2, a 
rating of "9" meant that participants found it very easy to imagine the animal lacking the 
property, whereas a rating of " 1 " meant that they found it very difficult to complete the 
transformation. Participants in the dependency group were informed that they would be 
presented with some assumptions about an animal followed by a question in which they were 
asked to estimate how much about an animal depended on a property in a 9-point scale. A 
rating of " 1" meant that they thought that a great deal about the animal depended on the 
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property, whereas a rating of "9" meant that they believed that "almost nothing" about the 
animal depended on the property. The lower the estimate the more about an animal depended 
on the property. Participants were given an example to work through. 
Unconditional probability task. Participants were instructed that they would see some 
statements whose likelihood they had to judge. This task used the same scale as the induction 
task. 
RESULTS 
Centralitv Estimation task. Table 2.3 presents the mean centrality scores for the 
central and the less central items for each centrality estimation task. The mean centrality 
scores for central items are lower than the corresponding scores for the less central items. The 
mean scores for the Dependency task are lower than the corresponding scores for the Ease-of-
imagining task. 
Table 2. 3 Mean (SE) centrality estimates for the central and less central items 
for each centrality measure for Experiment 2. 
Centrality 
Central Less Central 
Centrality Measure 
Ease-of-imagining 4.46 (.41) 6.79 (.33) 
Dependency 3.31 (.13) 5.61 (.20) 
Note. Lower estimates indicate higher centrality. 
Two 2(Centrality) x 2(Centrality measure) analyses of variance were carried out (one 
for Fi and for F 2). In the Fi analysis Centrality was treated as a repeated measures factor, in 
the F 2 both centrality and Task Order were treated as repeated measures factors. Centrality 
had a significant main effect (F,(l,43) = 263.83, p<.001; F 2 ( l , l l ) = 384.27, p<.001). 
Centrality Measure had a significant main effect (F,(l,43) = 9.43, p<.05; F 2 ( l , l l ) = 27.19, 
p<.001). No interaction was detected (both Fs<l). 
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Induction and Unconditional Probability tasks. The likelihood scores from the 
induction and the unconditional probability tasks were organized in two distinct ways. Coding 
A was similar to the one used in Experiment 1. Items were divided into two groups according 
to their estimated centrality. Conditional and unconditional likelihood measures for the two 
conditions were compared. Coding B involved calculating for each participant a correlation 
coefficient between the centrality estimates and the conditional likelihood estimates while 
partialling out the effect of the unconditional likelihood estimates. Conditional likelihood 
estimates might be contaminated by prior knowledge. This coding examined whether 
conceptual centrality influences the strength of an argument beyond the effects of 
believability in the conclusion. 
Coding A. Scores of the centrality estimation task were coded as in Experiment 1. For 
a given item, the property that was either harder to imagine an animal being without, or the 
property upon which more of an animal's functions depended, was coded as central while its 
counterpart as less central. The data from the induction and the unconditional probability 
tasks were organized in the resulting central and less central conditions. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the results. On average, participants assigned both higher 
conditional and higher unconditional likelihood estimates for the central rather than the less-
central properties. 
Table 2. 4 Mean conditional (unconditional) likelihood estimates as a function of 




Ease-of-imaqininq 4.31 (4.35) 4.42 (4.69) 
Dependency 4.03 (3.93) 4.52 (4.77) 
4.17(4.13) 4.47(4.73) 
Note. Lower estimates indicate higher judged probabilities. 
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Induction task. As for the Centrality estimates, two 2 (Centrality) x 2 (Centrality 
Measure) analyses of variance were carried out. Centrality had a significant main effect 
(F,(l,43)=6.85, p<05; F 2 ( l , l 1)=7.52, p<05.). Centrality Measure did not have a significant 
effect on either participants or items (both Fs<l). There was no significant interaction for 
participants (F,(l,43)=2.75) but there was for items ( F 2 ( l , l 1)=5.62, p<.05). 
Unconditional probability task. Similar 2 (Centrality) x 2 (Centrality Measure) 
analyses of variance were performed on the unconditional likelihood estimates. Centrality had 
a significant main effect (F,(l,43)=13.57, p<.005; F 2 ( l , l 1)=17.43, p<.005). No significant 
effect was observed for Centrality Measure (Fi(l,43)=1.27; F 2 ( l , l 1)=3.71). The interaction 
failed to reach significance (F,(l,43)=2.51; F 2 ( l , l 1)=3.94). 
The fact that centrality estimates are associated with unconditional likelihood 
estimates leaves open the possibility that the effect of centrality on conditional likelihood 
estimates is spurious. Participants seem familiar with some of the properties used. Possibly 
such familiarity influenced both their centrality and their conditional likelihood estimates. To 
examine this interpretation we re-coded the data. 
Coding B. For each participant a correlation coefficient was computed relating the 
raw centrality estimates to their conditional likelihood counterparts while partialling out the 
effect of unconditional likelihood estimates. The mean (SE) was .17 (.034). Following Lorch 
and Myers' (1990) recommendation, a one-sample t-test was performed on the resulting 
coefficients to compare them to chance performance of 0; t(44)=3.89, p<.001. The raw data 
(for all experiments) are shown in the accompanying floppy disk. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 had two main purposes: (i) to detect whether the centrality effect would obtain 
with independent judgments, and (ii) to detect whether the ease-of-imagining and the 
dependency structure tasks measure the same thing. The results support both predictions. The 
more central a property the higher its judged inductive strength. This effect was significant 
even when the effect of unconditional likelihood estimates was partialled out (from both 
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factors). Therefore the centrality effect of Experiment 1 was not an artifact of the forced 
choice design. Furthermore, the results failed to show a differential effect of centrality 
depending on the centrality estimation task used. This supports the view that the ease-of-
imagining and the dependency tasks gauge on the same factor. 
2.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1 participants were presented with items consisting of a pair of 
categorical arguments which had the same premise and conclusion categories but involved 
different properties. For each item, participants were asked to choose the arguments that they 
found more convincing. Also, for each argument, participants were asked to estimate how 
easily they could imagine an animal lacking a property that it normally has. The results 
showed that participants prefer to project immutable over less immutable properties. 
Experiment 2 replicated the centrality effect while asking for conditional likelihood estimates 
separately for each argument that comprised an item of Experiment 1. Further, Experiment 2 
used two distinct operational definitions of centrality: the ease-of-imagining definition and the 
dependency structure definition. Both definitions seem to tap the same underlying factor since 
the analyses showed no response difference depending on the definition used. 
The following chapters manipulate the conceptual centrality of features directly by 
manipulating their dependencies. There are both theoretical and experimental reasons for 
doing this. Theoretically, immutability is not a well-articulated notion, centrality in a 
concept's dependency space is. Ultimately, a model of category-based inference can be 
constructed by building on the Sloman et al. (1998) model of concept centrality. 
Experimentally, manipulating the centrality of a (relatively unfamiliar) feature by 
manipulating its dependencies has the advantage of being direct; it allows us to manipulate 
rather than to estimate feature centrality. For all participants, a given feature would be 
(relatively) either central or less-central - no separate analyses of the data for each participant 
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are needed. Recall that the data of Experiments 1 and 2 were analyzed by comparing 
centrality estimates to inductive scores for each participant separately. 
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CHAPTER 
CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY FROM A 
DEPENDENCY CHAIN 
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Experiment 2 supported the view that the Sloman et al. (1998) notion of conceptual centrality 
as centrality in a concept's dependency space is a good surrogate of immutability. Henceforth, 
we manipulate relative feature centrality based on the Sloman et al. notion, i.e., we take a 
feature to be central to the extent that other (central) features depend on it. In the present 
chapter the relative centrality of two features is operationally defined by embedding them in a 
dependency chain. A l l else being equal, i f feature C depends on feature A (C->A), then 
feature A is relatively more central than feature C. For birds, has wings, for instance, is a 
more central feature than can fly because flying depends on wings, while wings do not depend 
on flying. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 define the relative centrality of two features by embedding 
them in such a dependency relation. Experiment 3 also provides concrete explanations for the 
dependency relations (e.g. exceptional hearing causes frequent headaches because very high 
auditory frequencies cause nasal cavities to vibrate). To the extent that the projectibility of a 
property depends on concrete explanations, we expected explanations to enhance the 
centrality effect. On similar lines, all else being equal, given that C->B and B->A, feature A 
is relatively more central than feature C. Experiments 6 and 7 manipulate the relative 
centrality of two features by embedding them in such a dependency chain. Our 
straightforward prediction is that the depended-on properties (feature A in the schematic 
examples) wil l be more projectible than the dependent properties (feature C in the schematic 
examples) to the extent that the premise and conclusion categories share structure. 
A reason to expect centrality effects with centrality defined from a single dependency 
chain comes from the domain of categorization. Ahn and Lassaline (1995; see also Ahn & 
Dennis, 1997) showed that causes are weighted more heavily than effects in categorization 
decisions (the causal status hypothesis). For instance, given a disease characterized by 
symptoms A, B, and C such that A causes B which causes C, participants were more likely to 
diagnose a person with the disease given symptoms A and B but not C, rather than given 
symptoms B and C but not A. Causes are more central than effects because effects depend on 
causes, whereas causes do not necessarily depend on effects (though they may provide 
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evidence for them). These studies can therefore be said to show that central properties are 
weighted more strongly than less-central ones in categorization decisions. 
As we already mentioned in Chapter I I , inference is a major function of 
categorization. Having categorized an object as a member of a category sanctions lots of 
inferences about the object. Further, knowing that an object has a novel property leads us to 
infer that other similar objects will have the property as well. To the extent therefore that 
centrality influences categorization, we also expect centrality to affect inter-categorical 
inference. 
The present experiments investigate four broad issues: 
1. The role of centrality on projectibility 
2. The role of shared dependency structure: Does it mediate centrality effects? 
3. The role of vagueness: Does centrality operate under vague conditions? 
4. Feature centrality: centrality in a causal or a dependency space? 
Below we unpack issues 2, 3, and 4 in detail. 
3.1 SHARED DEPENDENCY STRUCTURE 
The introductory chapter stated that the role of centrality on projectibility should be 
mediated by the extent to which the premise and conclusion categories share structure. This 
claim is based on the observation that centrality is concept-relative, one and the same feature 
may have different centrality statuses across concepts (e.g., Medin & Shoben, 1988). The fact 
that centrality is concept-relative can be explained by our appeal to dependency structure. 
Different concepts involve features embedded in different dependency networks, and as a 
result the centrality status of a feature across concepts may differ. The color of a solar panel is 
one of its central properties, the color of a soccer-ball is not. 
Although we expected the effect of centrality to be mediated by the extent to which 
the premise and conclusion categories shared structure, we had no idea about how much 
structure the categories should share. This issue was addressed empirically by using premise-
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conclusion category pairs that are associated with different similarity estimates. We assumed 
that the more similar a pair of animals was judged, the more dependency structure their 
concepts shared. Experiments 3 and 4 manipulated common structure by using arguments 
involving either high or low similarity mammal pairs. Experiments 6 and 7 manipulated 
shared structure more widely. They used animal pairs high in similarity and from the same 
superordinate (HSSS; e.g. lions - tigers), low in similarity from the same superordinate 
(LSSS; e.g., elephants - mice), or low in similarity from different superordinates (LSDS; e.g., 
tigers - falcons). 
Experiments 6 and 7 also addressed two claims about the role of taxonomies in 
property induction: (1) that sharing a superordinate decides the strength of arguments, and (2) 
that sharing a superordinate mediates the centrality effect on property induction. I f claim (1) 
were true, then we should not observe differences in property generalizability among HSSS 
and LSSS categories, but we should observe differences among HSSS or LSSS and LSDS 
categories. Similarly, i f (2) were true, then we should not observe differences in the 
generalizability of the central and the less central properties among same superordinate 
categories, but we should observe differences among different superordinate categories. 
3.2 VAGUENESS AND DIRECTIONALITY 
In the introductory chapter we discussed structural-mapping models of category-
based inference, models that view object comparison as a process of alignment between 
structured representations. Properties (and relations) connected to the resulting aligned 
structure which are present in the base but absent in the target category constitute potential 
inferences. According to these models, property induction is constrained by the principle of 
systematicity. Al l else equal, the higher the order of relation that a candidate property is 
embedded in, the higher its projectibility. The principle of systematicity as an inductive 
constraint has gained empirical support in recent studies (Lassaline, 1996; Wu & Genter, 
1998). 
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In a sense, evidence that conceptual centrality affects projectibility, is also evidence 
for the principle of systematicity as an inductive constraint. Properties that are more central in 
the dependency structure of a concept are generally those more deeply embedded in the 
hierarchical structure of relations that structural mapping models' hold concepts consist of. A 
critical difference is our appeal on the status of a property in a relation. The directionality of 
relations are critical in determining centrality; in the simple B-^A case, all else equal, feature 
A to be more central than feature B. In contrast, the principle of systematicity does not 
consider the status of a property in a relation. For the B->A case, for instance, it does not 
predict that feature A has more inductive potential than feature B. The experiments reported 
in this chapter directly assess this hypothesis. 
Finally, notice that for structural-mapping models to work, predicates, as well as their 
relations to other predicates, need all to be completely specified. Otherwise stated, such 
models cannot deal with vagueness. Experiment 5 investigated centrality effects with abstract 
properties, i.e., under conditions of vagueness. 
3.3 FEATURE CENTRALITY: CENTRALITY IN A CAUSAL OR A 
DEPENDENCY SPACE? 
Ahn and Lassaline (1995) have made a similar proposal about feature centrality, what 
they call the causal status hypothesis (see also Ahn, 1998). According to this hypothesis, 
causal features are more central than effect features in category decisions. Following Sloman 
et al. (1998), we do not give a special status to causal over other asymmetric dependency 
relations as determinants of feature centrality. To avoid misunderstanding, possibly causal 
relations are in fact stronger (in the Sloman et al. model this translates into higher dy values). 
However, we hold that all asymmetric dependency relations are similar in how they 
contribute towards a feature's centrality. Experiment 5 examines this hypothesis by defining 
relative feature centrality from a generic dependency chain, e.g., "property W depends on 
property Z". 
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3.4 EXPERIMENT 3: CENTRALITY FROM A CAUSAL + EXPLANATION 
RELATION 
Experiment 3 aimed to test two hypotheses: (1) to detect whether a local causal 
relation together with an explanation suffices for centrality effects, and (2) in the case it does, 
it aimed to detect a possible boundary condition for the centrality effect set by similarity. To 
test hypothesis (1) 16 categorical arguments were constructed such that for half of them a 
causal relation was established and an explanation for this relation was given (the 
causal+explanation condition), whereas for the rest no relation was stipulated (the control 
condition). Hypothesis (2) was addressed empirically by systematically varying the similarity 
between the premise and conclusion animal pairs. Half of the items involved pairs of 
mammals that were highly similar, whereas the other half included pairs that had low 
similarity. We expected that the participants would be more willing to project central over 
less-central properties (causes over effects in the causal+explanation condition) rather than 
the same properties in the control condition. 
METHOD 
Participants. Participants were 24 University of Durham students. 
Design and Materials. Relation (causal+explanation or control) was crossed with Shared 
structure (high similarity or low similarity mammals) in a within subjects design on both 
factors. 
Participants were given 16 items to evaluate. Half of the items involved high 
similarity mammal pairs (e.g. horse-cow), whereas the other half involved low similarity 
mammal pairs (e.g. dolphin-cow). Eight mammal pairs were used, each of which appeared in 
2 orders (e.g. horse-cow, cow-horse). See top of Table 3.1 for the complete set of premise-
conclusion categories. 
Each of the resulting 16 mammal-pairs was assigned a pair of properties (for 
examples see Table 3.2; the full set of properties used is shown in Table A.3.1). At each level 
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of shared structure, for half of the items a causal relation was stipulated and an explanation 
for this relation was given (the causal+explanation condition), whereas for the rest no relation 
was stipulated (the control condition). At each level of shared structure, the same 4 mammal 
pairs were used to form the causal+explanation and control conditions except that their 
assignment to premise and conclusion categories was swapped across conditions. Four lists of 
materials were constructed to counterbalance the assignment of mammal-pairs to the 
causal+explanation and control conditions (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Design and Materials of Experiments 3 and 4. Experimental = 
causal+explanation condition (Exp. 3), causal condition (Exp. 4). 

































For each argument, participants were asked to choose the property (cause or effect in 
the causal condition) that the target mammal was more likely to have. Table 3.2 below 
illustrates samples from each Shared structure by Relation condition. 
Both the position of the properties after "Fact" and their evaluation order were 
separately randomized for each participant. Table 3.2 shows only one position of properties 
after "Fact" (the one where the central property is presented first), and only one evaluation 
order (the one where the central property appears as the first choice). 
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Table 3. 2 Sample items from each Shared Structure by Relation condition of 
Experiments 3 and 4. Control items contained the description in 
bold- faced letters. Causal+explanation items (Exp. 3) contained the 
whole description. Causal items (Exp. 4) contained the whole 
description except the text inside brackets. 
Shared structure 
High Fact: Squirrels have exceptional hearing and frequent 
Similarity headaches. 
For squirrels, exceptional hearing causes frequent headaches 
[because very high auditory frequencies cause nasal cavities to 
vibrate.] 
Choose the statement below that you consider more likely to 
be true. 
A. Mice have exceptional hearing. Central 
B. Mice have frequent headaches. Less central 
Low similarity Fact: Squirrels have an underdeveloped hippocampus and 
anterograde amnesia. 
For squirrels, an underdeveloped hippocampus causes anterograde 
amnesia [because underdeveloped mammillary bodies adversely 
affect memory.] 
Choose the statement below that you consider more likely to 
be true. 
A. Rhinos have an underdeveloped hippocampus. Central 
B. Rhinos have anterograde amnesia. Less central 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a booklet, containing one of the resulting 4 lists 
of material. There was no time limit but participants were encouraged to work quickly. 
Participants read the following instructions: 
Imagine that you are a first-year undergraduate in biology interested in the 
physiology and behaviour of mammals. You recently got hold of an 
authoritative book on the biology of mammals only to find out that some of 
the pages were missing or were torn apart. You are left with some excerpts 
from the book stating facts about the biology of some mammals. You are 
informed that a given mammal has two properties. These properties may 
refer to any physiologically meaningful aspect of that mammal. Beneath each 
excerpt you are presented with a different mammal and you are asked to 
choose the property that this mammal is more likely to have. 
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Participants had to work through two examples similar to the test items, one in the 
causal+explanation and another in the control condition. They were also asked to treat each 
test example separately. 
R E S U L T S 
Coding. The choice of the central property (the cause in the causal+explanation condition) 
was coded as 1, and the choice of the less central property (the effect in the 
causal+explanation condition) as 0. The control items were scored accordingly: control items 
whose causal+explanation counterpart was central were coded as 1, otherwise as 0. The 
dependent variable was the proportion of central property choices over the total number of 
choices. Each participant contributed 4 data points, one in each Shared structure by Relation 
condition. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results. Overall, participants chose more the central over 
the less-central properties in the causal+explanation condition, rather than the corresponding 
properties in the control condition. Further, the preference to project central over less-central 
properties is higher for arguments involving high similarity rather than low similarity 
categories. 
Table 3. 3 Mean proportion choice of the property designed as the cause in the 
causal+explanation condition. 
Shared Structure 
High Similarity Low Similarity 
Relation 
Causal .70 (.06) .61 (.05) 
Control .56 (.06) .53 (.04) 
Preliminary tests showed that the different lists did not have an influence on 
participants' responses. The data were therefore collapsed across lists. 
Two 2 (Shared structure) x 2 (Relation) analyses of variance were carried on the 
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resulting data (one for F| and one for F 2). In the Fi analysis both factors were repeated 
measures, in the F 2 analysis only Relation was a repeated measures factor. Shared structure 
failed to reach significance (F j ( l , 23) = 1.21; F2<1). Relation had a robust main effect (F i ( l , 
23) = 4.29, p = .05; F 2 ( l , 14) = 13.24, p<.005). There was no significant Shared structure x 
Relation interaction (both Fs<l). 
DISCUSSION 
In sum, only the centrality manipulation had a significant effect. Participants were more 
willing to project properties designed as causes rather than effects in the causal+explanation 
condition, rather than their counterparts in the control condition. The fact that the centrality 
effect was stronger in the item analyses is unsurprising. Participants could possibly reason 
about some of the properties used, and hence believability and variability effects came into 
play. Recall that the participant analysis compared responses for different items. In the item 
analysis, where each causal+explanation item was pitted directly against its control 
counterpart, all extraneous effects are cancelled out. That is, the item analysis provides a 
cleaner test for our hypothesis. 
The significant effect of centrality may be attributable to the causal relation, or also to 
the explanation provided. Experiment 4 directly assessed this hypothesis by using the same 
items as Experiment 3, while dropping the explanations from the causal+explanation 
condition to form a causal condition. To the extent that supplying explanations play a role, we 
expected participants to be less willing to project the central property in the causal condition. 
I f the opposite is the case, we expected no differences in the results of the two experiments. 
The fact that shared structure failed to reach significance, suggests that centrality 
effects defined from a single causal+explanation relationship are not mediated by similarity. 
Possibly we failed to detect such an interaction because all category pairs were relatively 
similar; they all involved mammal categories. Experiments 6 and 7 manipulated shared 
structure more widely by manipulating superordinate membership. 
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3.5 EXPERIMENT 4: CENTRALITY FROM A CAUSAL RELATION 
The results of Experiment 3 show a robust effect of centrality. Experiment 4 aimed to 
investigate whether this effect was due to the causal relationship, or also to the explanation 
given. To this end, Experiment 4 used the same items and procedure as Experiment 3 with the 
change that the explanations were dropped from the causal+explanation condition to form 
what we call the causal condition. 
METHOD 
Participants. A new sample of 24 University of Durham students voluntarily participated in 
this experiment. The experiment was run in the computer room of Durham's Main Library. 
Design and Materials. Experiment 4 used the same design as Experiment 3. Relation (causal 
or control) was crossed with Shared structure (high similarity or low similarity mammals) in a 
within subjects design on both factors. 
The materials of this experiment were similar to those used in Experiment 3, except 
that the explanations were dropped from the causal+explanation condition and formed the 
causal condition. The control conditions were identical across experiments. For sample items 
in each Shared structure by Relation condition refer back to Table 3.2. (For the complete list 
of items see Table A.3.1) 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 4 used was similar to that of Experiment 3, with the 
change that the instructions of Experiment 3 were minimally revised to compensate for the 
change from the causal+explanation to the causal condition. The causal+explanation example 
in the instructions gave way to its causal counterpart. 
76 
R E S U L T S 
Coding. The data were coded in the same way as in Experiment 3. The choice of the central 
property (the cause in the causal condition) was coded as 1, and the choice of the less central 
property (the effect in the causal condition) as 0. The dependent variable was the ratio of 
central property choices over total number of choices. Each participant contributed 4 data 
points, one in each Shared structure by Relation condition. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the results. Overall, participants preferred to project the central 
over the less-central properties in the causal condition, rather than the corresponding 
properties in the control condition. Further, the preference to project central over less-central 
properties is higher for arguments involving high similarity rather than low similarity 
categories. 
Table 3. 4 Mean (SE) proportions of the property designed as the cause in the 
Causal condition. 
Shared Structure 
High Similarity Low Similarity 
Relation 
Causal .77 (.06) .66 (.05) 
Control .63 (.05) .51 (.05) 
Preliminary tests showed that the different lists used did not affect participants' 
responses. The results were therefore collapsed across lists. 
As in Experiment 3, two 2 (Shared structure) x 2 (Relation) analyses of variance were 
carried out. Shared structure had a main effect for participants (Fi ( l , 23) = 8.62, p<.01), but 
not for items (F 2 ( l , 14) = 1.74, p>.20). Relation had a robust main effect (F,( l , 23) = 6.19, 
p<.05; F 2 ( l , 14) = 15.96, p<.001). No significant interaction was found (both Fs<l). 
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DISCUSSION 
The results show that centrality had a robust effect; i.e. participants were more willing to 
project central properties in the causal condition rather than these properties' counterparts in 
the control condition. Shared structure did not have a robust effect. Furthermore, since the 
means in the causal condition are higher than those in the causal+explanation condition of 
Experiment 3, we can conclude that the results are indeed produced by the causal relation and 
not by the explanation given. 
It may be the case that the explanations given in Experiment 3 were somehow 
unbelievable or convoluted and hence they failed to further strengthen the projectibility of the 
central property. Furthermore, it is possible that the participants in the latter experiment 
created their own explanations to account for the causal relations. One's own explanations 
may have a bigger effect on judgment than explanation by others. In any case, stipulating a 
causal relation is sufficient to produce centrality effects. 
3.6 EXPERIMENTS: CENTRALITY-IN-THE-ABSTRACT 
Experiment 5 has two main objectives: (1) to detect whether a dependency relation 
suffices for centrality effects, and (2) to investigate whether centrality operates under 
conditions of vagueness. 
METHOD 
Participants. A new sample of 32 University of Durham students volunteered to participate. 
Materials, Procedure, and Design. Participants were asked to make a choice for the 
following argument that appeared in a single page: 
Fact: Mammal A has both physiological properties Z and W. 
For mammal A, property W depends on property Z. 
Choose the statement below that you consider more likely to be true. 
1. Mammal B has Z. 
2. Mammal B has W. 
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No instructions were given, but we assume that the participants treated mammals A and B as 
different. Both the presentation order of the properties in the first statement (Fact:...) and the 
two response alternatives were counterbalanced. Z always referred to the central property and 
W to the less-central one. The experiment used a goodness-of-fit 2 de s ign. 
R E S U L T S AND DISCUSSION 
One participant wrote "both the same" and hence was excluded from the analysis. Out of the 
remaining 31 participants, 22 chose to project the central property (Z). The binomial 
probability of getting at least 22 out of 31 Z choices by chance is less than .02 ( 2 (1 ) = 5.45, 
p<.02). 
Centrality effect. The results suggest that stipulating a single dependency relation is 
sufficient for centrality effects. It seems therefore that centrality in a dependency space (as we 
propose) rather than centrality in a causal space (as theorists of the causal status hypothesis 
propose) better captures the results. 
Shared structure effect. Assuming that participants considered mammals A and B as 
different, once again it seems that similarity does not affect the willingness to project the 
central (depended-on) versus the less-central (dependent) properties. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the centrality effect (the number of central over less-central choices) is closer to 
those of the high-similar conditions of Experiments 3, and 4. Possibly, in the absence of any 
information about the species involved, participants considered both mammals as similar 
since the label "mammal" was particularly salient. Empirical evidence suggests that the use of 
common labels facilitates category-based inference (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman, 
1989; Davidson & Gelman, 1990). For instance, Gelman and Markman (1986) have shown 
that giving two creatures a common linguistic label (like "bird") increased preschoolers 
propensity to import knowledge from one creature to another. 
Vagueness. In the current experiment both categories and properties were left 
abstract. The results support the view that feature centrality operates even under vague 
conditions. It is difficult to see how structural mapping models of category-based induction 
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can account for such results, since for these models to work need a complete specification of 
the predicates used, as well as their relations to other predicates. 
Taken together, the results of experiments 3, 4, and 5 show that central properties are 
more projectible than less-central ones in category-based inferences involving mammals. This 
effect was independent of shared structure. This may be because shared structure was not 
widely varied (both conditions involved mammals). A number of objections can be raised 
against our interpretations of the results. One objection is that our results might be due to a 
demand characteristic because they stem from a forced choice design. It is possible that, given 
the option, people wil l be indifferent about projecting the central or the less-central properties. 
(Recall that Experiment 2 suggested otherwise). A further objection is that the central 
properties came from different general classes than the less-central ones (Experiments 3 and 
4). Recall though that our design controlled for this discrepancy by including the control 
condition. 
3.7 EXPERIMENT 6: CENTRALITY FROM A SINGLE DEPENDENCY CHAIN 
Experiment 6 aimed to control for possible objections to the previous experiments. 
First, participants were asked to provide independent likelihood estimates for the central and 
the less-central properties. Second, both properties for a specific item came from the same 
general class (e.g., both were either enzymes, hormones, or neurotransmitters). Further, the 
range of shared structure was extended - we tested animals from different superordinates 
(e.g., falcons-hippos) as well as from the same superordinate (e.g. rhinos-hippos). Finally, we 
used a wider variety of dependency relations (e.g., depends, regulates). 
METHOD 
Participants. A new sample of 33 University of Durham undergraduates voluntarily 
participated in the study. 
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Design and Materials. Experiment 6 crossed Centrality (central or less-central properties) 
with Shared structure (high-similar same-superordinate (HSSS), or low-similar same-
superordinate (LSSS), or low-similar different superordinate (LSDS) animal pairs) in a 
repeated measures design on both factors. 
Animal pairs of different shared structure were selected from the Osherson et al. 
(1990) study where they provide a pair-wise similarity matrix (p. 196). However, for some 
items we relied on our intuitions. A check on the similarity of animal pairs was carried out by 
an independent group of 11 University of Durham students. The students were asked to rate 
the biological similarity of the 18 animal pairs of Experiment 6 on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 
was labeled as "highly dissimilar" and 10 as "highly similar". The mean similarity ratings 
were 7.86 for the HSSS condition, 3.26 for the LSSS condition, and 1.75 for the LSDS 
condition. The animal pairs used are presented Table 3.5 as a function of decreasing 
similarity. Notice that similarity decreases as one moves from HSSS, to LSSS, to LSDS 
animal pairs. The similarity estimates mark well the borders of the similarity conditions, with 
the exception of the Deer-Dolphin pair of the LSSS condition that overlaps in similarity with 
pairs of the LSDS condition. It seems that sharing a common superordinate is not sufficient to 
discriminate similarity estimates, below we argue that it is neither critical in projecting a 
property amongst categories or in mediating centrality effects. 
Table 3. 5 Animal pairs of Experiment 10 along with the mean (SE) similarity 
ratings. 
HSSS SIM LSSS SIM LSDS SIM 
Gorilla-Chimp 9.2 (.30) Beaver-Hippo 3.9 (.77) Sparrow-Tiger 2.2(.63) 
Lion-Tiger 8.5 (.39) Raccoon-Tiger 3.7 (.76) Blackbird-Chimp 2.1 (.69) 
Rhino-Beaver 8.2 (.30) Zebra-Chimp 3.5 (.86) Robin-Horse 1.8(.58) 
Seal-Dolphin 7.2 (.52) Ferret-Horse 3.2 (.81) Eagle-Mouse 1.7(.60) 
Cow-Horse 7.2 (.81) Bear-Mouse 3.1 (.76) Falcon-Hippo 1.5(.59) 
Squirrel-Mouse 6.9 (.56) Deer-Dolphin 2.2 (.68) Swallow-Dolphin 1.2(.44) 
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Participants were informed that an animal had two properties: one upon which one of 
its functions depended (the central property), and one that depended upon that function (less 
central). Participants were asked to estimate the likelihood that another animal had each of 
these properties. Eighteen items were constructed, 6 in each shared structure condition. Table 
3.6 presents sample items from each Shared structure by Centrality conditions. For the full list 
of properties used see Table A.3.6. 
Table 3. 6 Sample items from each Shared Structure by Centrality condition of 
Experiment 6. Only one name order and one premise triple by 
property type assignment is shown. 
Shared structure 
HSSS Fact: Rhinos have both the enzyme lipase and the enzyme 
amylase. 
For rhinos, the enzyme lipase regulates metabolism. 
For rhinos, the enzyme amylase is regulated by metabolic rate. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Hippos have lipase. Central 
B. Hippos have amylase. Less central 
LSSS Fact: Beavers have both the hormone prolactine and the hormone 
renin. 
For beavers, the hormone prolactine regulates blood flow. 
For rhinos, the hormone renin is regulated by blood flow. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Hippos have prolactine. Central 
B. Hippos have renin. Less central 
LSDS Fact: Falcons have both the neurotransmitter acetylcholine and the 
neurotransmitter noradrenalin. 
For falcons, the neurotransmitter acetylcholine helps detect 
predators. 
For falcons, the levels of the neurotransmitter noradrenalin increase 
after seeing a predator. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Hippos have acetylcholine. Central 
B. Hippos have noradrenalin. Less central 
Note. HSSS=high similarity same superordinate. LSSS=low similarity same 
superordinate. LSDS=low similarity different superordinate. 
Items were constructed as follows. The 18 premise categories were organized into 6 
sets of triples, each triple consisting of an item from each of the three shared structure 
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conditions. For example, the three items shown in Table 3.6 comprise one triple. A l l three 
categories of a premise triple for were paired with a conclusion category to form one item in 
the HS-SS, one in the LS-SS, and one in the LS-DS shared structure condition, respectively. 
Table 3.7 shows the construction of each of the six triples. 
Table 3. 7 The 18 premise-conclusion categories of Experiments 6, 7, 10, 11 
(first 3 triples), 15, and 16. 
Triple # Premise Triples Conclusion 
HSSS LSSS LSDS 
1 Rhino Beaver Falcon Hippo 
2 Squirrel Bear Eagle Mouse 
3 Cow Ferret Robin Horse 
4 Gorilla Zebra Blackbird Chimp 
5 Lion Raccoon Sparrow Tiger 
6 Seal Deer Swallow Dolphin 
Table 3. 8 Design of the 3 lists of materials of Experiments 6, 7, and 10. 
Triple # Listl List2 List3 
1 EHN HNE NEH 
2 EHN HNE NEH 
3 HNE NEH EHN 
4 HNE NEH EHN 
5 NEH EHN HNE 
6 NEH EHN HNE 
Note. EHN = HSSS enzyme, LSSS hormone, LSDS neurotransmitter. 
HNE = HSSS hormone, LSSS neurotransmitter, LSDS enzyme. 
NEH = HSSS neurotransmitter, LSSS enzyme, LSDS hormone. 
Three types of properties were used: enzymes, hormones, and neurotransmitters. For 
a given item, both properties came from the same biological class (e.g. both were enzymes). 
Arguments constructed from a given triple were assigned different property types. For 
example, for triple number 1, one member of the triple would have enzyme properties, 
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another would have hormone properties, and the third neurotransmitters. Then, a 
counterbalancing procedure made sure that each member of the triple occurred equally often 
with each property type to form three lists of materials. Table 3.8 above shows the design of 
the 3 lists of materials. Each of these lists had a counterpart where the names of the central 
and the less-central properties were reversed. Table 3.9 shows the properties used for each 
triple. 





1 Lipase; protease Prolactin; renin Acetylcholine; 
nonadrenaline 
2 Amylase; ACTH; LH GABA; glycine 
streptokinase 
3 Papain; trypsin TSH; FSH Octopamine; histamine 
4 Thrombin; subtilisin ADH; MSH Norepinephrine; 
epinephrine 
5 Elastase; aliesterase Oxytocin; calcitocin Tyrosine; taurine 
6 Phosphorylase; Vasopressin; Quisqualate; kainate 
transacetylase proctolin 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 6 were similar to that used in Experiment 3, with 
the exception that the instructions of Experiment 3 were minimally revised to compensate for 
the fact that the present experiment involved animals. Participants worked through an 
example before starting the experiment. 
RESULTS 
The results are summarized in Table 3.10. As predicted, central properties were more 
projectible than less-central ones though this difference is small in absolute terms. 
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Table 3.10 Mean (SE) inductive strength (mean likelihood estimates) for the 
Shared structure by Centrality conditions. 
Centrality 
Central property Less-Central property 
Shared Structure 
Same-Superordinate Hiqh-Similaritv 74.9(2.11) 73.5(2.12) 
Same-Superordinate Low-Similaritv 55.2(2.99) 52.8(3.01) 
Differ.-Superordinate Low-Similaritv 51.8(2.92) 50.1 (2.98) 
Two 2 (Centrality) x 3 (Shared structure) analyses of variance were carried out. In the 
Fj analysis both factors were repeated measures, in the F 2 analysis only Centrality was a 
repeated measures factor. The analyses showed a main effect of Centrality (F, (1,32)=4.74, 
p<.05; F2( 1,15)= 12.42, p<.005) and a main effect of Shared structure (F,*(2,31)=30.91, 
p<.001; F2(2,15)=27.73, p<.001)8. There was no significant interaction (both Fs<l). 
To examine the locus of the main effect of shared structure, unplanned multiple 
pairwise comparisons were carried out using Tukey's HSD test. Across both participants and 
items the mean for the HSSS condition was significantly higher than that for either the LSSS 
or LSDS conditions. The means for the LSSS and LSDS conditions were not significantly 
different from each other9. 
DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of the present experiment was to control for objections that could be raised 
for our previous experiments. It asked for likelihood estimates, it matched the general class of 
the central and less-central properties, it varied the type of relation used, and it used a wider 
range of similarity. The results replicated the findings of the previous studies. Central 
properties were slightly, though significantly, more projectible than less-central ones. Shared 
Whenever a repeated measures factor has three or more levels we report the exact F statistic (F ) 
from the conservative Pillai's trace test (see Howell, 1997, p. 498). 
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structure had a significant main effect that was due to the differences between the HSSS 
condition and the LSSS or LSDS conditions. Again no centrality by shared structure 
interaction was evidenced. However, such an interaction should be obtained by using highly 
dissimilar animal pairs. Something that is central for lions, for instance, should not be 
projectible to insects, since these categories involve very different mental representations. 
The fact that the effect of centrality was small might be due to background 
knowledge effects. Keeping the general class of properties within each item constant might 
have adversely stipulated relations that contradict general knowledge. For example, although 
we stated that an enzyme is controlled by metabolic rate, participants may still have thought 
that the enzyme also regulated metabolism thus breaking down the intended asymmetry. 
On a different note, one could still object that the results of this experiment were due 
to a demand characteristic. The central and less-central properties of each item were estimated 
side-by-side, and this might have caused participants to focus on the dependency status of a 
property that would not have otherwise influenced their judgments. 
3.8 EXPERIMENT 7: REPLICATION OF EXPERIMENT 6 
The major aim of Experiment 7 was to detect whether the centrality effect of 
Experiment 6 is robust. Experiment 7 further addressed 2 issues: (1) whether the centrality 
effect of Experiment 6 was due to a demand characteristic, and (2) whether the weak 
centrality effect was due to participant's misinterpreting asymmetric relations as bi-directional 
ones. To address issue (1), each item of Experiment 6 was split to form two separate items -
one about the central and one about the less-central property (this resembles our manipulation 
in Experiment 2). Issue (2) was addressed by instructing participants that the relations should 
be taken as unidirectional; e.g., when an item informed that an enzyme was regulated by 
metabolism that did not mean that metabolism was regulated by that enzyme. 
9 For items, the Tukey's tests were carried out using SPSS. For participants, the tests were carried out 
by the author (mean HSSS = 74.21; mean LSSS = 53.97; mean LSDS = 50.98; CD=6.05 
[MSCIIor=l04.40; n=33; qr(3, 64)=3.40]). 
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METHOD 
Participants. A new sample of 33 University of Durham students volunteered to participate. 
Materials and Design. Experiment 7 used the same design as that used in Experiment 6. 
Experiment 7 also used similar materials as those used in Experiment 6, except that each item 
of Experiment 6 was judged independently. For example, the HSSS item of Table 3.6 gave 
rise to the following 2 separate items: 
A central item 
Fact: For rhinos, the enzyme lipase regulates metabolism. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statement: 
Hippos have lipase. % 
Its less-central counterpart 
Fact: For rhinos, the enzyme amylase is regulated by metabolic rate. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statement: 
Hippos have amylase. % 
The central and less-central counterparts of a single item of Experiment 6 were placed at 
maximum distance from one another (18 items apart). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results are summarized in Table 3.11. The main trends of Experiment 7 are very similar 
to those of Experiment 6. Centrality had a weak absolute effect (though higher than that of 
Experiment 6), shared structure had a significant effect, and there does not seem to be a 
Centrality by Shared structure interaction. 
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Table 3.11 Mean (SE) inductive strength (mean likelihood estimates) for the 
Shared structure by Centrality conditions. Super=Superordinate. 
Centrality 
Central property Less-Central property 
Shared Structure 
Same-Super Hiqh-Similaritv 72.3(2.87) 67.1 (3.56) 
Same-Super Low-Similaritv 47.5(4.05) 44.1 (3.97) 
Differ.-Super Low-Similaritv 43.0 (3.74) 37.9 (3.60) 
As in Experiment 6, two 2 (Centrality) x 3 (Shared structure) analyses of variance 
were carried out. The analyses showed a main effect of Centrality (F](l,32)=4.75, p<.05; 
F2(l,15)=19.55, p<.001) and a main effect of Shared structure (F,'(2,31)=46.50, p<.001; 
F2(2,15)=42.16, p<.001). There was no significant interaction (both Fs<l). 
To examine the locus of the main effect of shared structure, unplanned multiple 
pairwise comparisons were carried out using Tukey's HSD test. Across both participants and 
items the mean for the HSSS condition was significantly higher than that for either the LSSS 
or LSDS conditions. The means for the LSSS and LSDS conditions were not significantly 
different from each other (for participants: mean HSSS=69.68; mean LSSS=45.78; mean 
LSDS=40.47; CD=6.39 [MS e r T o r =l 16.60; n=33; q r(3, 64)=3.40]). 
The main purpose of Experiment 7 was (1) to replicate the centrality effect of 
Experiment 6, (2) to test whether this effect was due to a demand characteristic, and (3) to test 
whether the weak effect of centrality was due to participants misinterpreting the stipulated 
relations as bi-directional ones. A quick glance at the cells of Tables 3.9 and 3.10 shows that 
the trends of both studies are identical. In sum, the main effect of centrality was replicated 
and the results tentatively rule out interpretations (2) and (3). Also, the main effect of shared 
structure is due to differences between the HSSS and the LSSS or LSDS conditions. The 
small effect of centrality in both experiments might be in part because participants read the 
passive versions (statements concerning some of the less central properties) as actives. 
Further experimentation is needed to examine this hypothesis. 
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3.9 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experiments of Chapter I I I addressed four broad issues: (1) the effect of feature 
centrality on projectibility, (2) the influence of shared structure between the premise and 
conclusion categories on centrality effects, (3) the role of vagueness and relational status of a 
feature on projectibility, and (4) whether feature centrality is best captured as centrality in a 
dependency or a causal space. Below we relate the current findings to each issue in turn. 
3.9.1 Centrality effect 
Throughout the experiments of Chapter I I I , centrality was defined in terms of a 
dependency relation. In each and every experiment participants were more willing to project 
the central over the less-central properties. 
In Experiments 3 and 4 centrality was defined from a cause-and-effect relation; the 
cause being the central and the effect the less-central property. As predicted, causes were 
more projectible than effects. In Experiment 5 centrality was defined from the vague 
dependency relation "substance W depends on substance Z". The depended-on property (Z) 
was the central and the dependent (W) the less central property. The results showed that the 
central property (Z) was more generalizable than the less-central one (W). Finally, in 
Experiments 6 and 7 centrality was defined in terms of various types of dependency relations. 
Once again feature centrality had a strong effect on people's willingness to project a property. 
3.9.2 Shared structure 
The effect of feature centrality on projectibility is one aspect of our hypothesis. A 
second aspect is that this effect should be mediated by the extent to which the premise and 
conclusion categories share structure. To this end, we varied the similarity between the 
premise and conclusion categories. The more similar two categories were judged, the more 
structure they were assumed to share. In Experiments 3 and 4 some arguments involved 
similar while others dissimilar pairs of mammals. The effect of centrality on projectibility was 
independent from the level of shared structure. We reasoned that the failure to detect an 
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interaction might be because the amount of shared structure was not widely varied - all 
premise-conclusion pairs involved mammal categories. Experiments 6 and 7 examined this 
hypothesis by varying shared structure more widely. Some category pairs were highly-similar 
from the same superordinate, some low-similar from the same superordinate, and some low-
similar from different superordinates. Despite this wider manipulation of shared structure, we 
once again failed to detect an interaction between shared structure and centrality on people's 
willingness to project properties. 
Two factors may contribute to our failure to observe such an interaction: (1) that 
similarity was still not widely varied - all premise-conclusion pairs involved animals, and or 
(2) that the effect of centrality might depend on a stricter sense of similarity - on whether the 
conclusion category has the properties specified for the candidate feature for the premise. 
Notice that all the properties that depended upon the candidate features were specific and 
fairly general (e.g., metabolism, or heart rate). Hence, all animals could be safely assumed to 
share these properties. In Chapter IV we examine hypothesis (2) by using abstract dependent 
properties such as "lots of functions" or "few functions". I f people project a property to the 
extent they believe that the conclusion category shares the properties that depend-on the 
candidate inference, then in this case we expect shared structure to interact with centrality. 
As mentioned in the introduction of the present chapter, Experiments 6 and 7 by 
manipulating shared structure addressed two claims concerning the role of taxonomies in 
property induction: (1) that sharing a superordinate decides the strength of arguments, and (2) 
that sharing a superordinate mediates the centrality effect on property induction. I f claim (1) 
were true, then we should not observe differences in property generalizability among HSSS 
and LSSS categories, but we should observe differences among HSSS or LSSS and LSDS 
categories. Contrary to claim (1), the results showed significant differences between the 
HSSS and the LSSS or LSDS conditions only. I f claim (2) were true, then we should not 
observe differences in the generalizability of the central and the less central properties among 
same superordinate categories, but we should observe differences among different 
superordinate categories. Contrary to claim (2), no differences were detected (no shared 
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structure by centrality interaction). It seems therefore that both claims are unwarranted. 
Superordinate structure is not all-important in either projecting a property amongst categories 
or in mediating centrality effects. These two claims about superordinate structure wil l be 
revisited in Experiments 10 and 11 of Chapter IV. 
3.9.3 Vagueness and directionality 
Experiment 5 investigated for centrality effects under vague conditions. Both the 
candidate properties (substance Z, and substance W) as well as the premise and conclusion 
categories (Mammal 1, or Mammal 2) were left vague. The results showed that centrality 
operates under vagueness. Structural-mapping models cannot capture this finding since for 
such models to work predicates, as well as their relations to other predicates, need all be 
clearly specified. 
Yet, one could claim that the participants translated the vague properties as concrete 
ones, and reasoned from those. Even i f we grant that participants reasoned about concrete 
properties, the structural-mapping model still fails to predict a preference in projecting the 
central over the less-central properties (the depended-on over the dependent properties). That 
is because it does not consider the status of a property in a relation (refer to the General 
Discussion of Chapter II) . However, a preference to generalize central properties was 
evidenced in all our studies. In Experiments 3 and 4 participants preferred to project causes 
over effects in the causal condition, rather than their counterparts in the control condition. 
Further, in experiments 6 and 7 participants gave overall higher inductive strength estimates 
for the depended-on rather than for the dependent properties. 
3.9.4 Feature centrality: Centrality in a causal or a dependency space? 
Ahn and Lassaline (1995) claim that feature centrality is determined by virtue of a 
feature's causal relations (see also Ahn and Dennis, 1997). On this account, the centrality of a 
feature is a function of a feature's causal status. Our hypothesis extends this notion to 
asymmetric dependency relations of which causal ones are but a special case. In Experiment 5 
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the relative centrality of two properties was defined by embedding them in an unspecified 
dependency relation. The results showed that participants preferred to project the central over 
the less-central properties much in the same way as with causal relations (see Experiments 3 
and 4). This supports the view that feature centrality is not confined to causal status, but more 
generally to the status of a property in a concept's dependency space. (For independent 
evidence see Sloman et al. 1998, Studies 3A and 3B) 
3.9.5 Blankety blank 
Were the candidate properties used in the present experiments blank? Certainly the 
properties of Experiments 6 and 7 (and the abstract properties of Experiment 5), such as 
neurotransmitter octopamine, have the same flavor of unfamiliarity as the properties that 
Osherson et al. (1990) and Sloman (1993) used. At the same time, our studies provided 
information about how the candidate properties were related to each other, or how each 
property was related to a premise category's functions. Thus the properties were unfamiliar in 
a sense (most people are unfamiliar with the neurotransmitter octopamine), but not in terms of 
relative centrality status. Whether such predicates qualify as blank, depends on where a 
theorist stands on the centrality issue. For theorists who assume that centrality information 
(information about the dependency status of a property) does not influence inductive 
reasoning, then such properties are blank. Our whole theory centers on the belief that 
centrality information does influence projectibility, and hence we do not qualify such 
predicates as blank. 
To sum up so far, experiments in Chapter I I showed that the more immutable a 
property for an animal category the higher its generalizability to other animal categories. The 
results also suggested that immutability and centrality in a dependency space measure the 
same underlying factor (presumably conceptual centrality). Experiments in Chapter I I I built 
on this finding. They searched for centrality effects with centrality defined from a single 
dependency chain. The results showed that centrality defined as such influences projectibility 
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and that shared structure does not interact with centrality. A centrality effect was also shown 
under conditions of vagueness, i.e. with unspecified dependency relations. This implies that 
(1) current structural mapping models will prove unable to account for centrality effects, and 
(2) that feature centrality is best conceived as centrality in a dependency space (as we 
suppose) rather than as centrality in a causal space (as the causal status hypothesis suggests). 
Taken together, the findings support the Sloman et al. (1998) notion that centrality can be 
ultimately defined in terms of local pairwise dependency relations. Chapter IV continues to 
examine the centrality hypothesis by focusing on another critical aspect of the Sloman et al. 
notion, i.e. that a feature is central for a concept to the extent that other features depend on it. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
CENTRALITY AND PROJECTIBILITY FROM 
THE "FEW/LOTS" DEFINITION 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Experiments of Chapter IV operationalize relative feature centrality from the 
"Few/Lots" definition and examine its influence on projectibility. We stipulate that lots of an 
animal's functions depend on a property but few on another property of the same type (e.g., 
lots of an elephant's properties depend on the enzyme elastase, but few on the enzyme 
aliesterase). Participants are asked either to rate the likelihood that a target species has each of 
these properties or else to choose the property that a target species is more likely to have. The 
property upon which lots of an animal's functions depend (e.g. elastase) is taken to be the 
central property, while the property upon which few of the animal functions depend (e.g. 
aliesterase) to be the less-central property. The following sections explain why the 
"Few/Lots" operationalization was used. 
4.1.1 The "Few/Lots" definition captures Sloman et al.'s (1998) notion of 
feature centrality 
The "Few/Lots" operationalization captures the spirit behind the Sloman et al. (1998) 
notion that a feature is central to the extent that other features depend on it. Although in the 
Sloman et al. model feature centrality ultimately derives from pairwise dependency relations, 
defining relative feature centrality from a single dependency chain (as in the experiments of 
Chapter III) is an extreme rather than a typical case. The "Few/Lots" definition also leads to 
the construction of more ecologically valid examples in the sense that most biological 
properties are intertwined with multiple other biological properties and functions. Evidence 
that centrality from the "Few/Lots" definition influences projectibility would further suggest 
that centrality in a concept's dependency space constrains property induction. This definition 
also helps to rule out an interpretation that the results of Chapter I I I afford, as shown in the 
next section. 
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4.1.2 The "Few/Lots" definition helps control for necessity and sufficiency 
In Chapter I I I relative feature centrality was defined in terms of a single dependency 
chain, the depended-on properties being the central and the dependent the less-central 
properties, and its effect on property induction was examined. This operationalization helped 
contrast our predictions against those of structural-mapping models. Recall that most of the 
evidence for the principle of systematicity as an inductive constraint came from studies that 
compared the projectibility of features embedded in causal (or temporal) relations to ones that 
were not (see Lasaline, 1996; Wu & Gentner, 1998 [for a brief exposition of their studies 
refer to the introductory chapter]). The findings of Chapter I I I supported our claim. They 
showed that depended-on properties were more projectible than their dependent counterparts; 
central properties were more projectible than less-central ones. 
One might attribute the results to a default assumption that depended-on properties 
are necessary but insufficient for the presence of the dependent properties. In the case of a 
cause and effect relation, for instance, the presence of a cause may be assumed as necessary 
but not sufficient for the presence of the effect. On this assumption, whenever the effect is 
present the cause is present as well (the cause is necessary), but there may be cases where the 
cause is present but the effect is absent (the cause is not sufficient). Under such an 
assumption, therefore, it normatively follows that "central" properties are more projectible 
than their "less-central" counterparts. Although it is not clear why there is or there should be 
such a default assumption, the "Few/Lots" definition investigates to what extent centrality 
effects can be explained by an appeal to necessity and sufficiency. What is manipulated in 
Chapter IV is the number of properties that depend upon a candidate feature, not the status of 
the candidate feature: both the central and the less-central features are depended-on. This 
manipulation should thus control for any default assumptions about necessity and sufficiency. 
Note that we do not argue that beliefs about necessity and sufficiency leave property 
induction unaffected. Quite the contrary, all else being equal, stipulating that various features 
can account for the functions that depend upon a candidate feature, should reduce the 
96 
projectibility of that particular feature. That is because any one of those features would be 
sufficient to promote coherence. Stipulating, for example, that lots of elephants' enzymes help 
increase its metabolic rate reduces the belief that any particular enzyme is present in rhinos. 
Instead, the "Few/Lots" definition aims to rule out the possibility that the centrality effects 
can be fully explained by an appeal to default assumptions about necessity and sufficiency. 
4.1.3 The "Few/Lots" definition offers a different manipulation of shared 
structure 
So far, our experiments have failed to detect an interaction between (overall) shared 
structure and feature centrality on category-based inference. However, based on conceptual 
arguments we have claimed that the effect of centrality on projectibility should be mediated 
by the extent to which the base and target concepts share structure. That is because centrality 
is concept relative; e.g., roundness is a central property for the concept basketball but not for 
the concept cantaloupe (Medin & Shoben, 1988). In cases where the premise and conclusion 
categories share very different structure, the centrality effect may even be reversed. It is less 
likely, for instance, that humans and chairs share conceptually central rather than 
conceptually peripheral properties. 
Why then our experiments have failed so far to detect such an interaction? A reason 
might be that shared structure was not manipulated widely enough; all premise and 
conclusion categories involved animals and therefore shared lots of structure. Another (and 
possibly complementary) reason might be because in many experiments (especially in 
Experiments 6 and 7) the dependent properties were concrete and fairly general such as 
metabolism (but notice that Experiment 5 used abstract properties). Thus, it could be safely 
assumed that all target animals shared these properties. The point is that what might mediate 
the effect of feature centrality on projectibility may not be the extent to which the base and 
target categories share overall structure (properties and relations), but rather the extent to 
which the target shares the specific properties that depend on the candidate feature. 
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The "Few/Lots" definition goes some way in addressing this issue by leaving the 
properties that depend upon the central and less-central candidate inferences vague. 
Intuitively, the more similar the base and target categories are, the more likely that the target 
wi l l share the dependent properties specified for the base. All else equal, the more properties 
the target shares with the base, the greater the need to support them and hence the greater the 
need to project the central candidate inference. Following this line of reasoning, as the 
amount of shared structure decreases the preference to project the central property should 
decrease as well. Evidence therefore for a centrality by shared structure effect in experiments 
of the current chapter, would support that the effect of feature centrality on projectibility is 
mediated by whether the target is believed to share the base's properties that depend on the 
candidate feature. 
Experiments 10 and 11 of Chapter IV, like Experiments 6 and 7 of Chapter I I I , 
manipulate superodinate structure. They use animal pairs high in similarity from the same 
superordinate, low in similarity from the same superordinate, and low in similarity from 
different superordinates. Hence, these experiments also address the role of superordinate 
structure in property induction and in mediating the effect of centrality. 
4.1.4 The "Few/Lots" definition provides a test for vagueness 
As discussed earlier, a precondition for structural mapping models to make any 
predictions is that predicates, as well as their relations to other predicates, be all completely 
specified. Stating that lots (or few) of an animal's functions depend on a particular feature 
without specifying which, leaves this condition unsatisfied. Evidence for asymmetries in the 
preference to project the central over the less-central properties would therefore fall outside 
the domain of such models. 
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4.2 EXPERIMENT 8: FAMILIAR CATEGORIES, ABSTRACT PROPERTIES 
The purpose of Experiment 8 was twofold: (1) to provide evidence that centrality 
from the "Few/Lots" definition influences projectibility, and (2) to detect empirically a 
possible boundary condition for the centrality effect. Based on the findings of Chapter I I I , no 
interaction between feature centrality and shared structure was expected. However, i f such an 
interaction is observed, it will support that the centrality effect gets mediated by the extent to 
which the target category shares (or more accurately, it is believed to share) the properties 
specified for the candidate feature for the premise. 
METHOD 
Participants. Twenty-four University of Durham students voluntarily participated in this 
experiment. 
Design and Materials. Participants were informed that a mammal had two properties (Z and 
W) and that many of that mammal's physiological functions depended on Z (the central 
property), but only few on W (the less-central property). Participants were asked to choose 
the property (Z or W) that they believed another mammal was more likely to have. Sixteen 
items were constructed such that half included similar and half dissimilar pairs of mammals. 
Table 4.1 overleaf presents sample items from each shared structure condition. 
Animal pairs of different similarity were selected from the Osherson et. al. (1990, 
p. 196) study where they provide a pair-wise similarity matrix. However, for some items we 
relied on our intuitions. To check whether our similarity manipulation was justified, we 
gathered similarity estimates for the categories used. An independent group of twelve students 
from the University of Durham voluntarily rated the biological similarity of the 16 mammal 
pairs in a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 was labeled as "highly dissimilar" and 10 as "highly 
similar." For the High-Similarity condition the mean rating was 7.39 (SE = .43; min = 5.92; 
max = 8.92), whereas for the Low-Similarity condition the mean was 1.74 (SE = .18; min = 
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.92; max = 2.33). The results justify therefore the assignment of category pairs into High-
Similarity and Low-Similarity conditions. The similarity data are presented in the 
accompanying floppy disk. 
Table 4.1 Sample items from each Shared Structure condition for Experiment 8. 
Shared structure 
High Similarity 
Fact: Many of a horse's physiological functions depend on Z, but only 
a few depend on W. 
Choose the statement below that you consider more likely to be true. 
A. Cows have Z. Central 
B. Cows have W. Less central 
Low Similarity 
Fact: Many of a seal's physiological functions depend on Z, but only a 
few depend on W. 
Choose the statement below that you consider more likely to be true. 
A. Horses have Z. Central 
B. Horses have W. Less central 
Two lists of materials were constructed, each consisting of eight high similarity items 
and eight low-similarity items. The two lists differed in that the order of the premise and 
conclusion categories in List 1 was reversed in List 2. For example, List 1 contained the 
premise-conclusion pair "horse-cow" whereas List 2 contained "cow-horse". Table 4.2 
presents the ful l set of items of List 1. Twelve participants were assigned in each list. The 
presentation order of the items within each list was randomized for each participant. The 
order of the two response alternatives was pseudo-randomized for each participant; in each 
shared structure condition half the items presented the central response first, half the central 
response second. 
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Table 4. 2 Animal pairs for Experiment 8, List 1. 
High Similarity Low Similarity 
Premise Conclusion Premise Conclusion 
Horse Cow Seal Horse 
Mouse Squirrel Cow Mouse 
Dolphin Seal Elephant Beaver 
Rhino Elephant Squirrel Rhino 
Chimpanzee Gorilla Gorilla Deer 
Lion Tiger Tiger Chimpanzee 
Deer Antelope Antelope Dolphin 
Beaver Raccoon Raccoon Lion 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a booklet, containing one of the resulting two 
lists of materials. There was no time restriction but participants were encouraged to work 
quickly. Participants received the following instructions: 
Imagine that you are a first-year undergraduate in biology interested in the 
physiology of mammals. You recently got hold of an authoritative book on the 
physiology of mammals only to find out that some of the pages were missing 
or were torn apart. You are left with some excerpts from the book stating facts 
about the physiology of some mammals. You are informed that a given 
mammal has properties Z and W. Those properties may refer to any 
physiologically meaningful aspect of that mammal. You know nothing about 
the properties Z and W except that lots of the physiological functions of the 
given mammal depend on Z, but few depend on W. Beneath each excerpt you 
are presented with a different mammal and you are asked to choose the 
property (Z or W) that this mammal is more likely to have. 
Before the experiment commenced participants worked through an example of the same 
format as the test items. They were also told that there was no right or wrong answer - they 
just had to choose the statement that they considered more likely to be true. Finally, they were 
instructed that the properties Z and W were not meant to refer to the same properties across 
items and that each item should be treated separately. 
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RESULTS 
Coding. The choice of the central property (Z) was coded as 1 and the choice of the non-
central property (W) as 0. For each participant, the number of central choices divided by the 
total number of choices was calculated for each similarity condition. Scores higher than .50 
represent a positive centrality effect, scores lower than .50 a negative centrality effect, and 
scores close to .50 a null centrality effect. 
The results are presented in Table 4.3. Overall, participants chose to project the 
central over the less-central property among high-similar but not among the low-similar pairs 
of mammals. That is, a positive centrality effect is shown for high similarity but not for low 
similarity items. 
Table 4. 3 Mean (SE) percentage choice of the central property. 
Shared Structure 
High-Similarity Low-Similarity 
.95 (.02) .44 (.09) 
A 2 (List) x 2 (Shared structure) mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last 
factor, showed a significant main effect of Shared structure (Fi ( l , 22) = 30.45, p<.001; F 2 ( l , 
14) = 275.53, p<.001). Both List and the List by Shared structure failed to reach significance 
(all Fs<l). The mean estimate for the high-similarity condition was significantly greater than 
chance (participants: t(23) = 19.94, p<.001; items: t(7) = 18.81, p<.001; chance level = .50). 
The mean estimate for the low-similarity condition was not significantly different than chance 
for participants (11(23) I <1; chance level = .50), but it was for items (t(7) = 3.24, p<.05; 
chance level = .50). 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 8 addressed whether feature centrality defined in terms of the "Few/Lots" 
definition influences property induction. In the case it did, it further aimed to detect a possible 
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boundary condition for this effect by manipulating the similarity between the premise and 
conclusion categories. The results showed a main effect of shared structure (on the effect of 
centrality) - high similarity items showed a positive centrality effect (mean score higher than 
.50), whereas low-similarity items showed no robust centrality effect (mean score close to 
.50). Otherwise stated, for the first time, the results showed an interaction between shared 
structure and centrality on projectibility - feature centrality influenced projectibility for 
similar but not for dissimilar pairs of mammals. 
The findings of Experiment 8 should be interpreted with caution. One could object 
that the results are an artifact of a demand characteristic created by the forced choice 
procedure. I f participants were given a wider choice of estimates (e.g., a "no preference" 
option) this result might disappear. (Notice, however, that such a claim is not supported from 
our studies; see e.g. Experiments 2 and 7) To remove this plausible interpretation, all our 
studies henceforth asked for likelihood estimates while putting the central and less-central 
properties side by side for evaluation. This meant that i f participants were indifferent in 
projecting the central over the less-central properties, they were able to say so. 
4.3 EXPERIMENT 9: UNSPECIFIED CATEGORIES, ABSTRACT PROPERTIES 
Following up from Experiment 8, Experiment 9 aimed to test the reliability and 
generality of centrality effects by using the more sensitive measure of conditional likelihood 
estimates. Experiment 9 examined the effects of feature centrality when all that is known is 
the superordinate category, mammal or bird. Participants were asked to provide estimates for 
two items involving abstract properties. One item asked participants to project a central and a 
less-central property between mammals, while the other between a bird and a mammal. 
METHOD 
Participants. Twenty-four University of Durham students voluntarily participated in this 
experiment. 
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Design and Materials. Experiment 9 crossed Centrality (central or less-central properties) 
with Shared structure (same-superordinate or different-superordinate animal pairs) in a 
repeated measures design on both factors. Because the experiment involved only two items, 
no F 2 analyses were carried out. 
The participants provided likelihood estimates for the two items below (the bold-
faced headings are for clarification purposes and did not appear in the actual questionnaire): 
A. The Mammal 1->Mammal 2 Item (M->M) 
Fact: Many of mammal's 1 physiological functions depend on property X, but very 
few depend on property Y. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Mammal 2 has X. % 
B. Mammal 2 has Y. % 
B. The Bird 1-> Mammal 2 Item (B^M) 
Fact: Many of bird's 1 physiological functions depend on property Z, but very few 
depend on property W. 
Rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Mammal 2 has Z. % 
B. Mammal 2 has W. % 
Procedure. Participants were asked to provide likelihood estimates for the two items above 
which appeared in a single page. They were not explicitly told that mammal 1 and mammal 2 
were meant to be different, although it is assumed that participants treated them as different. 
The order of presentation of the two items in the questionnaire, as well as the order of the two 
response alternatives within an item was counterbalanced. Properties X and Z always referred 
to the central properties whereas properties Y and W to the less-central ones. Because all 
properties were abstract we did not consider it necessary to counterbalance for the names of 
the central and the less-central properties. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results are summarized in Table 4.4. A centrality effect is detected for the M - ^ M item 
but not for the B - ^ M item. Further, similarity seems to strongly influence the projectibility of 
the central but not the less-central properties. 
Table 4. 4 Mean (SE) inductive strength estimates for Experiment 9. 
Shared structure 
M->M Item B-»M Item 
Centrality 
Central Property .73 (.04) .47 (.05) 
Less-central Property .53 (.06) .47 (.05) 
A 2 (Shared structure) x 2 (Centrality) repeated measures ANOVA showed 
significant main effects of both Shared structure (Fi(l,23)=9.76, p<.01) and Centrality (F]( l , 
23)=7.82, p<.01). The Shared structure x Centrality interaction was also significant (F | ( l , 
23)=5.28, p<.05). For the M - > M item moving from the less-central to the central property led 
to a significant increase in inductive strength of .20 (t(23)=3.35, p<.005). For the B - ^ M item 
level of centrality had a null effect. For the central property moving from the M - > M to the 
B->M item led to a significant drop in inductive strength of .26 (t(23) = 4.51, p<.001), 
whereas for the less-central property the same movement resulted in a non-significant 
decrease of only .06 (t(23)<l). 
In sum, Experiment 9, using the more sensitive measure of likelihood estimates, 
showed that central properties are indeed more projectible than less-central ones but only 
across categories that share a common superordinate. The results rule out therefore the 
interpretation that the centrality effect of Experiment 8 was an artifact of the forced-choice 
procedure. I f participants were indifferent in projecting either property they could assign to 
both properties the same inductive strength estimate. Furthermore, similarity strongly 
influenced the participants' willingness to generalize the central property but only weakly 
their willingness to generalize the less-central property. 
105 
Taken together experiments 8 and 9 suggest a strong effect of feature centrality for 
same-superordinate highly similar animals (similar mammals) and no effects for different-
superordinate dissimilar animals (Experiment 9). Experiment 9 did not directly assess the 
issue of whether same-superordinate dissimilar animals can give rise to centrality effects, 
though Experiment 8 suggests that they do not. Following up from these experiments, 
Experiment 10 further examines the boundary conditions of the centrality effect by using 
animal categories that are highly similar from the same superordinate, dissimilar from the 
same superordinate, and dissimilar from a different superordinate. 
4.4 EXPERIMENT 10: FAMILIAR CA TEGORIES, CONCRETE PROPERTIES 
Experiment 10 examined centrality effects in a more ecologically valid context where 
both the animal categories are specified and the properties are meaningful (though 
unfamiliar). A boundary condition for the centrality effect on projectibility was investigated 
by crossing Centrality (central vs. less-central properties) with Shared structure (high-
similarity same-superordinate vs. low-similarity same-superordinate vs. low-similarity 
different-superordinate animal pairs) in a repeated measures design on both factors. Based on 
the evidence from Experiment 9, we expected no centrality effects in the different-
superordinate low-similarity condition (LSDS). Experiment 8 suggests no effect of feature 
centrality in the same-superordinate low-similarity condition (LSSS), though it employed the 
less powerful forced-choice procedure. 
METHOD 
Participants. Twenty-four University of Durham students volunteered to participate in the 
experiment. 
Design and Materials. Experiment 10 crossed Centrality (central or less central properties) 
with Shared structure (high-similar same-superordinate (HSSS), or low-similar same 
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superordinate (LSSS), or low-similar different-superordinate (LSDS) animal pairs) in a 
repeated measures design on both factors. 
Participants were informed that an animal had two properties: one upon which lots of 
its functions depended (the central property), and one upon which only few of its functions 
depended (the less-central property). Participants were asked to estimate the likelihood that 
another animal had each of these properties. 
The same animal pairs and properties were used as in Experiment 6, but the wording 
of the items was different. Eighteen items were constructed, 6 in each shared structure 
condition. Table 4.5 presents sample items from each shared structure by centrality condition. 




Fact: Many of a squirrel's physiological functions depend on the enzyme amylase, but only a 
few depend on the enzyme streptokinase. 
Please rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Mice have amylase. % Central 
B. Mice have streptokinase. % Less central 
LSSS 
Fact: Many of a bear's physiological functions depend on the enzyme amylase, but only a 
few depend on the enzyme streptokinase. 
Please rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Mice have amylase. % Central 
B. Mice have streptokinase. % Less central 
LSDS 
Fact: Many of an eagle's physiological functions depend on the enzyme amylase, but only a 
few depend on the enzyme streptokinase. 
Please rate the likelihood of the following statements. 
A. Mice have amylase. % Central 
B. Mice have streptokinase. % Less central 
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Three types of properties were used: enzymes, hormones, and neurotransmitters. For 
any given item, both properties were of the same type (e.g. both were enzymes as in the 
illustration above). Six lists of materials were constructed by counterbalancing the assignment 
of property type to animal pairs. Table 4.6 shows the design of the 6 lists of materials. 
Table 4. 6 Design of the 6 lists of materials of Experiment 10. 
Triple # Listl List2 List3 List4 List5 List6 
1 EHN EHN HNE HNE NEH NEH 
2 EHN EHN HNE HNE NEH NEH 
3 HNE NEH EHN NEH EHN HNE 
4 HNE NEH EHN NEH EHN HNE 
5 NEH HNE NEH EHN HNE EHN 
6 NEH HNE NEH EHN HNE EHN 
Note. EHN = HSSS enzyme, LSSS hormone, LSDS neurotransmitter. 
HNE = HSSS hormone, LSSS neurotransmitter, LSDS enzyme. 
NEH = HSSS neurotransmitter, LSSS enzyme, LSDS hormone. 
Each of the six lists had a counterpart where the names of the central and the less central 
properties were reversed, making 12 lists of materials in all. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a booklet, containing one of the resulting 12 lists 
of materials. There was no time limit but participants were encouraged to work quickly. 
Experiment 10 used similar instructions to the ones used in Experiment 8, with minimal 
changes to compensate for the use of unfamiliar properties and animals from different 
superordinates. Specifically, "animal" was substituted for "mammal," "two properties" for 
"properties Z and W," and "(Z or W)" and the sentence "You know nothing...on W" were 
both deleted from the instructions. Prior to the experiment, participants worked through an 
example of similar format to the test items. 
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RESULTS 
Table 4.7 summarizes the results. The centrality effect seems proportional to shared structure. 
This seems to be because as one moves from the HSSS to the LSSS to the LSDS condition, 
the inductive strength estimates for the central properties decrease steeply, whereas the 
estimates for the less-central properties decrease to a lesser extent. 
Table 4. 7 Mean (SE) inductive strength estimates as a function of Centrality and 
Shared structure for Experiment 10. 
Centrality 
Central property Less-Central property 
Shared structure 
HSSS 0.75 (.03) 0.55 (.05) 
LSSS 0.53 (.04) 0.47 (.04) 
LSDS 0.44 (.04) 0.47 (.05) 
A preliminary test showed no effects of the type of list used. The data were therefore 
collapsed across lists. Two 3 (Shared structure) x 2 (Centrality) analyses of variance were 
carried out. In the Fi analysis both factors were repeated measures, in the F2 analysis only 
Centrality was repeated measures. The analyses showed a main effect of Shared structure 
(F,*(2, 22) = 9.21, p<.005; F2(2, 15) = 50.84, p<.001) and a main effect of Centrality (F,*(l, 
23) = 11.51, p<.005; F 2 ( l , 15) = 24.23, p<.001). The Shared structure x Centrality interaction 
was also significant (F,*(2, 22) = 5.65, p<05; F2(2, 15) = 20.75, p<.001). 
To examine the locus of the centrality effect, multiple pairwise t-tests were carried 
out across participants. For the HSSS condition, moving from the less-central to the central 
properties was accompanied by a significant increase in inductive strength of .20; (t(23) = 
4.46, p<.005). For the LSSS condition, a marginally significant centrality effect of .08 was 
detected (t(23) = 1.92, p<.07). For the LSDS condition a slightly negative but non-significant 
effect was detected ( | t | < l ) . The results show therefore a strong effect of centrality in the 
HSSS condition, a marginal effect in the LSSS condition and no effect in the LSDS condition. 
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The marginal effect of Shared structure in the LSSS condition leaves open the question of 
whether a common superordinate is sufficient for centrality effects. We wil l return to this 
claim below. 
The Shared structure by Centrality interaction seems to be caused by the fact that 
shared structure differentially affected the generalizability of the central and the less central 
properties. The projectibility of the central properties was influenced by shared structure 
condition (F,*(2, 22) = 22.67, p<.001; F2(2,15) = 65.16, p< 001), whereas the projectibility of 
the less-central properties was not significantly influenced by shared structure condition for 
participants (F,* (2, 22) = 1.59, p>.23), but it was for items (F2(2, 15) = 5.47, p<.05). 
Our experiments have yet to provide a fine-grained quantification of the relation 
between similarity and inductive strength estimates for the central and the less-central 
properties. Taken together, Experiments 8, 9, and 10 show little change in the mean inductive 
strength for the less-central properties as one moves across similarity conditions - they are all 
close to .50 (see Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.6). In search for a fine grained quantification of this 
relation, the correlation between the mean similarity ratings and the corresponding mean 
inductive strength estimates for each item were computed. The correlation between similarity 
and inductive strength for central properties was .98, and between similarity and inductive 
strength for less-central properties was .61. Their difference was found significant by a t-test 
for non-independent rs developed by Williams in 1959 (t(15)=5.02, p<.01). The correlation 
between Similarity and the difference in inductive strength between the central and the less 
central items was .90, p<.001. In sum, the results show that similarity is (1) an excellent 
predictor of the projectibility of central properties, (2) a somewhat worse predictor of the 
projectibity of the less central, and (3) a good predictor of the centrality effect. Table 4.8 
presents the correlation statistics for the present Experiment as well as for Experiments 6, 7, 
and 11. 
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Table 4. 8 Correlation statistics for items between estimates of shared 
structure and estimates of inductive strength for central properties, 
less central properties, and their difference. 
Experiment # 
10 11 6 7 
Correlation between estimates 
of shared structure and 
estimates for: 
Central properties .98** .98** .91** .94 
Less-central properties .61* .93** .93** .97 
Central - Less-central properties .90** .94** - .13 -.02 
Note. * p<05; ** p<01. 
Role of superodinate structure. To examine the claim that sharing a superordinate 
decides inductive strength, the data were collapsed across centrality conditions and unplanned 
multiple pairwise comparisons were carried out using Tukey's HSD test. Across both 
participants and items, the mean for the HSSS condition was significantly higher than that for 
either the LSSS or the LSDS conditions. The means for the LSSS and LSDS conditions were 
not significantly different from each other. (For participants: mean HSSS=64.82; mean 
LSSS=50.09; mean LSDS=45.66; CD=8.57 [MS e i T o r = 148.81; n=24; q r(3, 46) = 3.44]). 
To examine the claim that sharing a superordinate mediates the effect of centrality on 
induction, six Shared structure by Centrality analyses of variance were carried out (three for 
participants and three for items) and the interactions were observed. Each of these analyses of 
variance contrasted two shared structure conditions. A significant Shared structure by 
Centrality effect was detected for the analyses contrasting the HSSS and the LSSS conditions 
(F,(l,23)=10.75, p<.001; F 2(l,10)=l 1.30, p<.01), and the HSSS and the LSDS conditions 
(F,(l,23)=10.20, p<.005; F2(l,10)=40.36, p<.001). For the analyses contrasting the LSSS and 
LSDS conditions the interaction was significant for items (F2(l,10)=9.70, p<.05) and 
marginally significant for participants (Fi(l,23)=3.71, p<.07). 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 10 the effect of centrality on property induction was found proportional to the 
amount of shared structure between the premise and conclusion categories. A significant 
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centrality effect was reported for same-superordinate high-similar animal pairs, a marginal 
effect for same-superordinate low-similar pairs, and no effect for different-superordinate low-
similar pairs. This finding was due to that shared structure influenced more the projectibility 
of the central properties than it influenced the projectibility of the less central properties. 
Correlation analyses across items between similarity estimates and inductive strength 
estimates showed a .98 correlation for central properties, a .61 correlation for less-central 
properties, and a .90 correlation for the difference between the inductive strength of the two 
centrality conditions. 
The findings of Experiment 10, as those of Experiments 6 and 7, suggest that 
superordinate structure is not all-important in estimates of inductive strength or in mediating 
the effect of centrality. In the view of the empirical evidence, it is more accurate to state that 
both estimates are proportional to judged similarity; the higher the similarity between two 
categories the higher the argument strength, and the higher the difference between the 
projectibility of the central and the less central properties. Taken together experiments 8, 9, 
and 10 show that the effect of feature centrality, as defined from the "Few/Lots" definition, is 
proportional to similarity. 
4.5 EXPERIMENT 11: CENTRAL VERSUS LESS-CENTRAL VERSUS NO 
INFORMATION GIVEN PROPERTIES 
A pretty robust result across the experiments of Chapter IV is that the more central a 
property the higher its projectibility across categories in proportion to the degree to which 
they are similar. This finding directly supports our initial hypothesis (see Chapter I). A close 
inspection of the results, however, reveals that the locus of the shared structure by centrality 
interaction is that similarity influences the projectibility of the central but not of the less-
central properties (notice though that the correlation analyses of Experiment 10 showed that 
the projectibility of the less-central properties significantly covaries with similarity though to 
a lesser extent than the projectibility of the central properties). A parsimonious interpretation 
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of the findings is that they are not due to differences in conceptual centrality (as we claim) but 
rather due to similarity being a good surrogate for estimating the likelihood that a target 
category has the "central" but not the "less-central" properties. This is because lots of 
functions of a base animal depend on the "central" property, while few on the "less-central" 
one. In contrast, the locus of our explanation is that central properties are more projectible 
than less-central ones across categories (to the extent that these categories share structure) 
because they promote more coherence to the target concept. [Note that our hypothesis is 
supported by the experiments of Chapter III.] 
One way that Experiment 11 investigated this possibility is by including a no-
information-given condition. We reasoned that a property about which no centrality 
information is given might be a better control than a property for which it is stipulated that 
only few of an animal's properties depend on. If, as we propose, people are more confident in 
projecting central properties because these promote more coherence to the target concept, 
then we should observe a higher willingness to project central rather than no-information-
given properties. A second way that Experiment 11 examined this possibility, is by comparing 
the correlation between similarity estimates and inductive strength estimates for the central 
properties to that between similarity estimates and inductive strength estimates for the less 
central properties. To the extent that effect of shared structure on projectibility is comparable 
for central and less central properties, we expected no difference between the two correlation 
coefficients. 
METHOD 
Participants. Thirty-four University of Durham first-year undergraduates in psychology 
volunteered to participate. 
Design and Materials. Shared-structure (HSSS vs. LSSS vs. LSDS) was crossed with 
Centrality (central vs. less-central vs. no-information-given properties) in a repeated measures 
design on both factors. 
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The first three triples from Experiment 6 were used. Each participant had to rate nine 
items, three in each shared structure condition. Each item asked for three likelihood estimates, 
one in each centrality condition. Participants therefore had to provide 27 likelihood estimates 
in all. Table 4.9 presents a sample item from each Shared structure by centrality condition 
constructed from the second premise triple of Table 3.6. 




Fact: Squirrels have: 
The neurotransmitter taurine upon which lots of their physiological functions depend. 
The neurotransmitter glycine upon which few of their physiological functions depend. 
The neurotransmitter tyrosine about which you have no information. 
Please rate the likelihood of the following statements 
Mice have taurine. % 
Mice have glycine. % 
Mice have tyrosine. % 
LSSS 
Fact: Bears have: 
The enzyme aliesterase upon which lots of their physiological functions depend. 
The enzyme streptokinase upon which few of their physiological functions depend. 
The enzyme elastase about which you have no information. 
Please rate the likelihood of the following statements 
Mice have aliesterase. % 
Mice have streptokinase. % 
Mice have elastase. % 
LSDS 
Fact: Eagles have: 
The hormone MSH upon which lots of their physiological functions depend. 
The hormone ACTH upon which few of their physiological functions depend. 
The hormone TSH about which you have no information. 
Please rate the likelihood of the following statements 
Mice have MSH. % 
Mice have ACTH. % 
Mice have TSH. % 
As in Experiments 6 and 10, three types of properties were used: enzymes, hormones, 
and neurotransmitters. For a given item all properties were of the same type (e.g. see Table 











type assignment in a Latin square design. Each of these lists had a counterpart where the 
names of the central and the less-central properties were reversed, making 6 lists in all. 
Procedure. Participants were given a booklet containing one of the six lists of materials. The 
instructions of Experiment 10 were minimally revised to compensate for the changes in the 
present experiment; "two properties" was substituted by "three properties," and participants 
worked through examples similar to the test items. 
RESULTS 
The results are summarized in Table 4.10. Central properties were the most projectible, 
followed by the less-central and the no-information-given properties. There seems to be a 
significant interaction between shared structure and central vs. either less-central or no-
information given properties, but no interaction between shared structure and less-central vs. 
no-information given properties. 
Table 4.10 Mean (SE) inductive strength as a function of Similarity and Centrality 




















Preliminary tests showed that there was no effect of list. The data were therefore 
collapsed across lists. A 3 (Shared structure) x 3 (Centrality) ANOVA was conducted across 
participants with repeated measures on both factors. F 2 statistics were not calculated because 
there were only three items per shared structure condition. A main effect of Shared structure 
was detected (F,*(2, 32) = 12.88, p<.001), and a main effect of Centrality (F|*(2, 32) = 9.25, 
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p<.001). The Shared structure x Centrality interaction was also significant (Fi*(4, 30) = 5.53, 
p<.005). 
Central versus less-central properties. A 3 (Shared structure) x 2 (central vs. less-
central properties) evidenced a main effect of shared structure (Fi*(2, 32)=15.87, p<.001), a 
main effect of centrality condition (F|*(l, 33)=T4.98, p<.001), and a significant interaction 
(Fi*(2, 32)=6.15, p<.01). Central properties were more projectible than less-central ones in 
proportion to similarity. 
The correlation coefficients between estimates of similarity and estimates of 
inductive strength for central properties and less central properties are presented in Table 4.8. 
Both correlation coefficients were high (.98 and .93 respectively), and not statistically 
different from one another. 
To examine the claim that sharing a superordinate decides inductive strength, the data 
were collapsed across centrality conditions and unplanned multiple pairwise comparisons 
were carried out using Tukey's HSD test across participants. As in Experiment 10, the mean 
for the HSSS condition was significantly higher than that for either the LSSS or the LSDS 
conditions. The means for the LSSS and LSDS conditions were not significantly different 
from one another, (mean HSSS=66.72; mean LSSS=53.73; mean LSDS=51.74; CD=6.04 
[MSer ror=107.24; n=34; q r(3, 66) = 3.40]). 
To examine the claim that sharing a superordinate mediates the effect of centrality on 
induction, three Shared structure by Centrality analyses of variance were carried out for 
participants and the interactions were observed. Each of these analyses of variance contrasted 
two shared structure conditions. A significant Shared structure by Centrality effect was 
detected in all analyses (HSSS-LSSS: F,(l,33)=6.89, p<.05; HSSS-LSDS: F,(l,33)=l 1.94, 
p<.005; LSSS-LSDS: (F,(l,33)=5.27, p<.05). 
Central versus no-information-given properties. A 3 (Shared structure) x 2 (central vs. 
no-information-given properties) evidenced a main effect of Share structure (Fi*(2, 
32)=14.91, p<.001), a main effect of centrality (Fi*(l, 33)=18.97, p<.001), and a significant 
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interaction (F(*(2, 32)=11.22, p<.001. Central properties were more projectible than no-
information-given properties in proportion to similarity. 
Less-central versus no-information-given properties. A 3 (Shared structure) x 2 (Less-
central vs. no-information-given properties) evidenced a main effect of Shared structure 
(F,*(2, 32)=5.53, p<.01), and a main effect of centrality (F,*(l, 33)=4.59, p<.05). There was 
no Shared structure x Centrality interaction (Fi*(2, 32)<1). Less-central properties were more 
projectible than no-information-given properties but this was unaffected by similarity 
condition. 
DISCUSSION 
The main objective of Experiment 11 was to detect whether the results of experiments 8, 9 
and 10, that the more central a property the higher its projectibility among categories that 
share structure, were because central properties lend more coherence to the target concept, or 
else because the description of the central but not the less-central properties invited to use 
similarity as a surrogate of projectibility. To decide among these hypotheses we used similar 
materials as in Experiment 10 but we included a no-information-given condition. The 
rationale was that the no-information-given condition should provide a better control for our 
hypothesis. The centrality effect of Experiment 10 was replicated irrespective of which 
condition is chosen as a control. Central properties were more projectible than either less-
central or else no-information-given properties in proportion to shared structure. This 
suggests that, as we assume, central properties are more projectible because they lend more 
coherence to the target concept. 
Our account is further reinforced from the correlation analyses between similarity 
estimates and inductive strength estimates for the central and the less central properties. Both 
correlation coefficients were high (.98 and .93 respectively) and not significantly different 
from one another. In contrast to Experiment 10, Experiment 11 showed a comparable effect 
of shared structure on the projectibility of the central and the less central properties (see Table 
4.8). 
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The findings of Experiment 11, as those of Experiments 10, suggest that 
superordinate structure is not all-important in estimates of inductive strength or in mediating 
the effect of centrality. There was a significant difference between the projectibility of 
properties among HSSS and either LSSS or LSDS categories. Properties were not projected 
differentially between LSSS and LSDS categories. Also, a significant Shared structure by 
Centrality interaction was shown from comparing any two shared structure conditions. 
A rather counterintuitive result was that less-central properties were significantly 
more projectible than the no-information-given properties. Since no-information was given 
about these properties one might expect them to fall somewhere between the central and the 
less-central ones. Possibly putting all types of properties side-by-side for evaluation made the 
less-central property seem superior since more information was given for it. 
4.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experiments 8, 9, and 10 in Chapter IV defined relative feature centrality from the 
"Few/Lots" definition and showed that central properties are more projectibile than less 
central ones in proportion to shared structure between the premise-conclusion categories. 
Experiment 11 ruled out the intepretation that this finding was because the inductive strength 
for the central but not for the less central properties covaried with estimates of similarity. 
First, the inductive strength for both types of properties covaried with similarity to the same 
extent. Second, a similar shared structure by centrality effect was shown when the control 
condition involved properties about which no information was given. The significant 
centrality effect shown in Chapter IV provides a non-trivial extension of the results of 
Chapter I I I , since the present definition better captured the spirit of conceptual centrality 
behind the Sloman et al. (1998) model; i.e., that central features are those upon which many 
other features depend. 
As stated in the introduction, the "Few/Lots" definition also helped clarify whether 
the lack of interaction between shared structure and centrality in Chapter I I I was because (1) 
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similarity was not widely varied, or because (2) what mediates the effects of centrality on 
projectibility is the extent to which the target shares the properties that are specified for the 
base by the candidate feature. Since all experiments of Chapter IV showed such an 
interaction, claim (2) is supported. The effect of feature centrality on projectibility seems to 
be mediated therefore not by some measure of overall similarity but rather by shared structure 
with respect to the dependent properties. According to this interpretation, the experiments of 
Chapter I I I failed to show such an interaction because the dependent properties were all fairly 
general. It could thus be safely assumed that all the target categories had them. In the 
experiments of Chapter IV the depending on properties were left abstract, and hence it could 
be reasoned that the target category had them to the extent that it was similar to the base. 
Experiments 10 and 11 by manipulating superordinate structure addressed two claims 
concerning the role of taxonomies in property induction: (1) that sharing a superordinate 
decides the strength of arguments, and (2) that sharing a superordinate mediates the centrality 
effect on property induction. I f claim (1) were true, then we should not observe differences in 
property generalizability among HSSS and LSSS categories, but we should observe 
differences among HSSS or LSSS and LSDS categories. Contrary to claim (1), the results 
showed significant differences between the HSSS and the LSSS or LSDS conditions only 
mirroring the findings from Experiments 6 and 7 of Chapter I I I . I f claim (2) were true, then 
we should not observe differences in the generalizability of the central and the less central 
properties among same superordinate categories, but we should observe differences among 
different superordinate categories. Contrary to claim (2), differences were detected (i.e. 
significant Shared structure by Centrality interactions) in all shared structure conditions. It 
seems therefore that both claims are unwarranted. Superordinate structure is not all important 
in either projecting a property amongst categories or in mediating centrality effects. The role 
of superordinate structure in property induction and in mediating the centrality effect wi l l be 
discussed in the Final Discussion. 
The "Few/Lots" definition also helped to rule out an alternative interpretation 
afforded for the results of Chapter I I I . Those experiments found that central features were 
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more projectible than less central ones. Because relative centrality was defined in terms of a 
asymmetric dependency chain, the results were open to interpretations in terms of necessity 
and sufficiency. I f participants had interpreted the central (depended-on) properties as 
necessary but not sufficient for the presence of the less-central (dependent) properties, then 
the preference to project central properties can be described as rule following. In the 
experiments of Chapter IV both the central and the less-central properties were depended-on; 
what varied was the number of functions that depended on each. Therefore, the present 
centrality effects cannot be accounted for by default assumptions about necessity and 
sufficiency. 
Finally, the functions that depended upon the central and the less-central properties 
were left vague. As stated in the introduction, vagueness prevents structural mapping models 
(e.g., Gentner, 1983) from making any predictions. Thus, the present findings cannot be 
accounted by such models. 
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CHAPTER V: 
CENTRALITY VERSUS VARIABILITY: 
JUDGMENTS OF FREQUENCY AND 
PROJECTIBILITY 
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5.1 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY VERSUS VARIABILITY 
Conceptually, the degree of immutability of a feature for a concept is orthogonal to its 
degree of homogeneity. Conceptual centrality and homogeneity are aspects of two distinct 
views one can adopt about concepts: the inside view and the outside view, respectively (cf. 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Conceptual centrality measures the extent to which a feature 
promotes coherence to a concept, the extent to which deleting it (or changing its value) affects 
the internal structure of the mental representation. In contrast, homogeneity measures the 
extent to which a property is stable across the remembered instances of a category. In sum, 
conceptual centrality refers to the degree to which a feature is mentally transformable while 
retaining coherence, whereas homogeneity is a statistical property that refers to the degree to 
which a property is transformable across actual instances of a category. 
Immutability and homogeneity are dissociable. A feature can be mutable yet 
homogeneous due to happenstance. For ravens, for instance, being black is a homogeneous 
property (since almost all ravens are black) albeit one of their non-central properties (since 
imagining a raven that is not black does not require much mutation). Even better, being white 
is a very homogeneous property of refrigerators, but one of their less central properties. In the 
other end, a feature can be intrinsically variable yet immutable. A chameleon's ability to 
change color to disguise in its surroundings is one of its central properties (example seen in 
Keil, Smith, Simons, & Levin, 1998). 
The examples above illustrate that, in theory, the inside and outside views may 
diverge. However, because of their common reference, the inside and outside views are 
usually compatible. Thus, measures of immutability and homogeneity converge (for empirical 
evidence see Sloman et al., 1998). For example, for most birds having wings is both an 
immutable and highly homogeneous property. Parenthetically, Keil et al. (1998) suggested 
that the high correlation between typicality and conceptual centrality may underlie the 
apparent success of the Roschean view that probabilistic representations are sufficient to 
explain all of categorization. In general, the difference between centrality and variability 
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closely maps into the difference between explanatory and statistical information. This point 
wil l be elaborated in the General Discussion at the end of this chapter. 
Moving away from conceptual arguments, evidence suggests that variability and 
mutability are empirically dissociable. Medin and Shoben (1988) demonstrated that a feature 
judged equally typical for two concepts might be judged to have differential importance for 
deciding category membership. For example, although roundness was judged to be an equally 
typical feature of cantaloupes and basketballs, participants rated a square cantaloupe as a 
better new example of the category cantaloupes than a square basketball of the category 
basketballs. Similarity-to-an-ideal is one of the measures of immutability (Sloman et al., 
1998). Hence, Medin and Shoben's study can be said to corroborate that homogeneity and 
immutability are empirically distinct. 
Similarly to the Medin and Shoben (1988) study, our studies so far used candidate 
properties (albeit unfamiliar ones) that were equated in terms of homogeneity, all members of 
the base category were assumed to have the central and the less-central properties. Our studies 
demonstrated that central and less-central properties are differentially projectible. The results 
therefore show that centrality affects projectibility with the effect of variability controlled. 
Taking a step forward, the present studies pit variability against centrality information directly 
and look at judgments of projectibility and perceived variability. To the extent that conceptual 
centrality influences projectibility we expected the central and the less-central properties to be 
differentially generalizable, irrespective of the observed frequencies. Also, to the extent that 
centrality information directly influences perceived frequency, we expected the frequency of 
central features to be overestimated relatively to the frequency of the less-central properties. 
To examine these hypotheses, participants were presented with 24 profiles of hippos. 
Profiles contained information about the features that a particular hippo had including two 
novel biological properties, a central and a less central one. The frequency of the central and 
the less central properties were manipulated such that the central property appeared less 
frequently than the less central property. Thus, one property was central and variable, the 
other less central and less variable. Participants were asked to recall how many out of the 24 
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hippos they saw had each of the properties (Frequency task), and to judge the likelihood that 
some target categories (e.g. rhinos) had each of these properties (Induction task). The order of 
these tasks was counterbalanced. To the extent that centrality exerts a greater influence on 
projectibility than variability, we expected higher inductive strength estimates for the central 
and variable property than for the less central and less variable property. Furthermore, to the 
extent that centrality information directly influences perceived frequency, we expected the 
frequency of central features to be overestimated relatively to the frequency of the less-central 
properties. 
Both of our claims are motivated by the literature. Evidence that centrality influences 
projectibility comes from the studies reported so far. Suggestive evidence that centrality 
influences perceived frequency comes from Spalding and Ross (1994). Using artificial 
category learning stimuli they asked participants to rank features for their importance in 
category membership and also by their frequency. Features that were rated more important 
tended to be judged more frequent than those rated as less important, though they were not. 
Given that immutable features are more important (are weighted more heavily) than mutable 
features in categorical decisions (e.g., Ahn, 1999; Ahn and Lassaline, 1995; Ahn and Dennis, 
1997; Sloman et al., 1998), this suggests that centrality influences perceived frequency. 
Direct evidence that conceptual centrality influences frequency judgments comes 
from Sloman et al. (1998, Study 5). Participants were given a brief description of an 
indigenous people concerning their ceremonial procedure of becoming a hunter. To become a 
hunter an individual should first get a tattoo (central property) and then a scar (less-central 
property). Getting the tattoo was a necessary precondition for getting the scar. Participants 
saw 24 profiles of such individuals and they subsequently had to estimate how similar-to-an-
ideal hunter was a hunter missing each of these features (Centrality task) and to judge the 
frequency of the properties in the profiles (Frequency task). The results showed that 
participants who completed the Centrality task first subsequently misjudged the frequency of 
the properties in the direction of centrality. So, the Sloman et al. study suggests that 
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conceptual centrality defined from a dependency chain influences judgments of frequency. 
5.2 A SUBTLE MANIPULATION OF FEATURE CENTRALITY 
In Experiment 12, the central property was a property upon which 5 properties 
depended (e.g. the hormone corticosterone helps the animal cope with stress). The less central 
property negated the properties stipulated for the central property (e.g. the hormone 
aldosterone does not help the animal cope with stress). This manipulation aimed to control for 
the relative salience of the central and the less central properties. 
Experiments 13 and 14 used a subtler manipulation of centrality. Upon both the 
central and the less-central features the same number of properties and functions depended. 
However, the properties that depended upon the central feature were more central themselves. 
This relative definition of centrality derives from the Sloman et al. (1998) notion that a 
feature is central to the extent that other central features depend on it. We stipulated, for 
instance, that hippos have the substance neurine (the central property) upon which three 
properties about neurons depended, and the substance folline (the less-central property) upon 
which three properties about hair-follicles depended. Al l else equal, neurine is a more central 
property than folline because neurons are (presumably) more central than hair follicles. 
This subtle centrality manipulation was aimed to clarify how centrality influences 
projectibility. In the experiments of Chapter I I I , where centrality was defined in terms of a 
single dependency chain and the dependent properties were all fairly general, centrality had a 
comparable effect in all similarity conditions. In the experiments of Chapter IV, where 
centrality was defined from the "Few/Lots" definition and the dependent properties were left 
vague, the effect of centrality was proportional to the similarity between the base and target 
categories. A joint interpretation of these results is that the effect of centrality is proportional 
to similarity to the extent that the target category is believed to share the dependent properties 
specified for the base. In the single dependency chain experiments, the depending on 
properties were all fairly general and hence no centrality by similarity interaction. In the 
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"Few/Lots" experiments, the depending on properties were left vague and hence the centrality 
by similarity interaction. Our hypothesis assumes, however, that the projectibility of a feature 
depends not only on feature overlap with respect to the dependent properties but also, 
critically, on the degree of centrality of the dependent properties. Experiments 13 and 14 
directly address this prediction. 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 12 
Experiment 12 was a first attempt to assess the assumption that people reason from 
the "inside" - use conceptual information to guide their inferences - even when "outside" 
information is available. Participants were given two pieces of information about a property: 
(1) "inside information" about the centrality status of a property, and (2) "outside 
information" about the relative frequency of a property across instances of a category 
(variability). Based on these pieces of information, participants had to provide inductive 
strength and perceived frequency estimates. To the extent that participants reason from the 
"inside" we expected reliance on centrality to estimate inductive strength. Also, to the extent 
that centrality information influences perceived frequency, we should observe an 
overestimation of the judged frequency of the central property. 
METHOD 
Participants. Twenty-four students from the University of Durham participated voluntarily in 
this experiment. 
Materials. Participants read 24 statements about hippos in which four different properties are 
described a variable number of times. After reading the 24 statements, participants completed 
a frequency task, in which they had to estimate the frequency of each of the four properties, 
and an induction task, in which they had to estimate the likelihood that each of four animals 
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(hippos, rhinos, mice, and falcons) possessed each of the four properties. The order of the 
tasks was counterbalanced, resulting in 2 lists of material. 
Each statement about hippos appeared on a computer screen and contained 
information about 4 properties: 1) a central property, 2) a less-central property, 3) mud spots 
and 4) a heart. Underneath the central property five attributes were listed that depended on it. 
The attributes listed for the less central property negated those listed for the central property 
(see sample description below). The frequency of each property was manipulated such that 
the central hormone, the less-central hormone, the mud spots and the heart appeared on the 
screen in 15/24, 16/24, 17/24, and 24/24 descriptions respectively. Critically, the central 
property was slightly more variable than the less-central one. Whenever a property was not 
chosen by the computer program for a particular description, it did not appear in that 
description. For each participant, the program randomly generated 24 descriptions that fitted 
the frequency constraints mentioned above. Thus, each description appeared with a varying 
number of properties, from 1 to 4. The order of the properties within each description was 
randomized. A sample description that includes all properties (the central property in this 
description is corticosterone) is illustrated below. 
This hippo has: 
The hormone corticosterone that: 
1) helps the animal cope with stress 
2) regulates sleeping habits 
3) reduces inflammation 
4) increases blood flow to muscles 
5) increases glucose metabolism 
The hormone aldosterone that: 
1) does not help the animal cope with stress 
2) does not regulate sleeping habits 
3) does not reduce inflammation 
4) does not increase blood flow to muscles 




As is seen in the sample description, the less-central condition was constructed by negating 
the properties listed for the central condition. This aimed to control for the relative salience of 
these properties as measured by the space allocated for each. 
Design. The induction task data were analyzed with a 2 (Centrality) by 4 (Shared structure) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. The frequency task data were analyzed with 
a 2 (Centrality) by 2 (Task order) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. No F 2 
analyses were carried out since there was only one item per shared structure condition. 
Procedure. After viewing the descriptions, participants were provided with a booklet 
containing one of the two lists of materials. One group of participants (N=12) received the 
Frequency task followed by the Induction task, whereas for another group of participants 
(N=12) the order was reversed. In each group, for half of the participants the central hormone 
was aldosterone and the less-central corticosterone, whereas for the other half the names were 
swapped. For the Frequency task, participants had to estimate the frequency of each property 
in the 24 descriptions they saw. For the Induction task, they had to rate the likelihood of an 
animal category (hippos, rhinos, mice, and falcons) possessing each of the four properties 
(Induction task). The four animals used in the induction task differed in their similarity form 
identical (hippos), very similar (rhinos), less similar (mice), and dissimilar (falcons). The 
order of the tasks was counterbalanced. 
The Frequency task appeared in a single page of the booklet. The order of the four 
frequency questions was randomized for each participant separately. The Induction task 
appeared in four pages of the booklet, each page asking about the likelihood that a single 
animal category (e.g. rhinos) had each of the four properties. The order of the properties in 
each page was randomized for each participant separately. Also, the pages of the induction 
task were shuffled for each participant separately. 
Participants were shown the following instructions: 
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You are about to see 24 partial descriptions of 24 different hippos. Each 
description contains some properties that the particular hippo has. 
Underneath some of these descriptions additional information is given 
concerning why these properties are useful (or not useful) for the animal. 
Please read the descriptions carefully and pay close attention to the 
properties of each hippo. Take as long as you like to study each description. 
When you feel you have familiarised yourself with the information, press the 
space bar to move to the next description. After you see all the descriptions, 
you will be asked some questions about them. 
Frequency Task. In the Frequency task participants were asked to consider the 24 
descriptions of the 24 different hippos they saw and to estimate how many out of these 24 
hippos possessed each of the 4 properties (e.g., How many of the hippos you saw have mud 
spots? / 24). 
Induction Task. In the Induction task participants were asked to consider all the 
hippos (rhinos, mice, and falcons) in the world and to estimate, for each animal, the likelihood 
of possessing each of the 4 properties (e.g., "How likely do you think it is that rhinos have 
aldosterone? % ) . 
1. Central vs. Less-central: novel properties 
Induction Task. The results are summarized in Table 5.1. Centrality had a strong 
effect in all shared structure conditions. 




Central property Less-central property 
Shared structure 





59 (5.22) Rhinos 
Mice 46 (4.29) 
50 (4.61) Falcons 
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Preliminary tests showed that neither the name of the hormones nor the order of the 
tasks influenced participants' inductive strength estimates. The data were therefore collapsed 
across these manipulations and Fi analyses were carried out. No F2 analyses were carried out 
because there was only one item per condition. A 4 (Shared structure) x 2 (Centrality) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors revealed a main effect of Centrality 
(F]*(l,23) = 12.81, p<.005) and a main effect of Shared structure (F,*(3,21)=6.58, p<.005). 
There was no significant Shared structure x Centrality interaction (Fi*<l). 
Two-tailed pairwise t-tests showed significant centrality effects at all levels of Shared 
structure (for all, p<.05). On average, moving from the less-central to the central property 
resulted in a significant increase in inductive strength estimates of about 14.5 points. 
As in the experiments of Chapter I I I , the failure to detect a Shared structure by 
Centrality interaction might be because the dependent properties were fairly general and thus 
applied equally well to all animals. That is, irrespective of level of shared structure, there was 
a comparable reason of preferring the central to the less-central properties. Strangely, the 
mean estimates were higher for falcons than for mice, although this difference was not 
significant. 
Frequency Task. The results from the frequency task are presented in Table 5.2 
below. Participants who received the frequency task second overestimated the actual 
frequency of the central property and underestimated the frequency of the less-central 
property. Participants who received the frequency task first judged the central and less-central 
properties as about equally frequent, though the less-central property was actually more 
frequent. 
Preliminary tests showed that the name of the hormones did not affect the 
participants' judgments. The data were therefore collapsed across this manipulation. A 2 
(Order of tasks) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA was carried out for with repeated measures on the 
last factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Centrality (F( l , 22) = 8.77, 
p<.01) and a significant Order x Centrality interaction (F(l , 22) = 5.52, p<.05). No main 
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effect of Order was found (F<1). The mean (SE) estimated frequency for the central property 
was 16.96 (.57) and for the less-central property 15.75 (.71). 
Table 5. 2 Actual frequency estimates and mean (SE) frequency estimates for 
each task order for Experiment 12. 
Central property Less-central property 
Actual Frequencies 15.00 16.00 
Frequency task following 17.33(79) 15.17(1.08) 
induction. 
Frequency task preceding 16.58 (.84) 16.33 (0.92) 
induction. 
The significant Order by Centrality interaction reveals a differential misjudgment of 
frequency depending on task order. Participants who completed the frequency task second 
significantly overestimated the frequency of the central property by about 2.30 points ( t( l 1) = 
2.95, p<.05, chance = 15). Participants who completed the frequency task first marginally 
overestimated the frequency of the central property (t(l 1) = 1.89, p<.10). We speculate that 
this is because participants who completed the induction task first focused on the dependency 
structure of the properties and used this as a guide to estimate the frequencies. Importantly, 
this result demonstrates that centrality can bias the perception of variability. 
2. Familiar properties 
Induction Task. Table 5.3 shows that the participants were willing to project mud 
spots to hippos and rhinos but not to falcons or mice. Participants' estimates might have been 
influenced either from direct experience or by relating mud spots to observable attributes that 
they are associated with, such as "living in lakes", and reason from those attributes. Heart was 
projected with maximum confidence. This validates that the participants understood the task. 
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Table 5. 3 Mean (SE) inductive strength estimates for the familiar properties of 
Experiment 12. 
Mud Spots Heart 
Shared structure 
HiDDOS 71 (4.13) 100 (.42) 
Rhinos 52 (6.06) 100(04) 
Mice 9 (3.53) 99 (.83) 
Falcons 4(2.31) 100 (.04) 
Frequency Task. Table 5.4 shows that participants underestimated the frequency of 
both mud spots and heart by about 2.00 points. Possibly this is in part because the familiar 
properties were less salient than either the central or the less-central properties since they 
were allocated less space in the PC screen. 
Table 5. 4 Actual frequency estimates and mean (SE) judged frequency 
estimates for the familiar properties of Experiment 12. 
Mud Spots Heart 
Actual frequency 17 24 
Judged frequency 15.08 (.96) 21.88 (.70) 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 12 examined the relative importance of centrality and variability in property 
induction with concrete but unfamiliar properties (hormones aldosterone and corticisterone). 
The results strongly suggest that participants were thinking in terms of dependency structure 
because: (i) centrality had a strong effect in inductive strength estimates, and (ii) participants 
overestimated the actual frequencies of the central properties when the frequency task came 
second. That is, both the inductive strength and frequency estimates were based on centrality 
rather than variability when both pieces of information were available. In our terms, 
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participants were thinking from the "inside." Centrality had an effect in all levels of Shared 
structure which we attributed to the generality of the dependent properties. 
The results are open, however, to a competing interpretation (we thank James 
Hampton for this suggestion). The less-central property was described in terms of negative 
relations, relations that are less memorable than positive ones. Hence, the frequency judgment 
data could be a result of people remembering more positive relations than negative ones. In 
turn, the perceived frequency judgments could have mediated the inductive inference data. In 
other words, the results could be attributed to thinking in terms of variability biased by the 
greater memorability of positive cues. Notice, however, that this interpretation cannot readily 
explain the observed Order by Centrality interaction in frequency estimates. Why did the 
frequency estimates for the central property increase when the frequency task came second? 
5.4 EXPERIMENT 13 
Experiment 13 aimed to rule out the possibility that the results of Experiment 12 can 
be fully explained in terms of memorability. Both the central and the less-central properties 
were described positively by stipulating that 3 properties depended upon each. However, the 
properties that depended upon the central feature were themselves more central than those 
that depended upon the less-central feature. 
METHOD 
Participants. A new sample of 24 University of Durham students volunteered to participate. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure of the present experiment were very 
similar to those of Experiment 12. A difference was that in current experiment the central 
property was present in 14 out of 24 descriptions (in Experiment 12 it was present in 15 out of 
24 descriptions). The frequencies for the less central property, mud spots, and heart remained 
unchanged; 16 out of 24, 17 out of 24, and 24 out of 24 descriptions, respectively. To make 
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the instructions clearer we added the sentence "Whenever a property does not appear in a 
description of a hippo, then that hippo does not have the property". Also the sentence 
"Underneath ... animal." was replaced by the sentence "Underneath some of these properties 
additional information is given about what functions depend on these properties." 
Materials. The materials used were similar to the ones used in Experiment 12, except that the 
descriptions of hippos were different. A sample description that includes all properties (the 
central property in this description is aldosterone) is presented below: 
This hippo has: 
The hormone aldosterone that: 
1) regulates the amount of oxygen in the blood 
2) controls blood density 
3) controls blood pressure 
The hormone corticosterone that: 
1) regulates the amount of green in the eye 
2) controls eye colour reflectance 
3) controls uniformity of eye colour 
Mud spots 
A heart 
Notice that the type of dependency relations for the central and the less-central properties was 
also controlled for. 
RESULTS 
1. Central vs. Less-Central: novel properties 
Induction task. The results are summarized in Table 5.5. The central property was 
more projectible than the less-central one. Shared structure seems to influence the 
projectibility of the less-central but not of the central property. 
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Table 5. 5 Mean inductive strength estimates for Experiment 13. 
Centrality 
Central property Less-Central property 
Shared structure 









Falcons 80.58 (5.10) 
As in Experiment 12, preliminary tests showed that the name of the properties and the 
order of the tasks did not influence participants' responses. The data were therefore collapsed 
across these manipulations. A 4 (Shared structure) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA was performed 
on the resulting data with repeated measures on both factors. Shared structure had a main 
effect (F,*(3,21)=4.83, p<.05). The effect of Centrality was significant (F,*(l,23)=14.54, 
p<.005). The Shared structure x Centrality interaction was also significant, F|(3,21)=5.37, 
p<.01. 
The presence of a significant Shared structure by Centrality interaction is surprising 
in that no such interaction was observed in Experiment 12 (see Table 5.1). Notice that, as in 
Experiment 12, the centrality effect was lowest in the pure projectibility case, the inference 
from the observed sample of hippos to all hippos. We speculated therefore that the interaction 
might be because of the very low effect of centrality for Hippos. To this end, a 3 (Shared 
structure: rhinos or mice or falcons) x 2 (Centrality: central vs. less central) repeated measures 
ANOVA was carried out. The main effects of shared structure and centrality were highly 
significant (F,*(2, 22) = 5.97, p<.001; F,(l,22) = 18.19, p<.001 respectively). The shared 
structure by centrality interaction failed to reach significance (F](2, 22) = 2.75). 
Frequency Task. The results from the Frequency task are summarized in Table 5.6. 
The mean frequency estimates of the group who completed the frequency task first were 
almost spot-on the actual estimates. The group who completed the frequency task second, 
however, overestimated the frequency of the central property. 
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Table 5. 6 Actual frequency estimates and mean (SE) frequency estimates for 
each task order for Experiment 13. 
Central Property Less-Central property 
Actual Frequencies 






Frequency task following 16.83(1.17) 16.33 (1.22) 
induction. 
As in Experiment 12, preliminary tests showed that the name of the properties did not 
have any effect on responses. The results were therefore collapsed across this manipulation. A 
2 (Order) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA was performed on the resulting data with repeated 
measures on the last factor. There were no significant effects: Order (Fi*( 1,22)= 1.83), 
Centrality (F<1), and Order x Centrality (Fi*(l,22>=2.25). 
Although the interaction failed to reach significance, the results are in the predicted 
direction. When the frequency task came second, the mean estimated frequency for the central 
property is higher than its counterpart, while the mean estimated frequency for the less-central 
property was largely unaffected by task order. These results are partially confirmed by one-
way analyses of variance at each level of Centrality. For the central property F](l,22)=3.42, 
p=.078, while for the less central property Fi(l ,22)<l. Four one-sample t-tests were 
performed, two for the central and the less-central properties (one for each order), to detect 
whether each deviated from its respective actual frequency (14 for the central and 16 for the 
less-central property). The mean judged frequency for the central property when the 
frequency task came second was significantly higher than its actual frequency, t ( l 1) = 2.42, 
p<.05. Al l the other comparisons yielded non-significant results (for all t ( l 1)<1). 
2. Familiar properties 
Induction Task. Table 5.7 summarizes the results. The results closely resemble those 
of Experiment 12. Participants were willing to project mud spots to hippos and rhinos but not 
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to falcons or mice. Their estimates may be influenced by direct experience (having seen many 
rhinos lots of which had mud spots) or by linking mud spots to some observable property and 
reasoning on the basis of that. For example, having mud spots is closely associated with living 
near lakes or swamps. Since rhinos live in such habitats (but not mice or falcons) it is quite 
likely that they will have mud spots. Participants projected heart with very high confidence to 
all animal categories. This again validates that the participants understood the task. 
Table 5. 7 Mean (SE) inductive strength estimates for the familiar properties of 
Experiment 13. 
Mud Spots Heart 
Shared structure 
Hippos 77 (4.45) 99 (.83) 
Rhinos 56 (6.86) 99 (.42) 
Mice 6 (2.30) 99 (.83) 
Falcons 5 (2.23) 99 (.83) 
Frequency Task. Table 5.8 summarizes the results for the familiar properties. As in 
Experiment 12, participants underestimated the frequency of mud spots and heart. We 
speculated that this may in part be because familiar properties were relatively less salient than 
central and less-central properties because they were allocated less screen space. 











The main objective of Experiment 13 was to rule out the interpretation that the results of 
Experiment 12 were only due to the higher memorability of positive versus negative relations. 
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To that end, both the central and the less-central features were described 'positively' - three 
properties depended upon each. The only difference between the central and the less-central 
features was that the properties that depended upon the central feature were themselves more 
central. The present experiment using a subtle manipulation of centrality, replicated the main 
findings of Experiment 12. Across all similarity conditions, central properties were more 
projectible than less-central ones. Furthermore, participants misjudged the frequency of the 
central but not of the less-central properties when the induction task was evaluated first, 
although the statistical analyses were only marginally significant. The results of the present 
experiments therefore cannot be explained in terms of differential memorability. 
A difference between the results of Experiments 12 and 13 was that a significant 
similarity by centrality interaction was evidenced in the latter but not in the former. We 
speculated (and supported with evidence) that the interaction of Experiment 13 may be 
because of a very low centrality effect for the inference to all hippos (a similarly low effect 
was observed in Experiment 12). This argument is post-hoc and therefore needs to be 
validated by further experimentation. 
5.5 EXPERIMENT 14 
The results of Experiment 13 are still open to an interpretation that does not appeal to 
differences in centrality. It is possible that participants preferred to project the 'central' over 
the 'less-central' feature because the properties that depended upon it were more homogeneous 
themselves. Animals seem to differ more, for example, in the amount of green in the eye 
rather than in blood density. Experiment 14 aimed to rule out this possibility by choosing 
homogeneous dependent properties for both features. For the less-central feature, the 




Participants. A new sample of 52 University of Durham students volunteered to participate. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure of the present experiment were very 
similar to those of experiments 12 and 13, with the following exceptions. The names and 
descriptions of the novel central and less central properties were changed (see sample 
description below). Their names were not counterbalanced. The less central property (folline) 
appeared in 16 out of 24 descriptions, whereas the central property (neurine) appeared in 
either 12 out of 24, or 14 out of 24, or 16 out of 24 descriptions. Moving to the familiar 
properties, heart was substituted by strong immune system. Both the central (strong immune 
system) and less central (mud spots) familiar properties appeared in 18 out of 24 descriptions. 
By keeping their frequency constant, we aimed to detect how centrality affects the perceived 
frequency and projectibility of familiar properties. 
Materials. A sample item that included all properties is presented below (neurine is the 
central and folline the less-central properties): 
This hippo has: 
The substance neurine that: 
1) regulates the level of activity of neurons in the cortex 
2) controls the structure of neurons in the cortex 
3) controls the number of neurons per square inch in the cortex 
The substance folline that: 
1) regulates the level of activity of hair follicles in the tail. 
2) controls the structure of hair follicles in the tail 
3) controls the number of hair follicles per square inch in the tail 
A strong immune system 
Mud spots 
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In the present experiment the property heart was substituted by the property a strong immune 
system. Also, the category falcons was replaced by the category bats, since only mammals 
have hair follicles. In the current experiment therefore all target animals shared a common 
superordinate. 
RESULTS 
1. Central vs. Less-Central: novel properties 
Induction task. The results are summarized in Table 5.9. below. At all levels of 
shared structure, central properties were more projectible than less central properties. The 
centrality effect was (in absolute terms) smallest when the target category was hippos. 
Table 5. 9 Mean (SE) percent inductive strength estimates for the novel 
properties averaged across frequency conditions of Experiment 14. 
Centrality 
Central property Less-Central property 
Shared structure 
Hippos 76.52 (2.35) 74.35 (2.74) 
Rhinos 79.56 (2.56) 66.29 (3.79) 
Mice 80.38 (3.00) 74.61 (3.84) 
Bats 74.00(3.27) 56.88(4.91) 
Preliminary tests showed that there was no significant effect of order or frequency 
condition on participants' responses. The data were therefore collapsed across these 
manipulations. A 4 (Shared structure) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA was carried out on the 
resulting data with repeated measures on both factors. The effect of Shared structure was 
significant; Fi*(3,49)=7.30, p<.001. A main effect of Centrality was detected; 
F1*(l,51)=19.77, p<.001. The Shared structure x Centrality interaction was also significant; 
F!*(3,49)=5.20, p<.005. 
As in Experiment 13, the locus of the interaction seems to lie in the pure projectibility 
case (the inference from the sample of 24 hippos to all hippos) where no centrality effect was 
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detected. This is confirmed by a 3 (Shared structure: rhinos or mice or bats) x 2 (Centrality: 
central or less central property) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. The effect 
of Shared structure and Centrality were highly significant (F, (1, 50)=9.70, p<.001; and (F,( l , 
51)= 19.26,.p<.001). No Shared structure by Centrality interaction was detected (Fi*(2,50) = 
2.10). 
Frequency task. The results are summarized in Table 5.10. The judged frequency 
estimates for the central and the less central properties are very close in each task order. 
Because the actual frequency of the central property was less than that of the less central 
property, the results show that participants overestimated the frequency of the central 
property. 
Table 5.10 Actual and mean (SE) frequency estimates for each task order for 
Experiment 14. 
Central Property Less-Central property 
Actual frequency 12.00, 14.00, or 16.00 16.00 
Frequency task preceding 16.36 (.72) 16.56 (.68) 
induction. 
Frequency task following 14.96 (.75) 14.78 (.78) 
induction. 
A 3 (Frequency condition) x 2 (Order) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA was carried out with 
repeated measures on the last factor. None of the factors had a significant influence on the 
results. 
2. Central vs. Less-Central: Familiar properties 
Induction task. The results are summarized in Table 5.11. The central property was 
more projectible than the less-central property in all levels of shared structure. The 
projectibility of both properties was proportional to similarity. The projectibility of the less-
central property decreased more steeply with decreasing similarity. 
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Table 5.11 Mean (SE) inductive strength estimates for the familiar properties of 
Experiment 14. 
Centrality 
Central property Less Central property 
(Strong immune system) (Mud spots) 
Shared structure 
Hippos 80.10(2.19) 76.98(2.78) 
Rhinos 76.52 (2.47) 50.44 (4.30) 
Mice 67.42 (3.10) 17.10 (3.40) 
Bats 68.73(3.07) 13.10 (2.90) 
A 4 (Shared structure) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA with repeated measures on both 
factors was carried out on the data. Shared structure and Centrality had significant main 
effects (F,*(3,49)=86.05, p<.001; and F,(l,51)=l 13.66, p<.001 respectively). The Shared 
structure x Centrality interaction was also significant (F|*(3,49)=41.64, p<.001). Notice that, 
as with the novel properties, the centrality effect was smallest when the target category was 
hippos. 
Frequency task. The results are summarized in Table 5.12. The mean frequency 
estimates are higher for central than for less-central properties. Further, when the frequency 
task came second, participants slightly overestimated the frequency of the central property 
and underestimated the frequency of the less central property. 
Table 5.12 Frequencies and mean (SE) frequency estimates for the familiar 
properties for Experiment 14. 
Central property Less Central property 
(Strong immune system) (Mud spots) 
Actual frequencies 18.00 18.00 
Frequency task preceding 17.52 (.80) 17.00 (.88) 
induction. 
Frequency task following 18.00 (.75) 16.72 (.81) 
induction. 
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A 3 (Frequency condition) x 2 (Order) x 2 (Centrality) ANOVA was carried out with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Central properties were associated with higher mean judged 
frequencies; Fi*(l,46)=4.78, p<.05. No other main effect, nor second or third order interaction 
was detected (for all p>.30). 
DISCUSSION 
The main objective of Experiment 14 was to rule out the interpretation that the results of 
Experiment 13 were due to differences in the homogeneity of the dependent properties. To 
this end, the properties that depended upon the less-central feature were homogeneous across 
mammals; they were related to hair follicles that all mammals have. The results from the 
inductive task replicated those of Experiment 13. At each level of similarity the mean 
inductive strength estimate of the central property was higher than that of the less-central 
property. Also, as in Experiments 12 and 13, the centrality effect (in absolute terms) was 
smallest when the target category was hippos. Critically, the results of the present 
experiments cannot be accounted for by appeals in the homogeneity of the dependent 
properties. 
For the critical comparison between the central and the less-central novel properties, 
unlike the previous experiments, the perceived frequency of the central property was not 
influenced by task order. This might be because the less-central property of the present 
experiment was relatively more central than the less-central property of Experiments 12 and 
13. Having fur, and therefore hair follicles, is a comparatively central feature of mammals 
since it protects them, for example, from weather conditions. The uniformity and reflectance 
of eye color is presumably less-central because (for most non biologists like ourselves) almost 
none of their properties depend on it. 
The present experiment also controlled for the actual frequency of the familiar 
properties; each appeared in 18 out of 24 descriptions. It thus allowed for a meaningful 
comparison between the central property (strong immune system) and the less-central 
property (mud spots). For the inductive task, the central familiar property was more 
143 
projectible than the less central familiar property for each similarity condition. For the 
frequency task, the mean estimate for the central familiar property was slightly higher when 
the frequency task came second compared to first, whereas the mean estimate for the less 
central property were slightly lower for the same task order. Although in the expected 
direction, the Task order by Centrality interaction failed to reach significance. However, these 
results closely resemble the frequency judgment data for the novel features of Experiments 12 
and 13. Put together, the data tentatively suggest that centrality can bias the perception of 
frequency. 
A surprising finding was that the frequency condition influenced neither the 
frequency nor the inductive strength estimates. It seems therefore that participants were 
largely insensitive to observed frequencies. 
5.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present experiments had two main objectives: (1) to examine the relative 
contributions of centrality and variability information in judgments of projectibility and 
frequency (all experiments), and (2) to rule out the interpretation that the effect of centrality 
on projectibility reported in Chapters I I I and IV can be explained solely in terms of feature 
overlap with respect to the dependent properties. The present findings are discussed in terms 
of each issue. 
5.6.1 Centrality versus frequency contributions on projectibility 
In the present experiments, participants were given a choice between conceptual 
structure information (centrality) and statistical information (frequency) to make an inductive 
response. The results showed that inductive responses were based on centrality information 
and were largely unaffected by observed frequencies. 
Further evidence that information about conceptual structure is preferred to frequency 
information comes from Murphy and Allopenna's (1994) studies in category learning and use. 
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Participants who were presented with categories whose features could be related by a 
common theme (schema), such as "arctic vehicle" or "jungle vehicle," learned the categories 
faster than participants who received features unrelated to a common theme (note that even in 
the common theme group the 'theme' was left implicit). The former participants were as fast 
and as accurate to identify any property of a category as a typical one, irrespective of its 
actual frequency. Importantly, they rated both frequent and infrequent properties as about 
equally typical. As in our study, it seems that the thematic participants based their responses 
not on the actual frequencies of properties but rather on how well the property hanged 
together in the structure of the thematic category. 
Broadly, our results echo Murphy and Kaplan's (1997; p. 170) empirical claim that 
"when subjects have the choice of using knowledge or the statistical structure of the category 
in making a response, the knowledge tends to win" (see e.g., Ahn et al., 1995; Murphy & 
Kaplan, 1997; Spalding & Ross, 1994; Wisniewski, 1995). 
5.6.2 Centrality information may bias the perception of frequency 
Centrality information was found to bias the perception of frequency for the novel 
properties in Experiments 12 and 13, although only marginally in Experiment 13. Participants 
who estimated the induction task first overestimated the frequency of the central property. 
This tendency was not observed in Experiment 14. We stipulated that this might have been 
because the 'less-central' property (which was related to having fur) was relatively central. A 
tendency to overestimate the frequency of the central with respect to the less-central property 
was also obtained for the familiar properties of Experiment 14 (strong immune system versus 
mud spots). A l l in all, we take the data to suggest that centrality information may bias the 
perception of frequency. 
5.6.3 Centrality and projectibility 
A possible joint interpretation of the results of Chapters I I I and IV is that features are 
projectible to target concepts in proportion to the extent that the target concepts share their 
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dependent properties. Following Sloman et al. (1998) we assume that centrality can be 
defined recursively: a feature's centrality depends upon the features' degree of centrality that 
depend upon it, which in turn depend upon the feature centrality of the properties that depend 
upon them and so forth. Features therefore upon which more central properties depend are 
more central than features upon which less central properties depend. According to our 
hypothesis, therefore, we expected the former features to be more projectible than the latter. 
In addition, because all the dependent properties were general, the degree of overlap between 
the base and target should be constant across similarity conditions. Hence, to the extent that 
the effect of centrality is proportional to the degree to which the target shares the depending 
on properties specified for the base, we expected no shared structure by centrality interaction. 
Both of these predictions were confirmed: central properties were more projectible than less 
central ones (bar the pure projectibility case) and the centrality effect was largely independent 
of shared structure level. 
The present experiments also examined, for the first time, pure projectibility cases 
(known as generalization from instances); e.g. inferences from a sample of hippos to all 
known hippos. The results suggest that central properties are more projectible than less 
central ones, though this effect was of a smaller magnitude than that of other shared structure 
conditions. In retrospect, this result makes sense. Hippos share with one another lots of 
characteristics and properties lots of which are mutable (e.g. color, smell, mud spots, stains in 
the trunks and so forth). In this case homogeneity information seems more relevant in 
determining the extent to which all hippos have a property: there are lots of properties that 
hippos share but only for few of them we have theories that constitute them immutable. 
Further, both the central and the less central properties were intrinsic (e.g. hormone, 
substance) and therefore had some inductive potential to begin with. Possibly one could 
observe a significant effect of centrality on the pure projectibility case by: (1) giving 
information from only a small sample of a category (say two hippos) and / or by (2) using 
intuitively mutable novel features (like "shiny teeth") and for the centrality condition stipulate 
that some very central properties depend upon them (e.g. reproductive success). 
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CHAPTER VI: 
CENTRALITY VERSUS VARIABILITY: 
INFORMATION SEARCH 
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6.1 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY VERSUS VARIABILITY: INFORM A TION 
SEEKING 
The series of experiments reported in Chapter V showed that people, when provided 
with both frequency and centrality information, they use centrality information rather than 
frequency information to draw inferences. Reviewing evidence on information use, we 
concluded that when people are given a choice between statistical or causal mechanism 
information to make a response they base their response on the latter. Taking a step back, one 
could ask what sort of information would people seek to make a response. This is the main 
question of the present chapter: Do people seek mutability or variability information to make 
an inference? 
Suggestive evidence that people seek information about causal mechanisms rather 
than statistical information comes from the domain of causal attribution. Traditional models 
of causal attribution suppose that people in order to determine the cause of an event seek 
information about the co-variation of factors (e.g. Kelley, 1967, 1973; Cheng & Novick, 
1990, 1992). However, Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and Gelman (1995) provided evidence on 
information seeking strategies that challenges this view. Specifically, they found that to make 
a causal attribution people ask more about underlying causal mechanisms than about co-
occurring events. For instance, when trying to discover why John had an accident on route 9 
last night, participants tended to ask questions that presupposed causal mechanisms (e.g. was 
John drunk?), rather than questions about the frequency that John had accidents on other 
occasions, or the frequency of other car accidents last night like the co-variation models 
presuppose. 
Covariation models of causal attribution with their focus on common versus 
distinctive factors are closely related to similarity-based models of category-based inference 
with their emphasis on common versus distinctive features (such as Sloman's (1993) feature-
based model). Recall that similarity-based models work quite well with blank properties -
properties about which participants have very little knowledge. Centrality information 
presupposes some mechanism ('intuitive theory') that binds the features of a concept together. 
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Even vague centrality information (e.g. lots of a lion's features depend on the neurotransmitter 
dihedron) gives some clue about the causal status of the candidate feature. To the extent 
therefore that people seek information about mechanisms to make a response, we expected 
them to seek centrality over raw frequency information to make an inference. 
The weight of centrality versus frequency information may critically depend on the 
similarity between the base and the target category. Similar animal categories (like Indian 
elephants and African elephants) share many properties: almost all of their central ones 
(which are relatively few) but also many non-central ones (e.g. color of eyes, hardness of 
nails, and size). Dissimilar animal categories (like zebras and chimps) share some central 
properties and very few mutable properties. Finding, for instance, that zebras have a property 
upon which many (or very few) of its functions depend, presumably gives some reason to 
believe that chimps will have (or wil l not have) that property. Knowing that many (or very 
few) zebras have a property provides no compelling evidence that chimps wil l (or wi l l not) 
have that property. In other words, it is possible that the relative value of centrality and 
homogeneity information depends on the degree of similarity between the premise and 
conclusion categories. Specifically, the usefulness of getting centrality over frequency 
information seems to increase as the similarity between the base and the target categories 
decreases. 
The present chapter presents two experiments that aimed to detect what type of 
information people seek (centrality or variability) to make a categorical inference. The 
participants' task was to decide about whether a target animal had a novel candidate property. 
They were given a choice between variability and centrality information. To detect whether 
the preference to seek centrality over variability information varies depending on the level of 
shared structure, the similarity between the premise and conclusion categories was varied. To 
the extent that people prefer information about causal mechanisms rather than raw 
frequencies, we expected them to seek centrality over variability information. Also, to the 
degree that this preference is mediated by the similarity between the base and the target 
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categories, we expected the preference to choose centrality over variability information to be 
proportional to the similarity of the animal pair. 
6.2 EXPERIMENT 15: CENTRALITY VS VARIABILITY IN INFORMATION-
SEEKING 
METHOD 
Participants. Twenty-four first-year undergraduates in psychology from the University of 
Durham voluntarily participated in this study. 
Design and Materials. Participants had to choose between centrality and variability 
information about a property for an animal (base) in order to make a choice about a different 
animal (target). The similarity between animal-pairs was varied (high-similarity same-
superordinate vs. low-similarity same-superordinate, vs. low-similarity different-
superordinate) in a repeated measures design. 
The present experiment used the same animal pairs and types of properties (enzymes, 
hormones, or neurotransmitters) as Experiment 6. There were six base-target pairs, each of 
which was modified to form 6 triples, with one member of the triple in the HSSS condition, 
one in the LSSS condition, and one in the LSDS condition. The only difference between 
members of a triple was the category used as a premise. The base categories {lions, raccoons, 
sparrows}, for instance, were paired with the target category {tigers} to form a triple. The ful l 
set of premise triples is shown in Table 3.7 and the ful l set of properties in Table 3.9. 
In each premise, two pieces of information have been blanked out, one before the 
category name (Blank 1) and one before the last phrase in the premise concerning the extent 
to which relevant functions depend on the cited properties (Blank 2). Blank 1 represents 
variability information whereas Blank 2 represents centrality information. After the inference 
task has been described, participants were instructed to say which of the two blanks they 
would like to have filled-in to complete the task. 
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As in Experiment 6, three different lists were constructed that counterbalanced the 
assignment of type of property to premise triples (see Table 3.8). 
Procedure. Participants were given a booklet containing one of the three lists of materials. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were finalists in a TV quiz show, 18 questions 
away from winning the grand prize. Their final task was to estimate the likelihood that 
members of an animal species have a physiological property. They were told, "The presenter 
gives you a choice of one of two pieces of information, both of which concern another species 
of animals." Then, participants were given an example similar to the test items to complete. 
They were asked to choose the Blank that they would rather have filled-in to complete the 
task, and that beforehand they had no clue about the precise information that Blanks 1 and 2 
contain. 
RESULTS 
Coding. The choice of centrality information was coded as 1 and the choice of variability 
information as 0. The dependent variable was calculated for each participant as the number of 
Centrality choices (number of Is) in each Similarity condition. 
The results are summarized in Table 6.1. Participants chose centrality over variability 
information as the similarity of the animal pairs decreased. 
Table 6.1 Mean choice of Centrality information in each similarity condition. 
Chance level = 3.00. 
Shared structure Mean (SE) 
HSSS 2.54 (.45) 
LSSS 4.29 (.46) 
LSDS 4.92 (.36) 
Note. HSSS = High-Similarity Same-Superordinate. 
LSSS = Low-Similarity Same-Superordinate. 
LSDS = Low-Similarity Different-Superordinate. 
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Shared structure. Two 3 (Shared structure) x 3 (List) analyses of variance were 
conducted. In the Fi analyses Shared structure was a repeated measures factor, in the F2 
analyses both factors were repeated measures. The main effect of Shared structure was 
significant (F,*(2,20) = 9.56, p<.005; F2(2,15)=80.83, p<.001). No main effect of List was 
found (Fj(2,21) = 1.73), nor a significant Shared structure x List interaction (Fi<l) . Moving 
from the HSSS to the LSSS condition resulted in a significant 1.75 point increase 
(participants: t(23) = - 3.17, p<.005; items: F 2(l,10) = 67.85, p<.001). Moving from the HSSS 
to the LSDS condition resulted in a significant increase of 2.38 points (participants: t(23) = -
4.31, p<.001; items: F 2(l,10) = 122.14, p<.001). The means of the LSSS and the LSDS 
conditions were marginally different for participants (t(23) = - 1.97), but significantly 
different for items (F 2(l,10) = 18.75, p<.005). 
Centrality or Variability? Participants in the low- but not in the high-similarity 
conditions sought more centrality information. Two-tailed one sample t-tests (chance level = 
3) for participants at each level of Similarity confirm this. The means for the LSSS and LSDS 
conditions were significantly higher than chance; t(23) = 2.83, p<.01 and t(23) = 5.39, 
p<.001, respectively. The mean for the HSSS condition was lower than chance but not 
significantly (t(23) = - 1.09). The result that the centrality choice in the LSSS and LSDS 
conditions was significantly greater than chance was replicated by one-sample t-tests across 
items (t(5)=12.87, p<.001, and t(5)=18.18, p<.001 respectively; chance level = 12). 
DISCUSSION 
Participants preferred centrality to variability information to make a categorical inference 
among low similarity animal pairs. For highly similar animals no such preference was 
observed. In general, the preference to seek centrality over variability information was 
negatively related to the judged premise-conclusion similarity. 
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6.3 EXPERIMENT 16: A REPLICATION OF EXPERIMENT 15 
Experiment 15 had a shortcoming: its instructions were ambiguous. The instructions 
failed to specify the precise sort of information that was represented by the blanks. The 
present experiment aimed to replicate the results of Experiment 15 while making crystal clear 
that the blanks would filled-in with vague centrality ("few/lots" type) and variability 
information. 
METHOD 
Participants. Thirty-one first-year undergraduates in psychology from the University of 
Durham voluntarily participated in this experiment. 
Design and Materials. The design of the present experiment was the same as that of 
Experiment 15, except of the wording of the items. Participants were given a choice between 
centrality and variability information about a property of an animal to make a categorical 
inference about another animal. The similarity between animal-pairs was varied (high-
similarity same-superordinate vs. low-similarity same-superordinate, vs. low-similarity 
different-superordinate) in a repeated measures design. The six triples used in Experiment 15 
were used in this experiment (see Table 3.7), but the wording of the items was different. 
Examples using a triple are shown in Table 6.2 overleaf. For the ful l list of properties used see 
Table A.6.3. 
Two lists of materials were constructed to counterbalance the presentation 
order of the centrality and variability information. In List 1 for triples 1, 3, and 5 
centrality information was presented first, whereas for triples 2, 4, and 6 centrality 
information was presented second. In List 2 this presentation order was reversed. 
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Table 6. 2 Sample items from Experiment 15. 
Shared structure 
HSSS Task: You want to find out whether chimps have the substance 
trolone. 
Circle the question below that you would most like to have 
answered to help you with the task. 
A. How many gorillas have trolone? 
B. For the gorillas that have trolone, how many of their properties 
and functions depend on that substance? 
LSSS Task: You want to find out whether chimps have the substance 
panctone. 
Circle the question below that you would most like to have 
answered to help you with the task. 
A. How many zebras have panctone? 
B. For the zebras that have panctone, how many of their properties 
and functions depend on that substance? 
LSDS Task: You want to find out whether chimps have the substance 
zylone. 
Circle the question below that you would most like to have 
answered to help you with the task. 
A. How many blackbirds have zylone? 
B. For the blackbirds that have zylone, how many of their 
properties and functions depend on that substance? 
Procedure. Participants received a booklet containing one of the two lists of materials. 
Participants read the following instructions: 
Thank you for taking part in this study! Your task is to find out whether 
members of an animal species have a particular substance. To help you with 
the task you can ask one and only one question concerning the members of 
another animal species. Consider an example: 
Task: You want to find out whether cats have the substance zioline. 
Circle the question below that you would most like to have answered to help 
you with the task. 
A. How many dogs have zioline? 
B. For the dogs that have zioline, how many of their properties and 
functions depend on that substance? 
Possible answers to these questions are: 
Almost all Very many Many Few Very few Almost no(ne) 
In the case you have any queries, please ask the experimenter now. 
Otherwise turn the page and begin. 
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RESULTS 
Coding. The choice of centrality information was coded as 1 and the choice of variability 
information as 0. The dependent variable was calculated for each participant as the number of 
centrality choices (number of Is) in each shared structure condition. 
The results are summarized in Table 6.3. Participants show a preference of centrality 
over variability information in all similarity conditions. This preference is slightly more 
evident in the low rather than in the high similarity conditions. 
Table 6. 3 Mean choice of centrality information in each shared structure 
condition. Chance level = 3.00. 
Shared structure Mean (SE) 
HSSS 4.03 (.40) 
LSSS 4.90 (.40) 
LSDS 4.74 (.39) 
Shared structure. A preliminary analysis showed that the type of list did not have an 
effect on the participants' responses. The results therefore were collapsed across lists. The 
effect of Shared structure was not reliable. It was not significant across participants (Fi'(2,29) 
= 1.85) but it was across items (F2(2,15) = 23.81, p<.001). 
More centrality information was sought in the low- rather than in the high-similarity 
conditions. Moving from the HSSS to the LSSS condition resulted in a .87 point increase 
(participants: t(30) = - 1.72; items: F 2(l,10) = 37.58, p<.001). Moving from the HSSS to the 
LSDS condition resulted in an increase of .71 points (participants: t(30) = - 1.47; items: 
F 2(l,10) = 122.14, p<.001). The means of the LSSS and the LSDS conditions were not 
different (participants: t(30) = - 1.41), items: F 2(l,10) = 1.92). 
Centrality or Variability? In each similarity condition centrality information was 
sought significantly more times than variability information. The one-sample t-statistics were: 
HSSS condition (participants: t(30) = 2.53, p<.05; items: t(5) = 8.88, p<.01), LSSS condition 
(participants: t(30) = 4.82, p<.001; items: t(5) = 23.31, p<.001), and LSDS condition 
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(participants: t(30) = 4.37, p<.001; items t(5) = 21.01, p<.001). The chance level for 
participants was 3, for items 15.5. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 16 aimed to make it crystal clear that the centrality and variability information 
that participants would get would be vague (e.g. for the hippos that have the candidate 
feature, lots of properties depend on it; lots of hippos have the candidate feature). As in 
Experiment 15 participants showed an overall preference for centrality information, but this 
time in all shared structure conditions. Further, similarly to Experiment 15, there was some 
suggestion that the preference to seek centrality over variability information was higher for 
low similarity rather than for high similarity animal pairs. However, the trend was not 
significant in this experiment. 
6.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present chapter reported two experiments that aimed to determine whether people 
prefer centrality to variability information to make an inference, and, in the case they do, 
whether the amount of shared structure between the premise and conclusion categories 
interacted with this preference. Taken together, experiments 15 and 16 suggest that 
participants overall seek centrality over variability information to make an inference. This 
preference is especially evident for inferences involving low similarity animal pairs. 
In the introduction we noticed that in the domain of causal attribution recent research 
has shown that people tend to seek information about causal mechanisms rather than about 
co-variation (see Ahn et al., 1995) to decide the cause of an event. Similarly, the present 
experiments found that people generally seek centrality information (information about how 
much of the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature) over raw frequency 
information to decide whether a target category had a novel property. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that when people seek information to make a response they prefer information 
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about the underlying mechanisms (or the role of a feature or factor in this mechanism) rather 
than raw statistical information. 
157 
CHAPTER VII 
EXTENDING THE CENTRALITY 
HYPOTHESIS TO ARTIFACTS 
7.1 NATURAL KINDS VERSUS ARTIFACTS 
The present account assumes a domain-general inference mechanism as do most 
psychological models of category-based inference (e.g. Osherson et al., 1990, 1991; Sloman, 
1993). At the same time, most of such models have only been tested with natural kind 
categories (for exceptions see Sloman, 1998). It follows that claims for all-purpose inference 
mechanisms should be tested outside the domain of natural kinds. This need is even more 
pressing given that many recent studies have demonstrated effects of domain specific 
knowledge in concept learning and use (e.g. Carey, 1985; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Pazzani, 
1991; Wattenmaker, 1995; for a review see Heit, 1997). Such evidence appears to challenge 
the possibility that a domain general inference process underlies category-based induction (cf. 
Hirschfield & Gelman, 1994). The present chapter begins with a review and evaluation of 
conceptual and empirical evidence on differences between artifacts and natural kinds. 
Subsequently it presents an experiment that aims to extend the centrality hypothesis to 
artifacts. 
7.1.1 Conceptual evidence and evaluation 
Numerous factors have been suggested to contrast natural kind categories (such as 
animals, gold, and tornadoes) and artifact categories. To name a few, artifact categories are 
said to differ from natural kind categories in that: ( l ) they do not occur naturally; (2) they do 
not have essences (whatever these turn out to be); (3) they do not have sciences centered 
around them; (4) they require reference to human intention. 
These distinctions have not been left unchallenged. Natural kinds are not the only 
naturally occurring classes of things because some other classes of things are also naturally 
occurring. Blue things, for instance, describe a naturally occurring class. Further, not all 
natural kinds may yet exist. Some classes of things, like a particular radioactive element, may 
be sufficiently rare as to not have been observed yet (see Keil, 1995). Naturalness fails 
therefore to segregate natural kinds from artifacts. 
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Natural kinds are not even the sole classes of things that have sciences centered 
around them - artifacts are also being studied (e.g. antique experts study antiques, dress 
designers study fashion). Gelman (1988) suggests that a critical difference between artifact 
experts and natural kind experts might be that the former focus on complex sets of 
distinctions whereas the latter on general laws that describe entire categories (such as 
mammals). This claim is based on the assumption that artifacts are inherently more variable 
than natural kinds. Almost all features of artifacts can vary as long as their intended function 
is satisfied (e.g. telephones can vary in color, shape of handle, and material as long as they 
can function as telephones). In contrast, natural kinds are constrained by their genetic make-
up to be of a certain color, to reach a certain size, and so forth. Notice, however, that the 
heterogeneity of properties varies within a domain. For example, color is a homogeneous 
property for elephants and PCs but not for parrots and shirts. Inductive potential should not 
therefore depend on category kind, but rather on the relation between a predicate and a 
category (Goodman, 1955; Markman, 1989; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). 
Reference to human intention also seems inadequate to delimit artifacts from natural 
kinds. Natural kinds, such as designer plants or animals subject to intensive breeding, seem to 
require reference to human intention. Vice versa, complex artifacts, such as computers, do not 
seem to require reference to human intention (at least to a certain extent). 
Based on such arguments theorists like Keil (e.g. 1989, 1995) contend that natural 
kinds and artifacts are arrayed along several continua rather than in contrasting bins. This 
leaves the door open for general mechanisms, such as conceptual centrality, to capture 
category-based inference across various domains. 
7.1.2 Empirical evidence and evaluation: Type of property by type of kind 
interaction. 
One sort of empirical evidence in support of the domain-specific approach comes 
from studies that show a type of property by type of category interaction (e.g. Gelman 1988; 
Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Keil; 1989, 1995; Rips 1989). These studies show that internal or 
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molecular features are important for categorizing natural kinds (e.g. for bird: it mates with 
other birds), whereas external, functional features are important for categorizing artifacts (e.g. 
for coffeemaker: it is used for making coffee). One interpretation of such findings is that 
natural kinds and artifacts involve different domains and hence the interaction between 
property and category type is an immediate consequence of this domain distinction. A review 
of the literature suggests that this claim is unwarranted. 
Gelman (1988, Study 1) studied inductive inferences about natural kind and artifact 
categories with four-year olds and second-graders. One of her findings was that second 
graders were more willing to generalize among artifacts' functional features (e.g. for clock: 
used for horology; for bike: you can traverse with it), rather than molecular or previous form 
features (e.g. for clock: has a pondus inside; for bike: used to be a piece of bauxite). 
Similar evidence is reported from the domain of categorization. Keil (1989), for 
example, had children consider an instance of a category lacking some surface properties and 
asked them whether they still considered the transformed instance as a member of the original 
category. By systematically varying the type of category, Keil found that surface features 
were rated more important for the identity of artifacts than for the identity of natural kinds. 
One story, for instance, involved a raccoon that underwent a transformation and came to look 
like a skunk (e.g. it smelled bad, and its tail was painted black with a white stripe). Most of 
the older children judged the transformed animal to have kept its identity, to still be a 
raccoon. Another story involved the transformation of a coffeepot into a birdfeeder. Most of 
the older children judged the transformed artifact to have lost its identity, to be a birdfeeder. 
(For similar evidence see also Rips, 1989; Barr & Caplan, 1987; Barton & Komatsu, 1989). 
Contrary to these studies, Malt and Johnson (1992) presented evidence against the 
idea that functional features are the most important in category decisions for artifacts. They 
found that some physical features (e.g. for tractor: has an engine, has large wheels, has one 
seat, the seat is unenclosed, has an attachment for farm machinery) are more important than, 
or at least as important as, some functional features (e.g. for tractor: allows one person on a 
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farm to ti l l ground or plow fields by pulling a variety of other machines). Malt and Johnson's 
findings cast therefore doubt to the validity of the property type x category type distinction. 
In sum, both the conceptual and empirical evidence fail to support a clear-cut 
distinction between artifacts and natural kinds. At the same time, the bulk of evidence 
suggests that there are broad differences between these types of categories. These broad 
differences seem to cast doubt as to whether a domain general mechanism can account for 
category-based inference. Below we present evidence that conceptual centrality offers just 
such a domain general mechanism. 
7.2 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY CAN ACCOUNT FOR CATEGORY BY 
PROPERTY INTERACTION 
Ahn's (1998) studies on adult categorization provide evidence that the causal status 
hypothesis (basically that causes are weighted more heavily than effects in categorical 
decisions; see Chapter IV for a more detailed discussion) can account for why functional 
features (e.g. it is used to pound nails) are generally more important for the identity of 
artifacts, whereas molecular features (e.g. it has a left aortic arch) for the identity of natural 
kinds. Her first two studies borrowed the materials from Barton and Komatsu (1989) and Malt 
and Johnson (1992) respectively, and showed that in both cases conceptual centrality was 
correlated with judged category importance. The results therefore give some credibility to the 
claim that causal centrality constrains reaUlife categorization. In her last two studies, Ahn 
examined artificial natural kind and artifact categories while directly manipulating the causal 
status of a property. She found that causal status was a good predictor of category importance 
independent of the type of category involved. Functional or molecular high-causal status 
features were judged as more important in categorical decisions than functional or molecular 
low-causal status features across both artifacts and natural kind categories. Taken together, 
Ahn's experiments strongly suggest that a feature's causal status constrains categorization. 
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Since causal status is but a special case of conceptual centrality, her studies corroborate the 
idea that conceptual centrality constrains category-based inference. 
We hold that artifacts are similar to natural kinds in the sense that they are also 
embedded in lay theories (or vague pre-theoretical biases), theories that can be represented by 
asymmetric dependency links connecting their properties. Otherwise stated, we hold that the 
features of artifacts also differ in terms of conceptual centrality and therefore they should be 
differentially projectibile. Being able to freeze-up stuff, for instance, is a conceptually central 
feature of refrigerators, being white is not. Much like with animal categories, we expect, all 
else being equal, that the more central a feature for a concept the higher its projectibility to 
other concepts that share its attributes and dependencies. 
7.3 EXPERIMENT 17: IT'S ALL GREEK TO ME 
Our experiments so far have tried to minimize participants' background knowledge of 
the central and less-central candidate features in an effort to keep 'all else equal'. Animal 
categories, being highly complex, are well suited to study our hypothesis in part because they 
possess many properties that we simply do not know about. Few people outside biological 
sciences, for instance, know the names of the various hormones that animals have. For 
artifacts, and especially for simple ones like chair, it is hard to come up with credible novel 
properties that are unbeknown to the participants10. Because of this limitation, in the present 
experiment the candidate properties were named in Greek. Relative centrality was defined 
from the "Few/Lots" definition. Participants were instructed that they would learn two facts 
about a category, and that they would be asked to generalize these to another category. To 
motivate them we told them that this task was in a context of a TV-show that promised a large 
sum of money for the best answers. 
The main objective of Experiment 17 was to show that feature centrality influences 
property induction among artifacts. Our straightforward prediction was that central features 
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would be more projectible than less-central features to the extent that the argument's 
categories shared structure. To investigate what sort of structure the categories should share 
we included 3 levels of similarity (high-surface high-functional (HSHF), or high-surface low-
functional (HSLF), or low-surface high-functional (LSHF). According to our prediction the 
centrality effect should be most evident in the HSHF level. Also, to the extent that shared 
functions mediate more the centrality effect, we expected a stronger centrality effect in the 
LSHF than in the HSLF condition. Such a result would sit well with theories supporting 
functional features as central for artifacts. Such a result, however, is independently expected 
because centrality is defined in terms of how many functions of an artifact depend on it. That 
is, LSHF category pairs are more similar in the relevant dimensions than HSLF pairs. 
METHOD 
Participants. The participants were 22 first-year undergraduates of the University of Durham. 
Participation was in the context of a tutorial. 
Design. This experiment crossed Centrality (central or less-central property) with Shared 
structure (high-surface high-functional (HSHF), or high-surface low-functional (HSLF), or 
low-surface high-functional (LSHF)) with repeated measures on both factors. 
Materials. Eight triples of materials were constructed in the same way as the triples in 
Experiment 15. That is, one member of a triple appeared in the HSSS condition, one in the 
LSSS condition, and a third in the LSDS condition. The only distinguishing feature between 
conditions was the critical category in the premise of the argument. An example triple is 
shown in Table 7.1. As can be seen from the table, the wording of the items is the same as the 
one used in the few/lots set of experiments (Chapter IV). 
The claim is not that complexity differentiates natural kinds from artifacts. Complexity varies within 
a domain; e.g. water is less complex than zebra; pencil is less complex than microwave oven. 
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Selection of base-target pairs. A series of base-target pairs were constructed by the 
author that were thought, intuitively, to differ in their surface similarity and function 
similarity. They were then discussed with his supervisor and a number of revisions, deletions 
and additions were made. The list was then further refined by the author to produce a list of 
24 items, eight in each Shared structure condition. This list was then presented to an 
independent sample of 12 participants who were asked to rate each item for its functional and 
surface similarity. For the functional similarity estimates participants were instructed (the 
actual instructions were in bold-faced letters): "Please rate how similar are the following pairs 
of objects in terms of function. The higher the rating the more functionally similar you think 
that the pair of objects are." For the surface similarity estimates participants were instructed: 
"Please rate how similar are the following pairs of objects in terms of their surface properties 
(e.g., how do they look). The higher the rating the more similarly looking you think that the 
pair of objects are." 
Items were constructed in a similar way as in Experiments 6, 7, 10, and 11, with the 
exception that in the present experiment a single property was assigned to each base-target 
pair. Since the properties were in Greek we felt it unnecessary to counterbalance the 
assignment of properties to premise triples. Eight premise triples were paired with a single 
target category to form an argument in each shared structure condition. For example, the 
premise triple {bungalow, Barbie's house, tent} was paired with {house}. Table 7.1 overleaf 
presents the 24 argument categories of Experiment 17. 
In each questionnaire half of the questions in each shared structure condition asked 
for the likelihood of the target having the central property first, and the other half second. The 
order of which the central and the less central properties were evaluated first, was 
counterbalanced across participants. The presentation order of the items was also 
counterbalanced such that about half the participants received one order while the rest its 
reverse. 
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Table 7.1 Premise triples along with the target categories for the items of 
Experiment 17. 
Premise Triples Target 
HSHF HSLF LSHF 
Lorry Toy-truck Cargo-boat Truck 
Trumpet Plastic saxophone Music-box Saxophone 
Washing-machine Refrigerator Car-wash Dish-washer 
Clock Compass Hour-glass Watch 
Mac TV Calculator IBM-PC 
Microwave Freezer Camp-stove Oven 
Boeing 747 Remote-control plane Rocketship Concorde 
Bungalow Barbie's house Tent House 
Procedure 
Similarity task. The items were presented in booklets. For the functional similarity 
estimates participants were instructed (the actual instructions were in bold-faced letters): 
"Please rate how similar are the following pairs of objects in terms of function. The higher the 
rating the more functionally similar you think that the pair of objects are." For the surface 
similarity estimates participants were instructed: "Please rate how similar are the following 
pairs of objects in terms of their surface properties (e.g., how do they look). The higher the 
rating the more similarly looking you think that the pair of objects are." 
Induction task. The items were presented in booklets. Participants were asked to 
imagine that they were finalists in a TV quiz show few questions away from winning the 
grand prize: £100,000. The presenter unveiled the last task named "It's all Greek to me!" They 
were told that they would be informed that an object had two properties. Their task was to 
rate the likelihood of another object having each of these properties. The catch was that the 
names of the properties were given in Greek. Participants had to work through an example 
before proceeding with the test items. 
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RESULTS 
Similarity results. Table 7.2 summarizes the results from the similarity control 
experiment. Broadly, the original assignment of category pairs to similarity conditions fits 
well with the participants' judgments. HSHF items were, as intended, high in both surface and 
functional similarity. HSLF items were higher in surface similarity but lower in functional 
similar than LSHF items. 
Table 7. 2 Mean (SE) functional similarity and surface similarity ratings for the 3 
similarity conditions. The higher the rating, the higher the judged 
similarity. 
Similarity type 
Functional Similarity Surface Similarity 
Similarity 
HSHF 77.72 (5.97) 67.37 (4.67) 
HSLF 17.55(2.65) 55.97(4.60) 
LSHF 43.66 (4.55) 20.90 (5.08) 
Note. H=High; L=Low; S=Surface; F=Functional. 
To detect whether the assignment of items to similarity condition were justified two 3 
(Similarity: HSHF or HSLF or HFLS) x 2 (Similarity Type: functional or surface) repeated 
measures analyses of variance were performed, one across participants and one across items. 
The only robust effects were that of Similarity and the Similarity x Similarity Type 
interaction. For Similarity the F-values were: F,(2,21)=41.11, p<.001; F2(2, 10)=11.12, 
p<.005. For the interaction the F-values were: F,(2,21)=25.69, p<.001; F2(2,10)=40.99, 
p<.001. These results sit well with the assignment of properties into conditions. The effect of 
similarity is because the HSHF condition is high in both types of similarity whereas the HSLF 
and HFLS in just one. The interaction is because of the differences between the HSLF and 
HFLS conditions. 
To test this latter proposal we performed a 2 (Similarity: HSLF or HFLS) x 2 
(Similarity type: functional or surface) repeated measures analyses of variance. As expected, 
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the only robust effect was the Similarity x Similarity type interaction (F1(l,14)=48.05, 
p<.001; F 2 ( l , l l )=50.71, p<.001). The assignment of items into the HSHF, HSLF and LSHF 
conditions seem therefore to be justified. 
Induction results. Table 7.3 summarizes the results. For the HSHF condition a strong 
centrality effect is observed. For the LSHF and the HSLF conditions central properties were 
more projectible than less central ones, though the value of the difference is much lower. The 
centrality effect for the LSHF condition is slightly higher than that of the HSLF condition. 





HSHF 61.91 (2.28) 42.88(3.42) 
HSLF 33.72(2.80) 30.76(3.11) 
LSHF 35.37 (2.66) 30.71 (3.30) 
The counterbalancing methods did not have a significant effect on the responses, and 
hence they were dropped from the analyses. Two 2 (Centrality) x 3 (Similarity) analyses of 
variance were carried out. In the Fi analysis both factors were repeated measures, in the F 2 
only Centrality was repeated measures. There was a main effect of Centrality 
(Fi*(l,21)=12.91, p<.005; F2(l,21)=34.83, p<.001), and a main effect of Similarity 
(F!*(2,20)=58.80, p<.001; F2(2,21)= 17.56, p<.001). The interaction was also significant 
(Fr(2,20)=8.48, p<.005; F2(2,21)=l 1.43, p<.001). 
To find the locus of the interaction, t-tests were performed across each level of 
similarity. A significant centrality effect was shown for the HSHF condition (participants: 
t(21)=4.75, p<.001; items: t(7)=33.88, p<.001). For the LSHF condition, the results were 
significant only for participants (participants: t(21)=2.09, p<.05; items: t(7)=3.84). For the 
HSLF similarity condition, the results did not reach significance (for both t< l ) . 
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DISCUSSION 
The aim of this experiment was to extend our conceptual centrality hypothesis to the artifact 
domain. The results clearly support this claim. A secondary aim was to detect whether the 
centrality effect would be mediated more heavily by functional rather than by surface 
similarity. Although the results somewhat suggest that the centrality effect is more closely 
associated with functional similarity (a centrality effect was obtained for the LSHF but not for 
the HSLF condition), they only do so mildly. The only clear cut finding is that centrality does 
influence property induction with artifacts, and especially among concepts that they are 
highly similar on both surface features and deeper functions. The main effect of centrality is 
strongly modified by the centrality by similarity interaction. 
Although this experiment evidenced an influence of centrality on category-based 
inference with artifacts, it is not clear what drove participants' judgments. At one end, 
participants may have reinterpreted the Greek names into known properties of the premise 
categories. I f this reinterpretation was random, then both the central and the less-central 
properties should have been equally projectible. Since a centrality effect was detected, this 
possibility is discarded. At the other end, participants may have used a general centrality 
heuristic, something like "project the central property no matter what". This second possibility 
must also be discarded since it fails to explain the overwhelming centrality x similarity 
interaction. A third possibility is that people reinterpreted the properties into known properties 
that fitted the bill, which agreed with the centrality descriptions. For instance, they might have 
reinterpreted the central property "mixani" of lorry as "engine" (which by the way is its real 
meaning), and the less-central property "kathisma" as "seat". An account of the results 
therefore is that central novel properties were reinterpreted as more general izable known 
properties. Notice though that the only information participants were supplied with was vague 
information about a feature's centrality. So, the possibility that central novel features cue 
generalizable familiar features supports that feature centrality influences generalizability. 
To summarize, the results show that centrality does exert an influence on property 
induction with artifacts in proportion to the similarity between the base and the target 
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concepts. Needless to state, a complete account of how people reason about artifact categories 
requires further experimentation. 
7.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Chapters I I to V I investigated the influence of centrality on property induction with 
categories from the natural kind domain. The present chapter extended this hypothesis to the 
artifact domain. Central properties were more projectible than less-central ones in proportion 
to the similarity between the base and the target concepts. Taken together, the findings 
suggest that our centrality hypothesis can account for category-based inference across 
different domains (see also Ahn, 1998). 
Figure 7.1 A simplified illustration of the view that dependencies point inwards for 
natural kinds but outwards for artifacts. Dots represent properties, 
(adapted from Keil, 1995). 
A natural kind concept An artifact concept 
• * ::::.;v>#5® external agent 
To avoid misinterpretations, we do not doubt that there are differences between 
artifact and natural kind concepts. Such differences, however, may involve more how 
dependency patterns in each domain cluster and converge. That is, although both natural kind 
and artifact concepts can be represented as networks of dependencies, it might be that for 
natural kinds these dependencies point inwards (e.g. animals have properties to serve their 
internal purposes), while for artifacts they point outwards (e.g. artifacts have properties to 
serve an external agent). Such clustering may reflect the belief that natural kinds have 
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essences or vital forces, while artifacts do not (e.g. Atran, 1990). Figure 7.1 above represents 
such a state of affairs (loosely adapted from Keil, 1995, p.237). 
Keil (1995, p.250) presents two types of developmental evidence in support of that 
distinction: (1) that even 3-year-olds are sensitive to causal direction - they understand the 
difference between having a property for oneself (e.g. a rose has thorns to protect itself) rather 
than for someone else (e.g. barbed wire has thorns to protect us), and (2) that even for 
preschool children it makes sense to ask what an artifact is for (e.g. what is a hammer for?), 
but not what a natural kind is for (e.g. what is an oak tree for?). Such 'domain' differences 
leave our hypothesis unaffected11. They just suggest different sorts of dependency clustering 
in different category domains. Given that for natural kinds the dependencies converge 
inwards, then molecular features (e.g. for carrot: it is made out of cellulose) should be more 
conceptually central. Given that for artifacts they converge outwards, functional features (e.g. 
for bicycle: it has a seat) should be more conceptually central. 
1 1 Even such 'domain' differences should be, at best, very general. As stated in the introduction, the 
features of some natural kinds (like designer plants) seem to require reference to an external agent, and 
the features of some complex artifacts (like computers) seem not to require (at least not directly) such a 
reference. 
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CHAPTER VIII : 
FINAL DISCUSSION 
8.1 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The present research had one main objective and three secondary ones. The main 
objective was to find empirical support for our centrality hypothesis, i.e. that the more central 
a feature for a concept, the higher its projectibility to other concepts that share its structure. 
One secondary objective was to obtain empirical support for our working assumption that the 
effects of conceptual centrality and variability on property induction are distinct. A further 
secondary objective was to examine whether conceptual centrality provides a domain-specific 
or a domain-general constraint. The final secondary objective was to investigate whether the 
centrality hypothesis operates under vague conditions. The present sets of experiments are 
revisited and their results are discussed with respect to each of these objectives in turn. 
Aiming to focus on the big picture, we have purposefully omitted some details. Such details 
can be found in the respective experimental chapters. 
8.1.1 Objective 1: All else being equal, the more central a feature for a 
concept the higher its projectibility to other concepts that share its 
structure. 
Two claims can be discerned from our centrality hypothesis the second of which 
depends on the first: (1) that feature centrality constrains projectibility, and (2) that this effect 
is mediated by the extent to which the target concept shares structure (features and 
dependencies) with the base concept. 
To assess the first claim, we operationally defined conceptual centrality. Four 
operational definitions were used, the ease-of-imagining task that taps immutability, and three 
measures that directly derive from the Sloman et al.'s (1998) notion of conceptual centrality, 
i.e. that a feature is conceptually central to the extent that other (central) features depend on it. 
These direct measures were: centrality from a single dependency chain (Chapter III) , 
centrality from the number of properties dependent on a feature (Chapters IV and VII) , and 
centrality from the centrality of the properties dependent on a feature (Chapter V). 
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The use of multiple definitions of conceptual centrality served several purposes. For 
one, converging evidence for the centrality hypothesis from different operationalizations 
makes our claim stronger. Second, converging evidence from various direct 
operationalizations of conceptual centrality, supports the Sloman et al. notion of conceptual 
centrality as constraining induction. This is important in terms of future model development 
because the Sloman et al. notion comes with a model that implements it. Third, as wi l l be 
shown shortly, results from each individual operational definition of centrality were amenable 
to competing interpretations. The use of multiple operational definitions helped to cancel out 
competing interpretations across sets of experiments. Fourth, some definitions of conceptual 
centrality (e.g. centrality from a single dependency chain) helped pit our hypothesis against 
other theories that used similar experimental designs but offered different interpretations. 
To assess the second claim, we needed to operationalize the extent to which two 
concepts share structure. The judged similarity between the base and the target categories was 
taken as a surrogate of the extent to which two concepts are believed to share structure. Most 
of our experiments manipulated shared structure as follows: High-Similarity Same-
Superordinate (e.g. lion, tiger); Low-Similarity Same-Superordinate (e.g. lion, mice); Low-
Similarity Different-Superordinate (e.g. lion, falcon). 
Claim 1: Conceptual centrality constrains property induction 
The results of the present sets of experiments converge on the notion that conceptual 
centrality influences property induction. Broadly, we found that the more central a property 
for a concept, the higher its judged projectibility to other concepts. 
Experiment 1 evidenced centrality effects on projectibility with centrality defined 
from the ease-of-imagining task. Experiment 2 replicated the centrality effect using the same 
materials. Experiment 2 also provided support for the idea that conceptual centrality as 
defined by Sloman et al. (1998) influences projectibility, Thenceforth, our experiments 
operationalized centrality directly from the Sloman et al. notion. 
174 
Experiments of Chapter I I I defined centrality from a single dependency chain. They 
examined whether centrality constrains induction above and beyond the principle of 
systematicity. The results showed that, as predicted, depended-on properties (e.g. causes) 
were more projectible than dependent properties (e.g. effects). The principle of systematicity 
cannot capture this finding since it does not consider the status of a property in a relation (e.g. 
it predicts no preference to project causes over effects). The results, however, are open to a 
different interpretation. Maybe the depended-on properties were more projectible than their 
dependent properties not because of centrality differences but because of a default assumption 
that the former properties are necessary but insufficient for the presence of the latter. When 
we stipulated, for example, that For lions the hormone aldosterone regulates metabolism 
while the hormone corticosterone is regulated by metabolism, participants may have taken the 
presence of aldosterone as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the presence of 
corticosterone. Given such an assumption, the preference to project the depended-on rather 
than the dependent properties is normative. Whenever the dependent property is present the 
depended-on property is present as well (the central property is necessary), but i f the central 
property is deemed not sufficient, there may also be cases where the depended-on property is 
present while the dependent is absent. 
Experiments of Chapters IV and V I I aimed to rule out this interpretation by defining 
the central and the less-central properties in terms of the number of properties that depended 
upon each. Lots of an object's properties depended on the central feature while few on the less 
central feature. In essence, although both the central and the less central properties were 
depended-on, they were not parts of a single dependency chain, and hence not amenable to 
interpretations based around necessity and sufficiency. The results from these sets of 
experiments once again revealed centrality effects. 
Experiments of Chapter V used a subtle definition of conceptual centrality. An equal 
number of properties depended upon both the central and the less-central properties (except in 
Experiment 12). However, the properties dependent upon the central features were more 
central themselves than the properties dependent upon the less central features. This 
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operationalization examined the iterative aspect of the Sloman et al.'s (1998) notion, i.e. that a 
feature's centrality is a function of the centrality of the properties that depend upon it. The 
results once again revealed centrality effects. 
In sum, the present research strongly suggests that conceptual centrality constrains 
projectibility. 
Claim 2: The effect of conceptual centrality on projectibility is mediated by the extent 
to which the base and target concepts share structure. 
The findings of the current research also support the second part of our hypothesis. 
Critically, they suggest ways to specify our hypothesis more precisely. The "shared structure" 
that most seems to mediate the projectibility of a candidate feature, is the structure related to 
the candidate feature (such as the properties that depend upon the candidate feature.) 
The series of experiments of Chapter I I I defined centrality in terms of a single 
dependency relation. In our best controlled experiments (Experiments 6 and 7) the property 
that depended- (or was depending-) on the candidate feature was specific and fairly general 
(e.g. metabolism). These experiments failed to evidence a similarity by centrality interaction. 
We reasoned that this may be because (1) similarity was not widely varied (all base-target 
pairs involved animals) or (2) the depended-on properties were fairly general and thus all 
target animal categories were assumed to have them. Conceptually, all target animals could be 
assumed to be equally similar to the base with respect to the dependent properties. 
Aiming to decide, in part, between hypotheses (1) and (2), experiments of Chapter IV 
defined centrality from the "Few/Lots" definition. In contrast to the experiments of Chapter 
I I I , the properties that depended upon the central and the less central features were left vague 
(e.g. lots of a lion's functions depend upon the hormone aldosterone, but few upon the 
hormone corticosterone). In Chapter IV, a significant similarity by centrality interaction was 
evidenced. Contrary to (1), it seems that similarity was varied widely enough in Chapter I I I to 
observe such an interaction. The results of Chapter IV sit better with hypothesis (2). The 
effect of centrality on projectibility seems to critically depend on the extent to which the 
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target concept is believed to share the properties and functions that depend upon the candidate 
feature for the base. The results of Chapter IV can be accounted for, i f one assumes that the 
participants used some overall similarity measure to compute the extent to which the target 
concept shared the properties of the candidate feature specified for the base. I f they did, then 
the more similar the base and target concepts were, the bigger the difference of coherence lent 
by the central and the less central features, and thus the bigger the centrality effect, the result 
that was obtained. 
This interpretation poses a potential threat to our claim that conceptual centrality as 
defined by Sloman et al. (1998) constrains inductive inference. Possibly it is not as much the 
centrality of the properties that depend upon a candidate inference that constrains induction, 
as the extent to which the target shares the features specified for the base category. The 
experiments of Chapter V suggested that both factors are critical. Upon both the central and 
the less central properties the same number of features depended, but the features that 
depended upon the central property were more central themselves. The results (bar the pure 
projectibility case, e.g. an inference from the sample of hippos to all hippos) showed main 
effects of both centrality and shared structure but no shared structure by centrality interaction. 
In sum, the results showed that the conceptual centrality effect is mediated by the 
extent to which the target concept shares properties with the base and especially those 
properties that depend upon the candidate feature. Our findings support the following 
modified hypothesis: 
All else being equal, the more central a feature for a concept the higher its 
projectibility to other concepts that share its structure, and especially the part of its 
structure connected to that feature. 
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8.1.2 Objective 2: Conceptual centrality versus variability 
Our research program assumes that conceptual centrality and variability are 
conceptually distinct, that they refer to different perspectives of looking at concepts. We take 
conceptual centrality to be an aspect of the mental representations of categories, while 
variability to be an aspect of the set of remembered instances of a category. We expected 
therefore these two dimensions to be empirically distinct, to exert different forces on 
projectibility. To investigate this claim the experiments of Chapter V pitted centrality against 
variability in judgments of projectibility and judgments of frequency. The results supported 
our claim since they showed that: (1) the centrality of a property influences its projectibility 
irrespective of its objective frequency, and (2) that to a lesser extent the centrality of a 
property can bias the perception of frequency. Experiments of Chapter V I took this claim a 
step further, and asked what sort of information would people seek to make a property 
induction. The results suggest that centrality information has more informational value than 
variability information (at least for arguments with low-similar categories), since the 
participants preferred the former type of information over the latter. 
In sum, as we expected, the effect of centrality is distinct from the effect of variability 
in judgments of projectibility. Interestingly, the centrality of a feature not only constrains 
property induction but may also bias the perceived homogeneity of a feature. Finally, 
centrality information is (generally) valued more highly than variability information when 
making an inference. 
8.1.3 Objective 3: Property induction: Domain specific or domain general ? 
Our account presupposes that category-based induction is influenced by conceptual 
centrality (a domain general aspect of representations), and therefore assumes that the 
centrality hypothesis will hold across different domains. We tested our hypothesis in two 
domains: the biological and the artifact domain. The bulk of our experiments (Chapters I I -VI) 
used materials from the animal domain and supported our hypothesis. Chapter V I I extended 
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the centrality hypothesis to the domain of artifacts. Taken together, the findings suggest that 
conceptual centrality provides a domain independent constraint on property induction. 
8.1.4 Objective 4: Vagueness 
The final secondary objective of our research was to examine whether the centrality 
hypothesis operates under conditions of vagueness. To this end, several of our experiments 
(Experiments 5, 8 to 11, and 17) used abstract properties or categories. Creating conditions of 
vagueness helped us contrast our hypothesis against structural mapping models. Notice that 
for structural mapping models to work, candidate properties as well as their relations to other 
properties need all be completely specified. That is, such models (and indeed most cognitive 
models) cannot operate under vagueness. However, often people make inferences under 
conditions of ignorance such as when we lack relevant knowledge or when we are operating 
in a novel context. In these cases, centrality offers a useful basis for judgments. 
The centrality effect was evidenced under vague conditions. This finding gives the 
centrality hypothesis a heuristic status. That is, wherever possible people seem to use 
centrality information to make an inference. It also points to the inability of the current 
models of category-based inference to address centrality effects. 
8.2 RELA TIONS OF CURRENT FINDINGS TO MODELS OF CA TEGORY-
BASED INFERENCE 
In the introductory chapter we presented four models of category-based inference: 
Sloman's (1993) feature-coverage model, Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, and Shafir's 
(1990) similarity-coverage model, Smith , Shafir, and Osherson's (1993) gap model, and the 
structural mapping model developed by Gentner and her colleagues (e.g. Gentner, 1983, 
1989). None of these models can account for the present findings. 
Being similarity-based, the feature-coverage and the similarity-coverage models do 
not assume, or at least cannot readily capture, relational structure. The centrality effects are 
structural effects, and thus fall outside the scope of these models. To be fair, the centrality 
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effects also fall outside the domain of these models. In the Sloman and Wisniewski's (1992) 
sense of predicate blankness, the predicates used in the present studies were not blank since 
the participants could relate them back to the argument's categories. 
The Smith et al. (1993) gap model also fails to capture centrality effects. Recall that 
the gap model deals with non-blank predicates such as can bite through barbed wire. Such 
predicates are assumed to invite an examination of the plausibility of the argument's premise. 
Broadly, the more implausible the premise is judged on the basis of prior beliefs, then the 
more these beliefs are revised as to adopt a more liberal criterion for accepting the predicate. 
The more liberal the criterion for accepting the predicate, the higher the judged strength of the 
conclusion of the argument. The predicates used here (e.g. has the enzyme streptokinase) 
were unfamiliar to the subjects and hence they fall outside the gap model's domain. We 
cannot see how the predicates used here invited an examination of the plausibility of the 
premises. 
The structural mapping model (e.g. Gentner, 1989) can capture relational structure 
effects, albeit not centrality effects. To capture centrality effects a model should consider the 
dependency status of the candidate property in a relation - the structural mapping model does 
not do this. Further, the centrality effect was evidenced under conditions of vagueness, 
conditions under which the structural mapping model cannot operate. 
8.2.1 Modeling centrality effects 
At present our centrality hypothesis is just that, a hypothesis proposing a very specific 
constraint on property induction. It is highly desirable to develop a model to capture the 
present findings. There is of course the Sloman et al. (1998) model that captures the relative 
centrality of features for a single concept, but it is non-trivial to extend this model to 
category-based inference. Below we summarize the main findings of our research related to 
the centrality hypothesis and build up toward a simple model that can account for those 
findings. 
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Main Findings. The findings can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Experiments of Chapter III defined relative centrality from a single dependency 
chain (e.g. For lions, hormone aldosterone regulates metabolism, whereas 
hormone corticosterone gets regulated by metabolic rate). The properties that 
depended upon the candidate features were both specific and general (e.g. 
metabolism) and so all target animals could be assumed to have them. The 
results showed a main effect of centrality, but no shared structure by centrality 
interaction. 
(2) Experiments of Chapter IV defined relative centrality by the number of properties 
that depended upon a candidate feature. The properties that depended upon the 
candidate features were left vague. One can assume that the more similar a 
target to the base, the more likely it is that the target will share the dependent 
properties specified for the candidate feature. The results showed a main effect 
of centrality, and a shared structure by centrality interaction. The more similar the 
categories of an argument were judged, the higher the centrality effect; i.e. the 
bigger the difference between the projectibility of the central minus the less 
central property. The results also showed a tendency for a negative centrality 
effect for very dissimilar animal pairs (e.g., falcons, dolphins). 
(3) Experiments 13 and 14 of Chapter V defined centrality by the centrality of the 
properties that depended upon a candidate feature. The properties that 
depended upon the candidate feature were specific and fairly general. All target 
categories had them. The results showed a main effect of centrality, but no 
shared structure by centrality interaction. 
Models. We take a property to be projectible to a target to the extent that its 
projection would promote coherence to the target. Adjusting the Sloman et al. (1998) notion 
of coherence to the present purposes, a property is projectible to a target to the extent that its 
projection would lend lots of structural support, that is, to the extent that it would support 
many of the target's (central) properties. The models we propose center around this notion. 
Under the assumption that concepts are reducible to vectors of values over sets of 
features (as Sloman's (1993) feature-coverage model assumes), the effect of centrality might 
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be proportional to the extent that the target (is believed to) share the dependent properties 
specified for the candidate feature in the base. A simple instantiation of this idea is to take the 
effect of centrality on projectibility as the dot product of the vectors representing the base and 
target concepts with respect to the dependent properties. Call this the similarity model of 
inference. 
Table 8.1. Illustration of how the similarity model can capture the shared 
structure by centrality interaction of Chapter IV. The number of 
dependent features that the target shares with the base is taken as a 
direct measure of the effect of centrality. 
BandT, Lots Effect on Few Effect on Central. 
d-on d-on central d-on less-cen. Difference 
Verv hiqh 80% 20 16 10 8 8 
similaritv 
Low 60% 20 12 10 6 6 
similaritv 
Verv low 40% 20 8 10 4 4 
similaritv 
Note. BandT, d-on refers to the base-target feature overlap with respect to the 
dependent properties. We assume that this overlap will be proportional to the overall 
feature overlap between the base and the target concepts. Lots d-on / Few d-on 
stand for the number of properties that (are believed to) depend upon the central and 
the less central features respectively. The numbers in the example are arbitrarily 
chosen. The critical assumption is that the number of Lots d-on is greater than the 
number of Few d-on. Effect on central/less cen. refers to the effect of centrality on the 
central and the less-central properties, respectively. For simplicity, this effect is 
computed as the number of properties that the target shares with the base. Central. 
difference stands for the difference in projectibility between the central and the less-
central properties. 
The similarity model can account for findings (1) and (2). It can account for the lack 
of shared structure by centrality interaction in (1), because all target concepts shared the 
dependent properties. Table 8.1 above illustrates how the similarity model can account for the 
significant shared structure by centrality interaction in (2). 
The similarity model, however, cannot account for the main effect of centrality in 
experiments 13 and 14 (finding (3)), because general features depended on both the central 
and the less-central properties. Hence, the amount of featural overlap with respect to these 
properties was the same for all target categories. Importantly, this finding shows that simple 
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similarity-based models wi l l prove insufficient to account for the current findings. To capture 
this finding, a model needs to capture the centrality of the dependent properties. The 
similarity model can be extended to capture this by representing concepts as vectors over 
features weighted by conceptual centrality. Such feature vectors can be supplied by the 
Sloman et al. (1998) model. Call this the centrality model of category-based inference. 
Such a centrality model cannot capture negative centrality effects. Such effects were 
observed, however, in some experiments of Chapter IV involving arguments with very low 
similarity category-pairs (e.g. lion-falcon). The broad shortcoming of the centrality model of 
inference may be that it fails to take into account the number (and type) of features that 
depend upon the candidate features in the base, but that the target does not have. An example 
would be i f people were presented with a two-premise argument like the following: 
Facts: Robins have property x1 upon which flying, metabolism, and heart 
rate depends. 
Robins have property x2 upon which metabolism and heart rate 
depends. 
Conclusion 1: Cats have x1 . 
Conclusion 2: Cats have x2. 
The centrality model predicts that the two conclusions would be judged as equally strong. 
However, it seems that the premises support conclusion 2 more than conclusion 1. The idea 
is: I f robins have wings to fly, and flying depends on property x l , then a cat will be less likely 
to have x l . In general, we suggest that the projectibility of a feature might be a negative 
function of the dependent properties that are specified for the base but are not found in the 
target (i.e. Band~T). Using arguments similar to those in the example would help address this 
prediction qualitatively. 
A simple way to capture such effects (of which we believe that the negative effect of 
centrality is but a special case) is by computing the effect of centrality on projectibility as a 
weighted difference between the dot product of the vectors of the base and the target 
categories with respect to the dependent properties (weighted for centrality) minus the dot 
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product of the base vector with itself with respect to the dependent properties that the base 
category has but the target hasn't. This effect can be computed as, 
a (BandT, d-on) - b (Band~T, d-on) (8.1) 
where a, b are non-negative constants. 
Table 8.2 illustrates how an instantiation of such a model can capture the negative 
centrality effect of Chapter IV. To simplify things, we take the overall effect of centrality in 
the projectibility of a feature as the difference between the number of dependent properties 
that the target shares with the base minus the number of dependent properties that it does not. 
That is, we assume that all dependent properties have equal centrality weights, and that 
constants a, b in Equation (8.1) equal 1. 
Table 8.2 The centrality model can account for the negative centrality effect for 
the very-low in similarity pairs of Chapter IV. 
BandT, Band-T Lots Effect on Few Effect on Central. 
d-on d-on Central L-central Difference 
Very 80% 20% 20 12 10 6 6 
high sim 
Low sim 60% 40% 20 4 10 2 2 
Verv low 40% 60% 20 -4 10 -2 -2 
sim 
Simple algebraic manipulations show that (under the current assumptions) negativity wil l be 
the case whenever the base-target overlap with respect to the dependent properties (i.e. 
BandT, d-on) is less than 50% (see Table A.8.2 for a proof). 
In sum, guided by the present findings, we described a class of feature-based models 
that can capture the present effects of centrality on projectibility. Call this class of models the 
modified centrality models of category-based inference. At the heart of the modified centrality 
models lies the idea that a feature is projectible to a concept to the extent its projection would 
provide support to many of its (central) properties, and would leave few of its dependent 
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properties unaccounted for. This class of models is centrality-based because concepts are 
represented as vectors of values over sets of features, values that reflect centrality weights. 
The proposed class of models take therefore advantage of the Sloman et al. (1998) model of 
weighting features by conceptual centrality. 
8.2.2 Toward a complete model of category-based inference 
A complete model of category-based inference, to be viable, would need to also 
account for other known effects of category-based inference (refer to section 1.3). It would 
need to account, for instance, for the observations that the premise-conclusion similarity, the 
premise typicality, and the conclusion-homogeneity all constrain induction. Modified 
centrality models can capture premise-conclusion similarity effects since one of their 
variables is premise-conclusion featural overlap. These models, though, fail to capture 
typicality and conclusion homogeneity effects. In fact, for positive values of b it seems that 
they get typicality effects the wrong way around (See Equation 8.1.). They seem to predict, 
for instance, that inferences from typical to atypical categories (e.g. an inference from falcons 
to bats) are weaker than inferences from atypical to typical categories (e.g. an inference from 
bats to falcons). That is because bats (presumably) have more idiosyncratic properties. [It is 
interesting to note that the present class of models predicts argument strength as a negative 
function of Band~T whereas the Sloman (1993) model predicts argument strength as a 
negative function of -BandT]. 
A simple (though not elegant) way to capture both category effects and centrality 
effects on projectibility is by linearly combining the modified centrality models of inference 
with Sloman's (1993) feature-coverage model. To keep it in line with the present 
representational assumptions, the input to the feature-coverage model would also be vectors 
of values over sets of features weighted for centrality. When no centrality information is 
provided, the hybrid model would reduce to the feature-coverage model. Since the feature-
coverage model can capture the 3 main effects of categories on inference (see section 1.4.1), 
so wi l l such a hybrid model. Such feature-coverage centrality hybrid models are promising in 
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that they seem able to account for many known effects of category-based induction. At the 
same time they are uninteresting because neither of the component models is an elaboration 
of the other. 
What about systematicity effects? The class of modified centrality models, being 
based on the Sloman et al. (1998) centrality model, fail to capture the effect that related 
features are more projectible than unrelated features (but see Lassaline, 1996; Wu & Gentner, 
1998) - they just consider the dependent properties as relevant. Capturing such effects is even 
more pressing because experiments 6 and 7 in Chapter I I I showed a very small difference 
between the projectibility of the depended-on and the dependent properties. A way to capture 
such effects might be by modifying the Sloman et al. (1998) centrality model by allowing 
some activation to flow back from the depended-on to the dependent properties. By doing so, 
the resulting values of the 'effect' features would be higher than the values for unrelated 
features. Such a breed of centrality models of inductive inference would show a preference to 
project related over unrelated properties. 
Alternatively, one could start with a structural mapping model and modify it by 
adding a centrality constraint - a constraint that wil l bias the model towards projecting central 
properties. Such a modified structural mapping model would readily account for the finding 
that the extent to which the target shares the dependent properties of the base mediates the 
effect of centrality. That is because the more dependent properties the target shares with the 
base the better the alignment, and hence the stronger the sanction to carry over the candidate 
feature to the target. Such a modified structural mapping model would also be able to capture 
some of the main effects of categories on category-based inference (see section 1.4.2). 
However, it is not obvious how structural mapping models can be modified. Further, it is 
doubtful that such a resulting model would work under vagueness. A decisive determinant, 
perhaps, between modified feature-based or modified structural-mapping models would be 
whether the labels of relations matter (beyond merely influencing the strength of the 
dependencies). I f they do, then the structural mapping models would be favored. I f they do 
not, then the simpler feature-based models can capture the effects. 
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To conclude, we have shown that modified centrality models of inference can capture 
our centrality findings. Further, we have argued that hybrids combining such models with 
Sloman's (1993) feature-coverage model, may account for many of the known effects of 
category-based inference. Such hybrids are uninteresting since the component models do not 
build on one another. It is the same as saying that when centrality information is available, the 
centrality model wil l take over and for blank predicates the feature-coverage model wil l take 
over. Modifying structural mapping models so as to capture centrality effects offer an 
alternative approach toward a universal category-based model. 
8.2.3 Relations between category-based models 
Domain relations. What is the relation underlying the various models of category-
based inference? As Gentner and Medina (1998) propose, the relation may be this: in the 
absence of sufficient knowledge (such as in the case of blank predicates), people fall back on 
default strategies such as overall similarity measures and or diversity-based reasoning. In such 
cases, both the similarity-coverage and the feature-coverage models are adequate for 
capturing judgments of projectibility. When knowledge is present relating the candidate 
feature to other properties of a concept, people wil l make intensive use of such knowledge. In 
such cases judgments of projectibility will be constrained by structural aspects such as the 
principle of systematicity and the centrality status of the candidate feature (For corroborating 
evidence that people make intense use of represented knowledge whenever possible, see 
section 8.6.4 on Instability across cultures.). In such cases, the structural-mapping and the 
centrality-based inference models wi l l be applicable. In the special case where such 
knowledge is vague, a vague centrality heuristic would be useful. Such cases are in fact not 
that special. We often make inferences under conditions of ignorance such as when we lack 
relevant knowledge or when we are operating in a novel context (see also section 8.6.3 
Instability across development). Centrality models of property induction could best capture 
such cases. Finally, in cases where the plausibility of premises is at question, the gap model 
may prove the best. In other words, the centrality heuristic is but one strategy that people use 
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to infer properties. That is why, we believe, it is uninteresting to try to combine centrality 
with models about blank predicates. 
Maximizing coherence. As stated in section 1.4.3, a central principle underlying 
category-based induction (and concept use in general) might be that of increasing consistency 
(positive coherence) and decreasing or avoiding inconsistency (negative coherence). (For 
more on positive and negative coherence see Pollock, 1979.) Property generalization is by 
itself a means of increasing positive coherence. Projecting a property from a sample of 
instances to the whole category can be seen as an inference to the best explanation, taking the 
generalization to explain its instances (see Harman, 1995). This explains, in part, why we 
have a tendency to draw inferences in the first place. One of the reasons why we endorse 
some property generalizations more than others seems to be because some properties lend 
more coherence to the target concept. That is, the purpose of property induction might be to 
increase the target concept's coherence. Projecting properties that are thought to explain (or to 
provide structural support for) many of the target concept's properties promotes more 
coherence than projecting properties that explain fewer of the target's properties. Projecting 
based on matching systems of related rather than of unrelated properties (i.e., following the 
principle of systematicity) can be also seen as a direct way of maximizing the target's 
coherence (see Harman, 1995). 
Stating the problem of induction in terms of maximizing coherence leads us to expect 
certain other aspects to potentially constrain induction, those aspects that have been proposed 
to influence coherence. Harman (1995) proposes that a coherence-giving connection 
orthogonal to explanatory connections, is implication. In the abstract, say that you believe that 
either concept C has feature A or else that it has feature B. Your senses inform you that 
concept C does not have feature B. Then the implication that C has feature A increases the 
concept's coherence. Harman suggests that implication cannot be reduced to explanatory 
relations (to say that in the above example your beliefs and observations explain the 
conclusion seems to stretch the notion of explanation). Implications, though, might be 
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reducible to asymmetric dependency relations, and hence they might be captured by the 
Sloman et al. (1998) notion of conceptual centrality. 
SUPERORDINATE STRUCTURE 
8.3.1 Hierarchies, judged similarity and property induction 
As noted in the introductory chapter, several theorists assume, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that (at least animal) concepts are structured hierarchically (see e.g. Osherson et 
al's (1990) similarity-coverage model). As a result, such theorists claim that people should be 
more willing to endorse inferences among categories from the same close superordinate than 
from a different superordinate (for empirical evidence see Gelman & Markman, 1986; 
Gelman, 1988). An inference from a mammal to another mammal, for example, should be 
judged stronger than an inference from a mammal to a bird. We argue that this may not 
always be the case. First of all, this assumption may fail with nonblank candidate predicates. 
Predicates such as can bite through barbed wire have been shown to potentiate some of the 
premise category's features. The inductive strength for such nonblank properties has been 
found proportional to the extent that the target category is similar to the base with respect to 
the potentiated properties (see the Smith et al. (1993) gap model). Conceptually, one can think 
of many cases where two categories from the same superordinate do not share the critical 
properties, whereas two categories from a different superordinate do. In general, as Goodman 
(1972) pointed out any two entities may be maximally or minimally similar depending on the 
chosen "respect". Consider the following categorical arguments: 
A. Cats can fit in box A; therefore pennies can fit in box A. 
B. Cats can fit in box A; therefore tigers can fit in box A. 
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Argument A seems much stronger than argument B though the former involves an inference 
among categories from a different superordinate whereas the latter an inference among 
categories from a common superodinate. 
More interestingly, even unfamiliar predicates seem to potentiate some of the base 
category's properties. Heit and Rubinstein (1992) showed, for instance, that for the anatomical 
property has a liver with two chambers inferences were stronger from hawks to chickens than 
from tigers to chickens, whereas for the behavioral property prefers to feed at night the order 
of the preference was reversed. Hence, the claim that sharing a superordinate plays a special 
role in property induction seems unwarranted. 
In a similar line, Experiments 6, 7, 10 and 11 failed to reveal a special status of 
superordinate structure on inductive inference. No robust difference was found in the 
projectibility of properties among LSSS and LSDS categories. At the same time, a significant 
difference was found in the projectibility of properties among HSSS and LSSS and among 
HSSS and LSDS categories. The present experiments suggest therefore that judged similarity 
between the premise and conclusion categories rather than superordinate structure decides the 
projectibility of a property. 
8.3.2 Hierarchies, judged similarity and the effect of centrality on projectibility 
Relating hierarchical structure to the centrality effect, one might suggest that the 
centrality effect is proportional to the extent that the base-target categories share a common 
superordinate. Conceptually, this should not always be the case at least for nonblank 
predicates for similar reasons as those outlined above. Empirically, the results of Experiments 
6, 7, 10 and 11 speak against such a claim. Experiments 6 and 7 showed a significant main 
effect of centrality but no shared structure by centrality interaction. Sharing therefore a 
superordinate failed to decide the absence or presence of a difference in projectibility between 
the central and the less central properties (i.e. the presence or absence of a centrality effect). 
Experiments 10 and 11 showed a main effect of centrality and a significant shared structure 
by centrality interaction. Specifically, the effect of centrality on projectibility was 
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proportional to the judged similarity of the base-target categories. The present experiments 
therefore also rule out the possibility that superordinate structure decides the presence or 
absence of a centrality effect on property induction. 
8.3.3 Hierarchies, dependency structure, centrality and property induction 
A more sober claim might be that categories inherit dependency structure from their 
superordinates. I f this were true, then a given property present in two categories from the 
same superordinate should have a comparable centrality status in each. We claim, however, 
that dependency structure may differ within a hierarchy and because of that a given property 
may have different centrality statuses across categories from the same superordinate. Take, 
for instance, wings. Both falcons and chickens have them, but for falcons wings are more 
central property since flying (and all the properties that depend on flying) depends on them. 
In essence, as Sloman et al. (1998) proposed, we hold that the centrality of a property directly 
derives from the number and the centrality status of the features that depend on it. Since more 
features about falcons than about chickens depend on having wings, having wings is a more 
central feature for the former than for the latter category. In addition, given that wings are 
more central for falcons than that for chickens, the present hypothesis predicts that wings 
should be more generalizable to a new species of falcons than to a new species of chickens. 
We put our thought experiment to the test. Thirty-seven participants were asked to 
rate the centrality of having wings for falcons and chicken. To the extent that the Sloman et 
al. (1998) model is right, we expected participants to judge wings to be more conceptually 
central for falcons. The same participants were also asked to estimate the likelihood of 
encountering a wingless species of falcons (chickens). To the extent that wings are more 
central for falcons and that our centrality hypothesis is right, we expected people to rate the 
possibility of wingless chickens as more likely. The results supported both claims (see Table 
A.8.1). Wings were judged to be marginally more central for falcons than for chickens 
(p<.06). Furthermore, participants rated as more probable to encounter a species of wingless 
chicken than a species of wingless falcons. This preliminary study showed therefore that (1) 
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dependency structure may differ within a hierarchy, (2) the centrality status of a property is a 
direct consequence of the dependency structure in which it is embedded, and (3) that 
centrality influences property induction. Last but not least, the present study suggests that our 
centrality hypothesis extends to familiar properties and categories. This last point is further 
reinforced from the Experiments of Chapter V, especially Experiment 14, which showed that 
familiar central properties (e.g. heart, a strong immune system) are more generalizable than 
familiar less central properties (e.g. mud spots). 
8.4 SAMPLE SIZE AND MULTIPLE PREMISE ARGUMENTS 
The present research is limited in at least two respects: it does not address effects of 
sample size or effects of multiple premises. Below we present some novel empirically testable 
predictions for each case. 
8.4.1 Sample size 
Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983) presented evidence that inductive 
inference is sensitive to sample size to the extent that the candidate property is believed to be 
somewhat variable. Participants were informed, for instance, that a sample of individuals of a 
tribe was observed all of who were obese and had brown skin. The size of the observed 
instances (1 or 3 or 10 individuals) was manipulated between participants. Nisbett et al. found 
that the effect of sample size on projectibility was high for properties believed to be 
heterogeneous (e.g. obese) but not for properties believed to be homogeneous (e.g. brown 
skin). 
Nisbett et al.'s research did not address why, in the first place, some properties are 
believed to be more homogeneous than others. Specifically, it may be that these notions arise 
bottom-up from frequency tabulations (this idea cannot apply to their examples since the 
context was novel), or top-down from expectations based on prior knowledge. Our research 
presents evidence that the centrality of a property may influence, in a top-down fashion, its 
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prqjectibility; in fact we have shown that centrality can bias perceived homogeneity (see 
Chapter V) . Recall that most of our experiments used novel properties thus precluding 
importing frequency tabulations from similar categories. To the extent that central properties 
are (all else being equal) more projectible, and given that the more projectible a property the 
less the effect of sample size, we predict that the projectibility of central features would be 
more robust with respect to sample size. 
Here is what we have in mind. Even i f we just find out that a single PC has memory 
registers upon which the functions of its central processor depend, we expect people to be 
highly confident that other PCs will also have memory registers. As more positive evidence 
comes in, the initial level of confidence should not increase by much. That is, even with few 
cases the level of confidence should be close to ceiling. I f we find out, however, that a single 
PC has a red cable that almost none of its features depend on, we wil l be wary of inferring 
that other PCs have red cables as well. As more positive evidence comes in, say 20 out of 20 
PCs have the red cable, we wil l be much more willing to generalize this property to other 
PCs. As Keil et al. (1998) suggest, in the absence of theories, feature tabulations serve as data 
for theory development. Returning to the example, people might even try to explain the 
apparent feature homogeneity. They may reason, for instance, that few companies make this 
sort of cable and they all make them red, or that there might be a reason for why the cable is 
red that we have not yet discovered. 
8.4.2 Multiple Premise Arguments 
At present our studies are also limited to single-premise categorical arguments. It is 
reasonable to wonder how our theory extends to multiple-premise arguments. On a similar 
line of reasoning as with sample size, we believe that (all else being equal) the number of 
premises wil l exert a stronger influence on the projectibility of less-central properties. An 
example wil l help illustrate. Given that lions have a property upon which some of its central 
functions (such as the amount of oxygen in the blood and metabolic rate) depend, we expect 
participants to be highly confident that tigers wil l have the property as well. Stating that other 
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categories (such as jaguars, pumas, and hyenas) also have the candidate property, should not 
increase their confidence by much. Their confidence should be close to ceiling even with the 
single premise argument. In contrast, the fact that lions have a less central feature (e.g. a 
hormone that controls teeth shine) does not strongly sanction that tigers wil l have the property 
as well. Stating that other categories have the property as well should substantially increase 
belief in the argument's conclusion12. 
8.5 IS FOLLOWING THE CENTRALITY HEURISTIC ADAPTIVE? 
The evidence that centrality constrains projectibility even under conditions of 
vagueness, gives the centrality hypothesis a heuristic status (see the section on 8.1.4 on 
Vagueness). A critical question is whether following the centrality heuristic (i.e. whether 
projecting conceptually central over conceptually less central properties among concepts to 
the extent that they share structure) is an adaptive strategy. 
Adaptiveness is a pluralistic term - being adaptive means different things to different 
people. Whether projecting properties according to our hypothesis is adaptive depends on the 
particular sense of adaptiveness adopted. Below we unpack two senses of the word 
"adaptiveness" and evaluate whether following the centrality strategy is adaptive in each case. 
But first we argue that our working assumption that concepts are organized around central 
features is adaptive in the sense that it help us master our environment. 
The idea that central properties are weighted more heavily in inductive decisions is 
based on the notion that concepts are structured around central features. Is it adaptive to 
organize concepts around central features (e.g. causes rather than effects)? We argue that it is 
adaptive because, as Ahn (1998) proposes, it increases our chances of survival; it helps us 
master our environment by promoting predictability and controllability. Its adaptive value 
1 2 Some researchers do not differentiate between generalization from instances and category-based 
inference; they treat both as generalizations from a set of cases (e.g. Heit, 2000). A critical difference 
between the two might be that instances of a category are more homogeneous than different categories. 
This implies that the projectibility of central properties is more robust to the number of "cases" when 
generalizing from instances than when generalizing from categories. 
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also seems to be domain independent. It makes sense to class together biological organisms 
that share conceptually central rather than conceptually less central features. Animals sharing 
conceptually central features (e.g. being a carnivore) helps us infer that they also share 
behaviors (e.g. being a predator, being relatively agile) as well as other biological features 
(e.g. presence of some enzymes, high rate of digestion, big field of stereoscopic vision). 
Similarly, it makes more sense to group disease concepts around etiology, rather than 
symptomatology. Classifying diseases according to etiology (but not symptomatology) helps 
predict the progress of the disease and to prescribe a treatment. Social concepts are also more 
inductively potent i f grouped in terms of shared central features (such as psychological traits) 
rather than shared non-central features (such as behaviors). Psychological traits (e.g. being hot 
tempered and aggressive) help us predict a person's behavior in a novel situation (e.g. likely to 
initiate a fight in a bar), whereas behaviors (e.g. fighting in bars) do not readily generalize to 
novel situations, such as behavior at work. 
In sum, it makes good sense to organize concepts around central features because 
doing so enhances their inductive power. Below we argue directly that projecting central over 
less central features across similar concepts is an adaptive strategy in terms of both 
maximizing real world success and minimizing psychological conflict. 
8.5.1 Adaptiveness as maximizing real world s u c c e s s 
One way to measure the extent to which a strategy is adaptive is by looking at its 
relative success rate. Would one be most times right in projecting central over less central 
properties to the extent that the base and the target categories are similar? First off, recall that 
centrality is not only concept relative but also relative to an individual. A feature's conceptual 
centrality is conditioned on a person's knowledge and intuitions about how the various 
features of a concept depend on one another. I f part of this knowledge is fallacious, then 
properties that are assumed to be central wil l not be. I f one believes, for instance, that lots of 
properties about refrigerators depend on being white but few on their ability to freeze up stuff, 
then for that person color would be a more immutable feature of refrigerators than function. 
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Most people, however, have a good idea of how properties are intertwined (at least for objects 
that we are relatively familiar with); this is why the belief that whiteness is a relative central 
property of refrigerators sounds strange. Given that most peoples' theories are correct, the 
degree of mental transformability should reflect the degree of actual transformability across 
members of a category; properties that are thought central should be more homogeneous. For 
example, it is more likely to find a pink refrigerator than one that was not designed to freeze 
up stuff. Similarly, one should be more confident that members of a similar category, such as 
freezers, wil l freeze up stuff rather than they wil l be white. 
The above argument is grounded on intuition. Corroborating evidence that following 
the centrality strategy is adaptive, at least for the biological domain, comes from the famous 
biologist and statistician Ronald Fisher. By means of an analogy, Fisher argued that evolution 
progresses gradually rather than in big steps. At a given time in evolution a species can be 
seen as analogous to a microscope slightly out of focus. This analogy goes through because a 
species, to have survived so far, should be close to perfection, "slightly out of focus". Fisher 
claimed that further improvement could be best achieved by relatively small changes (micro-
mutations) rather than by relatively big changes (macro-mutations). Relative small changes 
have about 50% chance of being successful. Big changes have a lower probability of success. 
To better understand Fisher's claim assume that the microscope's initial state is 1 inch out of 
focus. Making less than 1 inch changes in either direction has a 50% chance of being 
successful, of bringing the object in focus. Making changes bigger than 1 inch has a much 
less chance of success. This illustration presupposes knowledge of the magnitude of the initial 
error. The beauty of Fisher's argument is that it stands independent of this knowledge. Even 
when the amount of initial error is unknown, the smaller a change the closer the chances of 
success to 50%, the bigger the change the further away the chances of success from 50%. 
(For a thorough exposition of Fisher's argument see Dawkins, 1986). 
In our terminology, changing a central property constitutes a macro-mutation whereas 
changing a less central property a micro-mutation. That is because changing a central 
property forces a cascade of other feature mutations. For the mutated species to be successful, 
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these other mutations should be in the desired direction as well. The greater the number of 
successful mutations required, the less the likelihood of overall success13. Returning to our 
main issue, Fisher's argument translates that into the idea that the closer two species are 
together in evolutionary terms, the more central properties they share. Hence, all else being 
equal, projecting a central over a less central property to the extent that the base and the target 
animals are similar is an adaptive strategy since it correctly captures the structure of the 
environment. 
Applying Fisher's argument to our purposes presupposes that judged biological 
similarity captures evolutionary closeness. Is there any evidence that people's judgments of 
similarity reflect to some extent closeness in evolutionary terms? A strong case can be made 
from development and cross-cultural evidence. [Evidence from adults of Western cultures 
would be weak since it may reflect the impact of education]. We begin with the 
developmental evidence first. 
Preschoolers base their inductions on category membership even when this goes 
against perceptual similarity (e.g. Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & Markman, 
1986, 1987). Gelman and Markman, for instance, presented 3- and 4-year olds triads of 
pictures, 2 base pictures and 1 target picture, each featuring an object. Children were taught a 
novel fact about each of the base objects and were asked to generalize one of these facts to the 
target object. The stimuli were manipulated such as the target object looked very much like 
one base object but shared the same category label as the other base object. For example, 
children were presented with a tropical fish and were told that it breathes underwater. They 
were also presented with a dolphin and were told that it pops out on the surface to breathe. 
They were then asked to decide which of these 2 facts generalized to a shark (which looks 
more like a dolphin but belongs to the same category with the tropical fish). The results 
showed that children's inductions frequently relied on category membership rather than 
1 3 This argument can be made even stronger if we take into consideration that more mutations require 
more effort. The expected value (expected effort times expected probability of success) therefore of 
macro-mutations is much less than the expected value of a micro-mutations. 
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perceptual similarity. The use of common labels cannot account for the results. Even when no 
labels were used, children often drew inferences based on category membership (Gelman & 
Markman, 1987). So, developmental evidence suggests that preschoolers' inductions are 
influenced to some extent by evolutionary closeness. 
The preceding developmental evidence comes from a select group: American 
children. As Super (1980) argues, cross-cultural research can inform developmental theories 
by expanding our notions of what constitutes the endpoint of development. Basing theories on 
a select group of people, runs the risk of underestimating the variability of the adult end 
states, and thereby oversimplifying accounts of conceptual development. Recently, cognitive 
scientists have begun to study reasoning and categorization across cultures (e.g. Atran, 1995; 
Atran, Estin, Coley, & Medin, 1997; Coley, Medin & Atran, 1997; Lopez, Atran, Coley, 
Medin, & Smith, 1997). Lopez et al. (1997), for instance, studied the organization of folk 
biological taxonomies and their use in inductive reasoning among American and Itzaj Mayan 
adults. They found that the folk biological taxonomies of these populations were very closely 
and to a similar extent related to scientific categories. Lopez et al.'s experiments also 
suggested that a universal feature of inductive reasoning is making use of a culture's folk 
taxonomy. The fact that the folk taxonomies of these very different populations were highly 
related to scientific taxonomies (which capture evolutionary closeness), coupled with the fact 
that individuals of each culture depended on their folk biological taxonomy to infer novel 
properties, strongly suggests that reasoning about biological categories is influenced by 
evolutionary closeness. 
Returning to our main argument, following the centrality heuristic for biological 
categories seems adaptive because it seems to capture the structure of the environment. That 
is because, (i) animals close in the evolutionary chain do share lots of their central properties, 
and (ii) people's folk biological inductions are sensitive to evolutionary closeness. 
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8.5.2 Adaptiveness as minimizing psychological conflict. 
Drawing an inductive inference involves updating one's beliefs - induction is a special 
type of belief revision. Quine (1961) noted that logically speaking all properties of a concept 
are revisable. According his view, it is no less illogical to stick to central rather than to less 
central properties. However, Quine also noted that features are not equally revisable 
psychologically; people are less willing to give up properties upon which lots of their beliefs 
and ideas depend. A l l else being equal, sticking to beliefs one cherishes is an adaptive way to 
update ones beliefs - being conservative minimizes changes in one's knowledge base. An 
example wil l help illustrate. Say that you cherish your belief in science; lots of your ideas, 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors center around this belief. Assume, for instance, that you 
spend hours reading about science and you have even written books about it. You walk in the 
street and you see a magician. He performs a trick that you cannot readily explain. This wil l 
(presumably) induce a negative state because your beliefs and behaviors about science are 
incongruent with your current experience (Festinger, 1957; see also Cooper & Fazio, 1987). 
What beliefs should you revise? Should you give up your beliefs and attitudes toward science 
and confer that you have just observed a miracle? It makes more sense to stick to your 
cherished beliefs and conclude that the magician performed a trick that you cannot readily 
explain. Doing so achieves cognitive consistency at a minimal psychological cost. (For a 
detailed account of why conservatism is more reasonable, in the ordinary use of the term 
reasonable, than competing accounts such as Descartes' (1637) "special foundationalism", see 
Harman 1995). 
Returning to our main argument, following the centrality strategy seems to be 
psychologically adaptive. Induction is a special case of belief updating where new knowledge 
gets generated. In induction the question is not which beliefs should get ditched in the case of 
a conflict, but rather which new beliefs should get added to our existing stock of knowledge. 
Our knowledge about many objects is incomplete. Most lay people (ourselves included) 
know, for instance, that some biological substances regulate the digestion of lions though we 
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may not know which. In such cases it can be said that we have some essence placeholders 
waiting to be filled-in with a theory (Medin & Ortony, 1989). We argue that such 
placeholders are more readily filled-in by projecting central properties from similar concepts. 
That is because such properties would explain (or support) more of our other beliefs about the 
target concept. 
In sum, conceptual arguments show that following the centrality strategy is adaptive 
because it helps us maximize both real world success and psychological coherence. 
8.6 ON CONCEPTUAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Our centrality hypothesis is grounded on the presupposition that concepts (the 'ideas' 
describing categories) involve stable mental representations. Given that such representations 
are both stable and reducible to sets of interdependent features, a centrality measure can be 
defined over them. On the one hand, the assumption of concept stability is implicit in most 
accounts of concept structure and use - few theorists have questioned its soundness (for 
notable exceptions see Barsalou, 1983, 1987, 1989; James, 1950; Smith & Samuelson, 1997). 
On the other hand, various instabilities concerning conceptual judgments have been reported 
in the literature such as judgmental instabilities across points in development, cultures, tasks, 
and so on. The next section explores whether such judgmental instabilities imply unstable 
mental representations. In a sense, the next section is about the minimal conceptual 
assumptions needed for our hypothesis to go through, and about whether the evidence 
supports these minimal assumptions. But first we discuss a particular source of instability 
known as the multiple descriptions problem. 
8.6.1 The multiple descriptions problem: Given that an object can be 
described in multiple ways, does it make sense to talk about the 
centrality of a feature for a given concept? 
Entities do not map in a neat one-to-one fashion onto categories: A given entity may 
belong to many different categories (to the extensions of many different concepts). At 
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different times, for instance, an artifact can be described as an ashtray, a smoker's 
paraphernalia, a paperweight, or a piece of glass. Similarly, a natural kind can be described as 
a dog, a German shepherd, a pet, or a friend. Some of the categories that a given object 
belongs to are interrelated in a special way: one category is a subset of the other - German 
shepherds are kinds of dogs, and ashtrays are kinds of smokers' paraphernalia (for a review on 
the hierarchical structure of concepts see Murphy & Lassaline, 1997). A feature's centrality 
status across such concepts (e.g. dog and animal) seems to be highly related: features central 
for the concept animal seem also central for the concept dog. Hence, at least from the outside, 
the fact that objects can be described at various levels of abstraction does not seem to threaten 
the centrality notion (but see section 8.3.3). 
An object though may also claim joint membership in unrelated categories (e.g. it 
may be a member of the category glass and the category paperweight). Features that are 
central for the concept glass (e.g. being made out of glass) are not central for the concept 
paperweight. This type of description variability seems to threaten most the centrality 
hypothesis. The problem is this: given that an object can be described in many different ways 
and given that some of these descriptions imply very different features and dependencies, 
then the notion of a feature being central for an object seems unattainable. In fact such an 
assertion is fallacious, but this is not what we claim. 
Our centrality notion is about concepts ('ideas' describing categories) and not about 
objects. The centrality of a feature for an object is therefore conditional on the perspective 
one adopts about that object - the mental representation that one accesses upon perceiving that 
object. In a context where an object is thought of as a paperweight, features such as weight 
(and probably size) wil l be judged as conceptually central. In another context where the same 
object is thought of as an ashtray, features like being able to hold cigarettes and being made 
out of a non-burning material will be conceptually central. The notion of conceptual 
centrality circumvents (or better, is independent of) the problem of the one-to-many mappings 
from objects to categories. Our centrality notion is conditional on a person's conception of an 
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object and not on the object itself. It makes sense therefore to talk about the centrality of a 
feature for a concept (as we do) but not about the centrality of a feature for an object. 
Some theorists take the idea of the one-to-many mapping to an extreme and argue 
that there are infinite ways of grouping objects into categories - this view is known as 
promiscuous realism (Dupre, 1981). Although such a view does not contradict our thesis, it 
seems to question whether there are principled ways of organizing entities into categories. 
Keil (1995) suggests that from the premise that an object may belong to many categories it 
does not follow that such groupings may proliferate endlessly (at least for natural kinds). We 
also believe that the mapping from objects to categories is relatively constrained. 
Supportive evidence comes from the fact that it is very difficult to think of artifacts in 
multiple ways; the conventional use of artifacts greatly constrains our ability to perceive them 
as suitable for a wide variety of purposes. Pliers, for example, are conventionally used to cut 
stuff. Although they can certainly be used as a weight, it is hard to perceive them as such. In 
fact, knowledge of the conventional function of artifacts has been shown to interfere with 
problem solving. This phenomenon is known as functional fixedness and was the subject of 
many studies (e.g. Adamson, 1951; Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951; Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931). 
In Maier's (1931) classic study, participants had to tie together two strings that were hanging 
from the ceiling. The strings were placed far apart, so a participant could not grasp both 
strings at once. A participant could use a variety of objects to solve the task, including a chair 
and a pair of pliers. The solution involves tying the pliers on one string, setting that string 
swinging like a pendulum, and holding the second in the center of the room until the other 
string swings close enough to grasp. Only 39% of Maier's participants solved the problem 
within 10 min, presumably because of the difficulty of perceiving the pliers as weight. 
More direct evidence for functional fixedness comes from Duncker (1945; see also 
Adamson, 1951). His 'box' problem asked participants to mount three candles vertically on a 
screen, at a height of about 5 feet. To accomplish the task, participants were given a large 
number of objects including three pasteboard boxes of varying sizes, five matches, and five 
thumbtacks, the crucial objects for solving the task. The solution was to mount one candle on 
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each box by melting wax on the box and sticking a candle to it, and subsequently to tack the 
boxes to the screen. Most people found it hard to use the box as a platform for the candle, 
presumably because boxes are conventionally used as a container. The functional fixedness 
was more pronounced when the box was initially full rather than empty, presumably because 
being ful l reinforces its function as a container. 
In sum, we argue that our hypothesis is not suspect to a proliferation problem because 
it can be conditioned on the perspective that one adopts about an object. Further, it is not 
totally useless to state that some properties are more central than others for an object, because 
most of the times and for most people the perspective one adopts about an object is limited. It 
makes sense, for instance, to claim that the ability to freeze up stuff is more central for a 
refrigerator than being white since in the conventional perception of refrigerators the former 
property is more central than the latter. 
8.6.2 Instability across tasks: If the relative centrality of a feature is task 
dependent, does it make sense to talk about feature centrality? 
A robust finding in the concept literature is that the judged importance of a feature for 
a concept is largely conditional on the task used to measure it (e.g. Barsalou, 1983, 1989; 
Rips, 1989; Malt, 1994; Sloman et al., 1998). Prima facie such findings seem to challenge the 
notion that a single stable representation is accessed in all these tasks. We argue that such 
variability in judgments might instead be because different types of knowledge are important 
in different types of tasks (cf. Sloman et al., 1998). But first we begin with empirical evidence 
supporting the instability of a feature's importance across tasks. 
Malt (1994) gathered judgments about the appropriateness of the label "water" for 
various types of liquids, the percentage that each liquid was believed to contain H 2 0 
(presumably water's essential element), and the typicality of each liquid with respect to the 
category water. Malt's major finding was that category judgments were task dependent (see 
also Rips & Collins, 1993). Mineral water, for instance, was called water, was judged to have 
a high percentage of H 2 0 , but was also judged to be an atypical instance of the category 
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water. In contrast, ocean water was uniformly called water, was judged to be highly typical of 
water, but was judged not to contain high amounts of H 2 0 . Further, tea was judged to contain 
a higher percentage of H 2 0 than ocean water, but it was not even called water. At an extreme, 
there seem to be as many different patterns of category judgments as there are tasks to 
measure them. (Below we return and evaluate this extreme claim). 
Sloman et al. (1998) demonstrated a dissociation between judgments of naming and 
judgments of mental transformability. Being "red" is important for naming something a red 
apple (e.g. it is highly inappropriate to call a green apple "red") but not for imagining it (e.g. it 
is relatively easy to transform a red apple into one that is green). Sloman et al. attributed their 
findings to the view that different aspects of conceptual structure are important for naming 
and for conceptual transformation. They suggested that the importance of a feature critically 
depends on the goal of the agent using the concept. A goal of naming is to distinguish a 
category from similar categories. Color, for instance, is a relatively important feature for 
naming apples since it helps differentiate between types of apples. In contrast, property 
induction (presumably) aims in increasing the coherence of the target concept. Color is not a 
conceptually central property of apples (not many apple properties depend on it) and hence 
not highly projectible. In fact, for highly similar concepts (e.g. tigers and lions) features high 
in immutability (e.g. heart, liver) have low discriminatory value. 
In sum, the fact that the importance of a feature is task-dependent is not inconsistent 
with the claim that a single mental representation underlies various conceptual judgments. As 
Medin and Ortony (1989, p. 191) suggest, one should not equate instability in outputs with 
internal instability. It might be that mental representations are in fact stable and that the 
apparent instability is an artifact of the processes that operate on stable concepts. On similar 
lines Komatsu (1992, p.501) remarks that "experimental results do not directly demonstrate 
anything about conceptual representations. It is always difficult to decide whether a particular 
observation is a function of the information represented by the concept, the structure, or the 
format of that information". He concludes that what such results at a minimum specify is 
what sort of information is available to people about categories. 
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Parenthetically, we would like to mention that types of feature importance do not 
proliferate endlessly. Evidence suggests that different types of tasks load systematically on 
different factors, on different aspects of concept structure. Sloman et al. (1998), for instance, 
gathered conceptual judgments from 10 different tasks and found that the resulting judgments 
loaded on just 3 factors: feature centrality, feature diagnosticity, and feature salience (for 
more information see Sloman et al. 1998, Study 1). 
8.6.3 Instability across development 
The mental representations of categories change with time. Say, for instance, that the 
first 5 Frenchmen I meet are all rude. Based on this information, I am led to expect that the 
next Frenchman wil l also be rude. I f the following 15 Frenchmen I see are in fact polite, I 
may give high chances that the twenty-first Frenchman will be polite. The question of 
whether concepts change with time seems therefore silly (for a review of the conceptual 
learning literature see Heit, 1997). Children's concepts are certainly different from adults', 
often in potentially uninteresting ways. 
A more interesting question to ponder is whether children's and adults' concepts differ 
qualitatively. Early developmental research seemed to support such a distinction; it supported 
a shift from similarity to rules or from association to definition. One type of evidence came 
from studies showing that concepts follow a characteristic to a defining shift (Keil & 
Batterman, 1984; Keil, 1989). It has been found that young children judge category 
membership on the basis of typical or characteristic features even in the absence of defining 
features. Young children, for instance, judge a person of about the same age as their father, 
who gives them gifts as an "uncle", but not an adolescent who is their father's brother. In 
contrast, older children and adults weight more heavily defining rather than characteristic 
features (Keil, 1989). 
As Keil, Smith, Simons, and Levin (1998) suggest, on a closer look, such evidence 
does not really support a similarity to theory shift. Even young children's concepts must be 
constrained by theoretical (or pre-theoretical) principles. A young child, for instance, would 
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not consider features such as "having blue shoes" as important for claiming membership in 
the category "uncle" even i f all her uncles happened to have blue shoes (for strong arguments 
against a developmental similarity to theory shift see Keil et al., 1998). We concur with Keil 
et al. that even young children's concepts are constrained by intuitive theories (or at least by 
vague pre-theoretical biases) that some features are more explanatory relevant than others. 
Their arguments are compelling. Intuitive theories or pre-theoretical biases, for instance, seem 
necessary for constraining the otherwise vast tabulation space. 
Interestingly, the sort of pre-theoretical biases (or notions of causal powers) that Keil 
et al. (1998; see also Keil, 1995) advocate point to a potential advantage of Sloman et al.'s 
(1998) notion of conceptual centrality over Ahn and Lassaline's (1995) causal status 
hypothesis: pre-theoretical biases can be readily captured by asymmetric dependency 
relations but not by causal (or generally by explanatory) relations. Explanatory relations seem 
to presuppose knowledge of causal mechanisms. To say that feature A explains feature B 
implies that one has an intuitive theory stating why this is so. Pre-theoretical biases are by 
definition vague - they refer to the intuition (the ungrounded belief) that some features are 
more explanatory and central (for a given domain) than others. Models of conceptual 
centrality can capture notions of causal powers while the causal status hypothesis cannot 
capture other dependency relations. Given that people's concepts are influenced by pre-
theoretical biases, the conceptual centrality hypothesis would therefore have an advantage: 
features that by intuition seem central (and hence are psychologically central in conceptual 
judgments) would be represented and predicted as such14. 
Evidence suggests that vague pre-theoretical biases do exert an early influence 
judgments of category centrality and projectibility. Simons and Keil (1995) presented 
children with a target (an animal or a machine) together with a set of potential 'insides': the 
insides of an animal, a machine, a pile of rocks, or a pile of blocks. Children were asked to 
1 4 Notice that the ability of models of conceptual centrality to capture vague pre-theoretical biases 
provides also an advantage over structural-mapping models. As stated elsewhere, structural mapping 
models cannot deal with vagueness. 
206 
match the target objects with the correct insides. The results showed that even preschool 
children expected the insides of machines and animals to differ (they systematically picked 
different insides), but sometimes they were picking the wrong insides. Vague causal 
knowledge seems therefore not only to influence but also to precede knowledge of specific 
causal mechanisms in influencing judgments of category centrality. In fact Keil et al. (1998, 
p.42) argue that "these basic notions of causal centrality may emerge early, as early as 
sensitivity to typicality of properties ... the ability to perceive and learn causal patterns may 
be just as fundamental as the ability to learn typicality and frequency distributions." 
Further evidence directly supports the view that abstract pre-theoretical biases 
influence property induction. Keil and his colleagues (in preparation, cited in Keil, 1995), for 
instance, presented children with an ambiguous picture that for one group of children was 
labeled "rock" while for another "frog". Participants were shown two other pictures and had 
to choose the one that belonged to the same category as the target object. The results showed 
that when the property was labeled as "frog", shape rather than color and surface markings 
were important. When the same entity was labeled as "rock", color and surface markings 
became more important. Keil (1995) demonstrated a similar property by category interaction 
while using pictures vaguely described as either novel animals, or novel machines. Because 
such objects were by definition novel, the knowledge underlying children's judgments should 
be in the form of abstract pre-theoretical biases rather than of concrete causal knowledge. 
To close-up the parenthesis, it seems that concepts are constrained not only by precise 
causal knowledge but also by vague pre-theoretical biases. To the extent that these vague pre-
theoretical biases can be captured by the notion of conceptual centrality but not by the causal 
status hypothesis, the former has an advantage. 
8.6.4 Instability across cultures: Does the observed cultural instability in 
concept structure and use affect the centrality hypothesis? 
In the section about the 'adaptive' value of the centrality hypothesis (section 8.4), we 
mentioned that cross-cultural studies suggest some universals in folk-biological organization 
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and reasoning. For instance, Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, and Smith.'s (1997) studies with 
Americans and Itzaj Mayans revealed that these cultures are similar in that they both (i) 
organize species into folk-biological taxonomies and (ii) use their respective taxonomies to 
make category-based inferences. The Lopez et al. (1997) studies also revealed some cultural 
peculiarities. An interesting one is that while American subjects showed a tendency to judge 
as stronger multiple premised arguments with diverse rather than similar premises, Itzaj 
Mayans did not. (In the Osherson et al. (1990) terminology Americans exhibited premise 
diversity while Itzaj Mayans did not). Americans seem to have based their inductions on a 
vague diversity principle (something like: the more different the categories sharing a property 
the more likely that other categories wil l share the property as well), while Itzaj Mayans seem 
to have based their inductions on ecological considerations. Follow-up studies revealed that 
the lack of premise diversity in the part of Itzaj Mayans was not because Itzajs were not 
capable of diversity based reasoning - in different settings their reasoning exhibited diversity. 
Lopez et al. suggested that the premise-diversity difference might be attributable to Itzajs 
having more knowledge than Americans about their respective ecology. This point is 
supported by evidence that American experts (e.g. landscapers and maintenance workers) also 
show no or negative diversity as a result of engaging in ecological reasoning (Medin, Lynch, 
Coley, & Atran, 1997). (For people who believe that knowledge is an integral part of culture 
(like Lopez et al. do), such differences are cultural differences. For people that see knowledge 
as a factor independent of culture, such demonstrations are demonstrations of knowledge 
differences.) 
Our centrality hypothesis is consistent with the notion that these premise-diversity 
reasoning differences between cultures or people of the same culture, are knowledge based. 
The centrality of a feature for a given person (or a given culture) directly depends on the 
knowledge that this person (or the culture) has. Different knowledge about a category 
translates into representations involving different dependency structures. The centrality of a 
feature across representations of different dependency structures, is potentially different. This 
follows from defining conceptual centrality in terms of dependency relations. 
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It is one thing to say that a hypothesis is not inconsistent with knowledge differences, 
and quite another to give a positive account of when and how knowledge affects concept use. 
Gentner and Medina (1998) in their discussion on adult induction draw an interesting parallel 
between the similarity versus rules distinction in induction, and Newell and Simon's (1972) 
distinction between weak methods and strong methods. Weak methods are general strategies 
(such as modus ponens or the premise diversity principle) that can operate under insufficient 
knowledge of a domain. Strong methods are methods that make heavy use of represented 
knowledge. Genter and Medina believe that strong methods are more appropriate when 
sufficient knowledge is present. This dovetails nicely with the Lopez et al.'s account of their 
results: Americans relied on a weak method (the diversity principle) because they had 
insufficient knowledge, while Itzajs and tree experts relied heavily on strong methods (on 
represented knowledge, such as ecological knowledge) to make an inference. 
8.6.5 Summary 
Up to now we have presented evidence that demonstrated judgmental instabilities 
across tasks, development, and cultures and argued that (i) none of them individually is 
inconsistent with the notion of (fairly) stable mental representations, and (ii) that some 
differences (like cultural instabilities) sit well with our hypothesis since they are attributable 
to knowledge differences. However, some theorists considering some of this or other 
evidence simultaneously have reached the opposite conclusion that concepts are highly 
unstable entities (Barsalou, 1983, 1989; William James, 1950; Smith and Samuelson, 1997). 
Barsalou (1993) proposed that we should re-conceptualize 'concepts' as referring to 
momentary thoughts rather than timeless internal structures, while William James (1950) 
advocated that concepts are 'mythological entities'. It is outside the scope of the present 
discussion to fully expose the issue of stable versus unstable representations (for a review see 
Smith and Samuelson, 1997). We are content to state that the centrality hypothesis works 
even i f the notion of stable representations is relaxed. Even i f most of concepts are formed on-
line, like Barsalou's (1983) ad hoc concepts, the notion of centrality would still be applicable 
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as long as such on-line entities are structured. There is every reason to believe that such 
entities wi l l be constrained by knowledge or pre-theoretical biases and hence reasons to 
believe that the centrality hypothesis will be applicable. 
8.7 CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY AND ESSENTIALISM 
The notion of conceptual centrality begs to be compared with the notion of 
essentialism. Ahn (1998) presents a very good comparison between the causal status 
hypothesis and various flavors of essentialism. The causal status hypothesis can be seen as a 
special case of conceptual centrality since (in its most relaxed form) it leaves out non-
explanatory dependency relations like implications, or ones coming from pre-theoretical 
intuitions. What follows is a presentation of Ann's arguments (with slight modifications) as 
applied to conceptual centrality. 
A pervasive philosophical and psychological view about concepts is that (at least 
some) things have essences. According to Locke (1894/1975) essences refer to unobservable 
properties of things that make them the thing they are. Putnam (1977) similarly advocates that 
natural kinds have essences although we may not know what their essences are. More recently 
Medin and Ortony (1989) proposed psychological essentialism: the position that irrespective 
of whether or not things really have essences, people act as i f they do have essences that 
explain their phenomenal features. 
The notion of conceptual centrality shares with essentialism the assumption that some 
features are more 'central' than others. Conceptual centrality, at the same time, differs from 
particular flavors of essentialism in that (1) it does not assume that central features are 
necessarily defining features, (2) it does not divide features into surface and deep features, (3) 
it is not restricted to natural kind categories like some essentialist accounts, (4) it is not 
independent upon the theories (knowledge) that a person has about a concept. Each of these 
four points is clarified below. 
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8.7.1 Central features are not necessarily defining features 
According to a strong version of essentialism essences are defining features: i f a thing 
has an essence of a certain kind then it is an object of that kind, whereas i f the thing does not 
have an essence of a certain kind then it cannot be a member of that kind. According to 
conceptual centrality the features of a particular concept can be put on a continuum reflecting 
their relative immutability. Conceptual centrality is not committed as to whether essences (in 
our terms, features upon which all other features either directly or indirectly depend) in either 
a psychological or metaphysical sense exist. Figure 8.1 shows two possible dependency 
structures, a general one and one that reflects psychological essentialism (see Keil, 1995, 
p.237, for a variety of possible causal patterns). 
Figure 8.1 Simplified illustration of a generic dependency structure, and a special 
one reflecting essentialism. Dots stand for properties. 
Generic Essentialism 
_ • • v 
v\ A / 7$y^ © • 
Keil (1995) presents arguments against metaphysical essentialism. He argues, for 
instance, that although some theorists equate the essence of animals with some DNA 
sequence, a DNA sequence cannot qualify as an essence since no two animals share the same 
sequence of nucleotides. Note that essentialism does not sit well with Darwinian evolution -
in fact the great insight of natural selection emerged only when Wallace and Darwin 
abandoned the strongly held ideas of species having essences. Accepting that two 
contemporary species (presumably two different natural kinds) derive from a common 
ancestor entails accepting the splitting up of an essence. 
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As Medin and Ortony (1989) point out, as psychologists we should be more 
interested in what people believe about things rather than in about what things really are. 
Empirical evidence corroborates psychological essentialism. McNamara and Sternberg (1983) 
showed that many people believe that some properties are defining. Psychological 
essentialism seems to be universal. Atran (1987) showed psychological essentialism beliefs 
across cultures, and Gelman and Wellman (1991) found that such beliefs are present even in 
young children (see also Hatano, Siegler, Inagaki, Stavy, & Wax, 1993). 
8.7.2 Central features are not necessarily deep features 
Locke (1894/1975) believed that essences are undiscoverable. In a similar vein, some 
essentialists (e.g., Putnam, 1977) categorize features as either essential or surface ones. 
However, we believe that how deep a property actually is in a thing is orthogonal to its 
conceptual centrality. That is some deep properties are non-central (e.g. an unexpressed DNA 
sequence) and some surface properties are central (e.g. the color of a solar panel). To make a 
broad analogy, conceptual centrality is an increasing function of how 'deep' a feature is in the 
dependency structure (or intuitive theory) that an individual has about a concept - not in the 
actual thing itself. An unexpressed DNA sequence is a deep but nonetheless mutable property 
of an animal since almost nothing (according to most people's knowledge) depends on it. The 
color of a solar panel is one of its surface but nonetheless immutable properties since its 
crucial functions of attracting and storing energy depend on it. To summarize, we believe that 
features vary in conceptual centrality with features in the center of a dependency structure 
being more central than those in the periphery. 
8.7.3 Conceptual centrality depends on (specific or vague) knowledge 
According to some essentialist accounts (e.g. Kripke, 1971; Putnam, 1975) the 
categorization of natural kinds is independent of our knowledge of essential properties. Even 
i f scientists discovered that gold is actually composed of plasticine, that would not change 
what we have been referring to as gold. On this account, what we refer as gold picks out some 
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stuff independently of how much (or i f ) we know about that stuff (see also Komatsu, 1992). 
On the other hand, the conceptual centrality of a feature directly derives from the theories (or 
vague ideas) that someone has about that concept. I f our knowledge of a concept is changed, 
then its dependency structure and hence the centrality weights of some of its features might 
change as well. I f scientists discover (and we get informed about this discovery) that sharks 
are not actually fish but are robots controlled by aliens and their appearance is but a disguise 
to fool us, then we might reconsider the centrality of their bronchia. In fact, not only specific 
knowledge influences conceptual centrality but even vague pre-theoretical biases. 
8.7.4 Conceptual centrality is domain-independent 
Although some theorists hold that both natural and nominal kinds have essences (e.g., 
Putnam, 1975), some others reserve essences to natural kinds (e.g., Schwartz, 1979). In 
general there are certainly many differences between artifact and animal categories (for a 
review see Keil, 1989; Keil et al. 1998). Nonetheless, we hold that conceptual centrality 
offers a domain-general mechanism of weighting features. What our account presupposes is 
knowledge (or at a minimum some intuition) of how properties of a kind are interconnected. 
To be concrete, assume that a person's representation of artifact categories are centered 
around their functional features whereas representations of natural kinds are centered around 
molecular features (see e.g. Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Gelman, 1988; Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989; 
but see Malt & Johnson, 1992). The conceptual centrality mechanism will not discriminate 
among these categories but it wil l promptly show functional features to be more central to 
artifacts, and molecular features to be more central to natural kinds. This is in fact what Ahn 
(1998) found. In essence, conceptual centrality is a structural constraint so differences in 
content or differences in clustering do not matter (see Figure 7.1). 
8.8 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
The current research addressed two issues about category-based inference: (1) Why 
are people more willing to generalize some properties over others? and (2) Why does the 
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generalizability of a property depend on the premise and conclusion categories? Our account 
of both issues is in terms of conceptually centrality. People are more willing to generalize 
some properties over others because certain properties promote more coherence to the target -
they support more of its central properties. Furthermore, people's willingness to generalize a 
property depends on the specific concepts used because centrality is concept-specific - the 
same property may lend lots of support to certain targets but not to others. Being round is 
projectible for wheels but not for oranges, because roundness is central for understanding 
wheels but not oranges. 
Have we solved the problem of induction then? No! We just have identified a strategy 
people use to project properties when (even vague) knowledge about their centrality status is 
available. Other strategies people use when relevant knowledge is available include causal, 
and gap-like strategies. Categorical arguments of the form Lakes are contaminated with toxic 
waste; therefore fish in the lakes are contaminated with toxic waste are strong because of a 
strong causal link between the argument's premise and conclusion. Arguments of the form 
Poodles can bite through barbed wire; therefore German shepherds can bite through barbed 
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Table A.2.1 F: ANOVA of the centrality scores for Experiment 1. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 41.860 1 41.860 91.166 .000 
Centr * Task 
order .162 1 .162 .352 .560 
Error(Centr) 9.183 20 .459 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Task order 141972 i i4~972 Z064 166 
Error 145.060 20 7.253 
Table A.2.2 F 2 ANOVA of the centrality scores for Experiment 1. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 45.665 1 45.665 557.728 .000 
Error(Centr) .901 11 8.188E-02 
Task order 16.333 1 16.333 197.334 .000 
Error(Task 
order) .910 11 8.277E-02 
Centr * Task 
order .176 1 .176 3.297 .097 
Error(Cen * 
task) .588 11 5.347E-02 
Table A.2.3 Fi ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 1. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Score Order 8.437E-03 1 8.437E-03 .225 .640 
Error .824 22 3.744E-02 
Total .832 23 
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Table A.2.4 ANOVA of the centrality scores for Experiment 2 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 120.447 1 120.447 263.416 .000 
Cent * Cent 
Measure 1.098E-02 1 1.098E-02 .024 .878 
Error(Centr) 19.662 43 .457 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centr 
measure 30.525 1 30.525 9.449 .004 
Error 138.905 43 3.230 
Table A.2.5 F 2 ANOVA of the centrality scores for Experiment 2 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality .784 1 .784 7.519 .019 
Error(Centr) 1.147 11 .104 
Centr 
measure .102 1 .102 .526 .484 
Error(centr 
measure) 2.126 11 .193 
Centr * 
Cent- .438 1 .438 5.615 .037 
measure 
Error(Centr* 
Centr .858 11 7.798E-02 
measure) 
Table A.2.6 FT A N O V A of the conditional likelihood scores from Experiment 2. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 1.995 1 1.995 6.848 .012 
Centr * 
Centr_Def .801 1 .801 2.749 .105 
Error(Centr) 12.528 43 .291 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centr_Def .170 1 .170 .114 .737 
Error 63.923 43 1.487 
Table A.2.7 F 2 A N O V A of the conditional likelihood scores from Experiment 2. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality .784 1 .784 7.519 .019 
Error(Centrality) 1.147 11 .104 
Centr_Def .102 1 .102 .526 .484 
Error(Centr_def) 2.126 11 .193 
Centr * Centr_Def .438 1 .438 5.615 .037 
Error(Centr*Centr_Def) .858 11 7.798E-02 
Table A.2.8 Fi ANOVA of the unconditional likelihood scores from Experiment 2. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 7.813 1 7.813 13.577 .001 
Centr * 
Centr_Def 1.444 1 1.444 2.510 .120 
Error(Centr) 24.743 43 .575 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centr_Def .614 1 .614 1.269 .266 
Error 20.820 43 .484 
Table A.2.9 F 2 ANOVA of the unconditional likelihood scores from Experiment 2. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 3.731 1 3.731 17.431 .002 
Error(Centrality) 2.354 11 .214 
Centr_Def .350 1 .350 3.709 .080 
Error(Centr_Def) 1.039 11 9.446E-02 
Centr * Centr_Def 1.175 1 1.175 3.942 .073 
Error(Centr*Centr_Def) 3.277 11 .298 
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Table A.3.1 The argument premises (facts) of Experiments 3 and 4. Control items 
in both experiments contained only the description in bold-faced 
letters. Causal+explanation items (Experiment 3) contained the whole 
description. Causal items (Experiment 4) contained the whole 
description except the text inside brackets. Only one position of 
properties (the one where the central property comes first) is shown. 
Argument premises (Facts) Conclusion 
Cows have acute kinaesthetic receptors and good hand eye co- High Sim 
ordination. 
For cows, acute kinaesthetic receptors cause good hand-eye co- Horse 
ordination [because higher controllability of motor movements promotes 
good co-ordination.] 
Squirrels have exceptional hearing and frequent headaches. Mouse 
For squirrels, exceptional hearing causes frequent headaches [because 
very high auditory frequencies can cause nasal cavities to vibrate.] 
Seals have a rapid heart rate and a high water consumption. Dolphin 
For seals, rapid heart rate causes high water consumption [because it 
lowers blood pressure which can be corrected by high consumption of 
liquids.] 
Elephants have a strong odour and restless sleeping habits. Rhino 
For elephants, a strong odour causes restless sleeping habits [because 
it induces high amphetamine production that results in sleeplessness.] 
Mice have high amounts of oxydilic acid and good digestion. Squirrel 
For mice, high amounts of oxydilic acid cause good digestion [because 
they help in the breaking down of fat.] 
Dolphins have vitamin deficiency and overstretched vocal chords. Seal 
For dolphins, vitamin deficiency causes overstretched vocal chords 
[because deficiency of essential vitamins affect the normal development 
of the larynx.] 
Rhinos have high amounts of opiates and accident susceptibility. Elephant 
For rhinos, high amounts of opiates cause accident susceptibility 
[because they induce undersensitive pain receptors that inhibit species-
typical defensive responses.] 
Horses have a weak immune system causes and an acute sense of Cow 
smell. 
For horses, a weak immune system causes an acute sense of smell 
[because it makes the animal susceptible to food poisoning which can 
be avoided with sensitive smell detectors.] 
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Table A.3.1 (continued) 
Low-sim 
Cows have high amounts of glucose and an increased Dolphin 
metabolism. 
For cows, high amounts of glucose cause an increased metabolism 
[because they stimulate glutamate accumulation into the cell and its 
oxidation] 
Squirrels have an underdeveloped hippocampus and anterograde Rhino 
amnesia. 
For squirrels, an underdeveloped hippocampus causes anterograde 
amnesia [because underdeveloped mammillary bodies aversively affect 
memory.] 
Seals have low REM sleep and severe learning impairments. Horse 
For seals, low REM sleep causes severe learning impairments 
[because low REM sleep impairs the ability to concentrate.] 
Elephants have dense hair and little skin pigment. Mouse 
For elephants, dense hair permits little skin pigment [because the hair 
can cover the body and protect it from the sun, a function usually 
served by pigment.] 
Mice have high amounts of binaural neurons and good localisation Elephant 
of stimuli. 
For mice, high amounts of binaural neurons cause good localisation of 
stimuli [because they respond to changes in arrival times of sounds 
presented to both ears.] 
Dolphins have an overactive thyroid gland and high amounts of Cow 
peptides. 
For dolphins, an overactive thyroid gland permits high amounts of 
peptides [because it leads to increased metabolism which compensates 
for high food consumption.] 
Rhinos have low amounts of ADH hormone and high osmotic Squirrel 
pressure. 
For rhinos, low amounts of ADH hormone cause high osmotic pressure 
[because they regulate the amount of water that the body excretes.] 
Horses have a loose tensor tympani and frequent migraines. Seal 
For horses, a loose tensor tympani results in frequent migraines 
[because it regulates the amount of sound that is permitted to pass 
through the ear.] 
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Table A.3.2 F, ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 3. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared structure 7.878E-02 1 7.878E-02 1.208 .283 
Error(Shared) 1.499 23 6.519E-02 
Relation .287 1 .287 4.285 .050 
Error(Relation) 1.541 23 6.700E-02 
Shared * Relation 1.628E-02 1 1.628E-02 .240 .629 
Error(Shared*Relation) 1.562 23 6.791 E-02 
Table A.3.3 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 3. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Relation 9.790E-02 1 9.790E-02 13.241 .003 
Relation * 
Shared 6.328E-03 1 6.328E-03 
.856 .371 
Error(relation) .104 14 7.394E-03 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
S , h a r f d 2.820E-02 structure 1 2.820E-02 .485 .497 
Error .814 14 5.811 E-02 
Table A.3.4 Ft ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 4. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Relation .510 1 .510 6.192 .021 
Error(Relation) 1.896 23 8.243E-02 
Shared Structure .315 1 .315 8.616 .007 
Error(Shared) .841 23 3.657E-02 
Relation * Shared .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
Error(Relat*Shared) .969 23 4.212E-02 
Table A.3.5 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 4. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Relation .170 1 .170 15.955 .001 
Relat * Shared 3.125E-10 1 3.125E-10 .000 1.000 
Error(Relation) .149 14 1.067E-02 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared 
Structure .105 1 .105 1.739 .208 
Error .846 14 6.041 E-02 
Table A.3.6 Descriptions of the 18 pairs of properties used in Experiments 6 and 7. 
Central properties are presented first. Semantic relations are 
highlighted. 
Triple 1 
The enzyme lipase regulates metabolism. 
The enzyme protease is regulated by metabolic rate. 
The hormone prolactin regulates blood flow. 
The hormone renin is regulated by blood flow. 
The neurotransmitter acetylcholine helps detect predators. 
The levels of the neurotransmitter nonadrenaline increase after seeing a predator. 
Triple 2 
The enzyme amylase helps dissolve blood clots. 
The enzyme streptokinase gets denser when blood clots. 
The hormone ACTH modulates blood pressure. 
The hormone LH is regulated by blood pressure. 
The neurotransmitter GABA helps oxygenate the brain. 
The neurotransmitter glycine depends on the oxygen level of the brain. 
Triple 3 
The hormone TSH ensures normal muscle development. 
The hormone FSH is produced as a result of muscle development. 
The neurotransmitter octopamine determines food intake. 
The production of the neurotransmitter histamine is determined by food intake. 
The enzyme papain reduces inflammation. 
The enzyme trypsin can double in size because of inflammation. 
Triple 4 
The hormone ADH helps the animal cope with stress. 
The hormone MSH is produced in response to stress. 
The neurotransmitter norepinephrine regulates movement. 
The neurotransmitter epinephrine is regulated by their movements. 
The enzyme thrombin helps detect poisonous food. 
The enzyme subtilisin changes color in response to poisonous food. 
Triple 5 
The neurotransmitter tyrosine regulates many brain functions. 
The neurotransmitter taurine is regulated by many brain functions. 
The enzyme elastase helps to digest food. 
The enzyme aliesterase changes shape during digestion. 
The hormone oxytocin regulates mating behavior. 
The levels of the hormone calcitocin increase after mating. 
Triple 6 
The neurotransmitter quisqualate promotes visual acuity. 
The neurotransmitter kainate depends on visual acuity. 
The enzyme phosphorylase regulates blood pH. 
The levels of the enzyme transacetylase are regulated by blood pH. 
The hormone vassopresin controls bone growth. 
The hormone proctolin is secreted as a result of bone growth. 
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Table A.3.7 Fi ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 6. 
Hypothesis 




Trace .666 30.909 2.000 31.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .046 .750 2.000 31.000 .481 
Table A.3.8 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 6. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 26.694 1 26.694 12.416 .003 
Centr * Shared 1.556 2 .778 .362 .702 
Error(Centr) 32.250 15 2.150 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared 
Structure 3844.667 2 1922.333 27.737 .000 
Error 1039.583 15 69.306 
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Table A.3.9 F 1 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 7. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .750 46.501 2.000 31.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .046 .752 2.000 31.000 .480 
Table A.3.10 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 7. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 191.890 1 191.890 19.553 .000 
Central * 
Shared 7.233 2 3.616 .368 .698 
Error(Central) 147.209 15 9.814 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
f . h a [ ! d 5841.360 2 2920.680 42.157 .000 Structure 
Error 1039.206 15 69.280 
226 
Table A.4.1 F<i ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 8. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
t^!!? 3.126 1 3.126 30.445 .000 Structure 
Shared* List 2.083E-02 1 2.083E-02 .203 .657 
Error(Shared) 2.259 22 .103 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
List 5.208E-03 1 5.208E-03 .048 .828 
Error 2.368 22 .108 
Table A.4.2 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 8. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared 
Structure 1.021 1 1.021 275.577 .000 
Error 5.187E-02 14 3.705E-03 
Table A.4.3 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 9. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared Structure .647 1 .647 9.758 .005 
Error(shared) 1.525 23 6.628E-02 
Centrality .258 1 .258 7.823 .010 
Error(Centr) .760 23 3.302E-02 
Shared * Centr .252 1 .252 5.281 .031 
Error(Shared*Centr) 1.098 23 4.775E-02 
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Table A.4.4 F^ ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 10. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .456 9.205 2.000 22.000 .001 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .339 5.646 2.000 22.000 .010 
Table A.4.5 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 10. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 4.988E-02 1 4.988E-02 24.226 .000 
Centr * 
Shared 8.544E-02 2 4.272E-02 20.749 .000 
Error(Centr) 3.088E-02 15 2.059E-03 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared 
Structure .245 2 .122 50.844 .000 
Error 3.608E-02 15 2.406E-03 
able A.4.6 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 11 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .446 12.877 2.000 32.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .424 5.530 4.000 30.000 
.002 
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Table A.4.7 F, ANOVA (Shared structure) x (Centrality: central or less-central) of 
the scores from Experiment 11. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .498 15.869 2.000 32.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .277 6.145 2.000 32.000 .006 
Table A.4.8 F, ANOVA (Shared structure) x (Centrality: central or no-information 
given) of the scores from Experiment 11. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .482 14.907 2.000 32.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .412 11.221 2.000 32.000 .000 
Table A.5.1 F^ ANOVA of the frequency scores for the novel properties from 
Experiment 12. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 17.521 1 17.521 8.769 .007 
Central * 
Order 11.021 1 11.021 5.516 .028 
Error(Central) 43.958 22 1.998 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Order .521 1 .521 .029 .867 
Error 397.958 22 18.089 
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Table A.5.2 F-\ ANOVA of the conditional likelihood scores for the novel properties 
from Experiment 12. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .484 6.577 3.000 21.000 .003 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .059 .437 3.000 21.000 .729 
Table A.5.3 F, ANOVA of the frequency scores for the novel properties from 
Experiment 13. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 1.687 1 1.687 .250 .622 
Central * 
Order 15.187 1 15.187 2.248 .148 
Error(Central) 148.625 22 6.756 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Order 35.021 1 35.021 1.830 .190 
Error 420.958 22 19.134 
Table A.5.4 F, ANOVA of the conditional likelihood scores for the novel properties 
from Experiment 13. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .409 4.835 3.000 21.000 .010 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .434 5.369 3.000 21.000 .007 
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Table A.5.5 FT A N O V A (Centrality) x (Shared structure: rhinos or mice or falcons) 
of the conditional likelihood scores for the novel properties from 
Experiment 13 . 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .352 5.967 2.000 22.000 .009 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .200 2.751 2.000 22.000 .086 
Table A.5.6 A N O V A of the frequency scores for the novel properties from 
Experiment 1 4 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 2.970E-02 1 2.970E-02 .033 .856 
Centr * 
Order .644 1 .644 .719 .401 
Centr * Freq. 
cond. .377 2 .188 .210 .811 
Centr * order 
* Freq. .377 2 .188 .210 .811 
cond. 
Error(Centr) 41.230 46 .896 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Order 99.704 1 99.704 3.738 .059 
Freq. 
cond. 46.293 2 




94.869 2 47.434 1.779 .180 
Error 1226.855 46 26.671 
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Table A . 5 .7 FT ANOVA of the conditional likelihood scores for the novel properties 
from Experiment 1 4 . 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .309 7.297 3.000 49.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 




Trace .241 5.200 3.000 49.000 .003 
Table A.5.8 ANOVA (Centrality) x (Shared structure: rhinos or mice or falcons) 
of the conditional likelihood scores for the novel properties from 
Experiment 14 . 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .280 9.698 2.000 50.000 .000 
Centrality Pillai's 





Trace .078 2.101 2.000 50.000 .133 
Table A.5.9 Fi ANOVA of the frequency scores for the novel properties from 
Experiment 1 4 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 23.784 1 23.784 4.778 .034 
Centr * Freq. 
cond. 3.045 2 1.522 .306 .738 
Centr * 
Order 2.131 1 2.131 .428 .516 
Centr * Freq. 
cond. * 6.319 2 3.160 .635 .535 
Order 
Error(Centr) 228.989 46 4.978 
232 
Table A.5.10 Fi ANOVA of the conditional likelihood scores for the familiar 
properties from Experiment 14. 
Hypothesis 
Effect Value F df Error df Sig. 
Centrality Pillai's 








Trace .718 41.635 3.000 49.000 .000 
)ble A.6.1 FT ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 15 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Hypothesis 








Trace .160 .914 4.000 42.000 .465 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
List 23.250 2 11.625 1.732 .201 
Error 140.917 21 6.710 
Table A.6.2 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 15. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared 
structure 291.000 2 145.500 80.833 .000 
Error 27.000 15 1.800 
Total 4736.000 18 
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Table A.6.3 Properties used in Experiment 16. 
Triple # Property Names 
HSSS LSSS LSDS 
1 Tismine Pirtine warkine 
2 Terone Maldone quazone 
3 Perrain Trypain strylain 
4 Trolone Panctone zylone 
5 Fermain Saltain papain 
6 Trypsine Kermine sufine 
Table A.6.4 FA ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 16. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 




Trace .113 1.845 2.000 29.000 .176 
Table A.6.5 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 16. 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
S h a r e d 6 8 . 7 7 8 2 34.389 23^808 .000 
structure 
Error 21.667 15 1.444 
Total 10078.000 18 
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Table A.7.1 FT ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 17. 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Centrality Pillai's 
Trace .381 12.911 1.000 21.000 .002 
Shared Pillai's 




Trace .459 8.476 2.000 20.000 .002 
Table A.7.2 F 2 ANOVA of the scores from Experiment 17. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Centrality 943.862 1 943.862 34.826 .000 
Centr * 
Shared 619.316 2 309.658 11.426 
.000 
Error(Centr) 569.140 21 27.102 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Shared 
structure 4185.873 2 2092.937 17.559 .000 
Error 2503.118 21 119.196 
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Table A.8.1 Mean (SE) Centrality and inductive strength estimates for study on 
wingless Falcons versus wingless chicken. 
Centralitv Task 
Chickens 5.13 (.32) 




Note. In both tasks a 0 to 100 scale was used. For the centrality task, higher 
estimates indicate higher centrality ratings for the property wings. For the induction 
task, higher estimates indicate higher likelihood ratings for the possibility of a 
wingless species. Wings were rate marginally more central for falcons than for 
chicken (t(36)=1.95, p<06). The possibility of wingless falcons was rated significantly 
less likely than the possibility of wingless chickens (t(36)= -2.32, p<.05). 
Table A.8.2 Proof that a negative centrality model can capture negative centrality 
effects. 
Assume that, 
The overlap between the base and the target with respect to the dependent 
properties (BandT, d-on) is constant a, where 0<a<1. 
So, amount of non-overlap (Band~T, d-on) will be 1-a, where 0<1-a<1 
Say c + and c" are two non-negative constants that stand for the number of 
dependent properties of the candidate feature in the base. In a sense, these 
reflect the maximum number of properties the target can share with the base. 
c + - c" > 0 because, by definition, more properties depend on the central 
feature. 
Then, the effect of centrality for the central property is, a c + - (1 -a) c + 
and the effect of centrality for the less central property is, a c" - (1-a) c" 
So, the centrality effect is, 
[a c + - (1-a) c +] - [a c - (1-a) c ] = a (c + - c") - (1-a) ( c + - c ) 
CE > 0, when a (c + - c") > (1-a) (c + - c") 
when a > 1-a, (dividing by common factor) [ c + - c">0, assumption] 
when .5 < a < 1. 
So, CE < 0 when 0< a < 5 
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Contents of the accompanying floppy disk 
The floppy disk accompanying this thesis contains the following 15 MS Excel files 
(compatible with version MS Excel 97 or MS Excel 5.0/95 for Windows). 
File Name 
Chapter II, Experiment 1 
Chapter II, Experiment 2 
Chapter III, Experiments 3 & 4 
Chapter III, Experiments 6 & 7 
Chapter IV, Experiment 8 
Chapter VI, Experiment 9 
Chapter VI, Experiment 10 
Chapter VI, Experiment 11 
Chapter V, Experiment 12 
Chapter V, Experiment 13 
Chapter V, Experiment 14 
Chapter VI, Experiment 15 
Chapter VI, Experiment 16 
Chapter VII, Experiment 17 
Similarity data for Experiments 6,1, 10, & 11. 
Each of these files contains information that produced the statistics connected with 
one or more Experiments. The information of each file is self explanatory. The file's name 
indicates the Chapter, and the Experiment number (e.g. "Chapter II, Experiment 1"). The 
sheet labels within a file (presented at the bottom of each Excel sheet) indicate how the data 
were organized (e.g. "DATA FOR Ss"). The variables within each file are illustrated clearly, 
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